File No. 600.119/2918
The British Ambassador (
Spring Rice) to the Counselor for the Department of State (
Polk)
Washington,
August 11, 1917.
[Received August 13.]
My Dear Polk: You
spoke to me this morning about the telegram which Crawford showed
you yesterday on the subject of the restriction of neutral exports
to Germany. I understood from Crawford that
doubts were raised as to certain points in this telegram, and I am
trying to clear these points up with the Foreign Office by cable. It
may perhaps be best, in these circumstances, to postpone putting
this telegram on record until these points are cleared up.
I am, however, now in a position at least to put clearly the point of
principle regarding our willingness to go as far as you in the
directions we have suggested and to revise our existing agreements
with neutrals where such revision is necessary. In order to have
this definitely on record, I have written the enclosed official note
which embodies the most important part of the telegram.
The points remaining to be cleared up are ones of procedure and I
have indicated them at the end of the penultimate paragraph of
[Page 921]
the enclosed note. The
main point raised by the telegram is that Denmark and Holland sent
us 40,000,000 sterling worth of food last year, that we are willing
to forego all this food except the Dutch margarine which we now get
in return for Dutch imports of various oils and fats, but that if it
is cut off from us before Denmark and Holland give way to our
proposed demands, it will probably be diverted to Germany, and we
therefore doubt whether it is wise, not from the point of view of
maintaining our own food supplies but from the point of view of
restricting those of the enemy, for us to invite such retaliatory
action by appearing too prominently in the initial step of
presenting the proposed demands to these neutrals, however strongly
and completely we are prepared to support you in those demands. I
hope it may be possible to give this point the most careful
consideration, and, if you think there is something in it, you will
perhaps be able to suggest some method by which we can identify
ourselves with your policy without weakening the first step you
take.
Yours sincerely,
The British Ambassador (
Spring Rice) to the Secretary of
State
Washington,
August, 1917.
Sir: In the memorandum presented to
the Department of State under date of June 14,2 I had the honour to make, under
instructions from my Government and at the invitation of the
United States Government, various suggestions as to the trade
policy to be pursued towards neutral countries contiguous to
Germany. A question having been recently raised as to the extent
to which His Majesty’s Government would be in a position to
identify themselves with such a policy in view of their past
negotiations and agreements with the Governments and nationals
of these neutral countries, I have been instructed to make the
following statement to the Government of the United States:
In order to secure the objects set forth in the
memorandum of June 14, His Majesty’s Government are
prepared to act concurrently with the United States in
stopping the export from their territory to Norway,
Sweden, Denmark and Holland of all the more important
commodities such as foodstuffs, fodder, metals, oils,
lubricants and fertilizers and in enforcing by these
means the demands to be made upon the neutral
Governments concerned. They are prepared to modify or
terminate any existing agreement which, in
[Page 922]
the view of
the United States Government after conference with His
Majesty’s Government, is calculated to hinder the
adoption of this policy, without securing special
counterbalancing advantages to those associated in the
war against Germany. It is on the basis of full identity
of policy and responsibility with the Government of the
United States in dealing with this particular problem
that they desire to urge the importance of early action
on the lines already discussed and my Government would
be glad to arrange with yours how the diplomatic action
of the two Governments may best be made to correspond
with this identity of policy and responsibility, which
appears to be called for by the circumstances of the
case.
My Government inform me that further and complete instructions
are now on the way to me explaining fully the military, naval
and political considerations on which they have based their
conclusions, as well as the precise extent of the embargo which
they are in a position to impose so soon as an understanding has
been reached with the Government of the United States.
I have [etc.]
