File No. 763.72/4612
The Minister in Chirm ( Reinsch) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 12.]
Sir: In connection with my Nos. 1429 of March 281 and 1448 of April 13,2 I have the honor to submit a brief résumé summarizing the essential features in the development of the diplomatic situation after February 8, the date of the Chinese protest against the German submarine warfare issued in response to the American invitation. On February 13 his excellency Lu Cheng-hsiang called on me and stated that the Chinese Government was being strongly urged by Japan to commit itself to a war policy; that there was considerable opposition to such a policy in the interior of China; that particularly among the Mohammedans of western China the danger of an uprising appeared imminent. He asked me what financial assistance China could expect from the United States in order to enable her to face this danger. I stated to him that the matter had already been submitted to the American Government for its decision. Mr. Lu then informed me that he considered China, before committing herself to the war, should endeavor to obtain such assurances from the Allies as would guarantee her financial independence.
On the same day Mr. Lu had interviews with the British, French, and Russian Ministers; in these he stated that the Chinese Government could not undertake the responsibility of taking any further steps in the direction of war without having the assurances of the powers that they would allow China certain financial benefits, particularly the postponement of the Boxer indemnity installments during the remainder of the war, and ah increase of the customs duties to which China is entitled by treaty. He added that it would also [Page 442] be necessary to cancel the agreement for the exclusion of Chinese troops from Tientsin. Mr. Lu acted as the unofficial representative of the Premier. The fact that the suggestions were first taken up with the European Allies indicates the desire to avoid committing the conduct of Chinese foreign affairs to the hands of the Japanese. If, however, hopes had been entertained that assurances would be immediately obtained from the European Allies, such expectation had to be given up as they could not act without more general consultation. On the next day, therefore, Mr. Lu submitted the same suggestion to the Japanese Minister as well as to the Belgian and Italian representatives.
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On March 2 Mr. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao came to see me and asked me many leading questions, all of which gave me to understand that he was determined to push the Premier into a war policy and that he was confident of his success in this effort. Thus he asked me whether I did not believe that it would be wise and safe for China to enter the war if she should receive adequate assurances on the matter of financial support and the independence of her military establishment. Thereupon he stated that China had such assurances, including specifically oral assurances on the part of Japan that no control would be asked over the Chinese military system. He asked me whether such oral assurances were sufficient, to which I replied that the recipient of such assurances must form his own opinion as to their sufficiency. …
On March 3 the Cabinet decided to break off diplomatic relations and practically to endorse a policy looking to entry into the war.
On March 4 the President objected to such action being taken without reference to Parliament. This opposition led to Tuan’s flight to Tientsin, already reported on. Upon his return from Tientsin on March 7 I had an interview with the Premier in which he stated that China would not commit herself at the present time to a policy of declaring war.
On March 10 Parliament approved of the breach of diplomatic relations, which was notified to the representatives of the powers on March 14 as reported in my No. 1448 of to-day’s date, and in No. 1429 of March 28.
In the unofficial and official explanations of his policy, made to members of Parliament and to the Parliament in session, the Premier gave to understand that he was in possession of assurances from the powers which made it safe for China to take the step of breaking off diplomatic relations and to look forward towards taking further appropriate action.
After March 14 there seemed to take place a gradual cooling off in the war policy. It is apparent that this was due to the realization [Page 443] that binding assurances were as distant as ever. The loan of 20,000,000 yen seemed less attractive, when, instead of being made purely against treasury notes as was first intimated, it was found by the Japanese representative that after all it would be to the best interest of all if some security, namely the land tax, were insisted upon. Efforts, however, to induce China to take a further step continued, …
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Towards the end of last week the representatives of the Entente powers agreed to suggest to their governments an answer to the Chinese proposals of March 14,1 which can not but be extremely disappointing and irritating to the Chinese and which will further accentuate the disappearance of the hopes aroused earlier by the Japanese representative. I am informed that these proposals include the deferment of the Boxer indemnity installments until the end of the war and the immediate increase of the customs duties by 30 per cent, as well as the withdrawal of the prohibition against stationing Chinese troops in Tientsin; but these concessions are coupled with the provision that all outstanding diplomatic claims of the representative nations against China shall be immediately settled. …
Under the circumstances, as set forth, it is apparent that the strongest motive which would now induce the Chinese Government and people to arraign themselves on the side of war against Germany will be found in the action of the United States, and the most natural policy for China would be to associate herself still more completely with American action. There are certain factors opposed to the war. My information leads me to believe that throughout the center and south of China the commercial classes are not favorable to taking any further step. This is due partly to the fear of the uncertainties inherent in war, and partly to propaganda on the part of the German merchants who still remain in China. I believe, however, that should war be declared, especially in association with American action, no serious opposition would subsequently be incurred from the above sources.
Another element is constituted by the southern revolutionists in Tang Shao-yi and Sun Yat-sen. These men seem to be determined to cause difficulties to the Government at any cost. They have declared themselves as opposed to war and state that they fear unrest and other bad consequences. It is possible that they might help to realize their apprehensions.
A conference of the representatives of the military governors has been called to meet in Peking on April 21. The main subject of [Page 444] discussion for this conference will be the policy with regard to Germany. Should the military leaders be willing to hold themselves responsible for the consequences in the provinces, it now seems likely that the Cabinet would then propose to Parliament a declaration of war against Germany. The Premier and the majority of the Cabinet are in favor of such a step.
There are herewith enclosed for your information certain articles from the Peking Gazette and the Peking Daily News, relating to the subject of this despatch, including an editorial dealing with the American declaration of war.1
I have [etc.]