File No. 868.00/94
The Minister in Greece (
Droppers) to
the Secretary of State
Greek Series
No. 154
Athens,
January 13, 1917.
[Received February 14.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith
the original and English translation of a document sent to me by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs in a covering despatch dated December
18, 1916.1 This is the official version of the
disturbances which occurred at Athens on December 1, 1916, and
contains a number of statements, about which I think that some
doubts may be expressed.
In the first paragraphs the point is made that the demand for the
surrender of Greek war material to the French Admiral was firmly
resisted by the Greek Government. This statement is correct so far
as the official reply is concerned, which was made by the Greek
Government toward the end of November. But this affair has a long
and complicated history. During the month of October a French
deputy, M. Benazet by name, had had various
friendly interviews with the King and it was understood between them
that as an offset to the surrender of the Rupel fortresses to
Bulgaria the Greek Government would place at the disposal of the
Entente forces in Macedonia a quantity of arms and ammunition. The
King in so many words promised this and agreed to the wording of a
telegram, which was transmitted by both to Paris, clearly indicating
his wish to make these deliveries. Later on, when it was discovered
that this act was unpopular, the Greek Government began to bargain
as to what amounts and under what conditions the deliveries should
be made.
On the day before the conflict of December 1, Admiral du
Fournet was in conversation with the King and he
states positively that they came to an understanding as to his
bringing up marines from the French and British ships; these
preliminary measures were taken in the expectation that they would
render opposition to the surrender of the war material useless. No
rear conflict was thought of by the Admiral, as is shown by the fact
that the marines were furnished for the most part with blank
cartridges. At Roufos, halfway between Piraeus and Athens, the Greek
soldiers and officers fraternized with the foreign detachments,
offering each other cigarettes. A contingent of British marines was
dispatched from Phaleron to an abandoned powder magazine near the
cemetery at the northeastern
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extremity of the city. These men sat down to eat their lunch and
were in blissful ignorance of any coming danger. They also exchanged
some pleasantries with some Greek soldiers in the neighborhood and
were just finishing their lunch, when they heard firing. This
probably came from the hill of Philopappos, where a somewhat larger
contingent of French marines had been stationed. At once the firing
began at all three places, I am informed, simultaneously. The French
and British were hopelessly outnumbered. At the powder magazine
aforesaid, a machine gun was brought into play by the Greek soldiers
and the British either retired into the magazine or marched back to
Phaleron. The results of these engagements were, as near as I can
ascertain, as follows:
|
Killed |
Wounded |
|
Officers |
Men |
Officers |
Men |
| British |
0 |
8 |
0 |
30 |
| French |
4 |
51 |
0 |
150 |
| Greek |
4 |
25 |
4 |
55 |
The conclusion at which I arrive is, therefore, that the Greek
Government is technically correct in stating that it refused to
surrender the arms, but that Admiral du
Fournet, thinking that he had the King’s acquiescence,
ordered the British and French marines on the morning of December 1
to occupy certain places in the city, where they, entirely innocent
of any hostile intent, were fired upon by a very large number of
Greeks, who were mostly of the “reservist” class, i. e., not on
active service, and had hastily been armed the day before by the
Government. The statement that the British or French fired first, as
stated in the Greek official version, is not tenable.
A guard of French marines had been stationed for some weeks
previously in the Zappeion Park Building, not far from the Stadium.
These men were also fired upon by the Greek soldiers and took refuge
inside the building. A machine gun placed on a hill opposite was
worked murderously against them for some time, giving the building a
scarred appearance, as though it had withstood a regular siege. This
French force withdrew at night by arrangement between the King and
the Entente Ministers.
It seems to me quite clear from the orders given by the French
Admiral, as quoted in this Greek version, that there was no armed
opposition expected. The Admiral thought that pleasant words and
good manners would carry the day and found out only too late that
the warnings conveyed by outside parties were truer than his own
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unsuspecting optimism. The
fact that blank cartridges for the most part were furnished to the
landing parties goes to prove the same view.
As to the contention of the Greek official version that the
Venizelists took advantage of the conflict to incite a panic and
subvert public order, this is a question of great importance, which
requires a separate discussion.
I have [etc.]
[Enclosure–Translation]
The Greek Government’s official version of the
disturbances of December 1, 1916
After yielding to the successive demands made by the Entente, the
Royal Government, out of consideration for public opinion and
the sentiment of the army, sent in two notes a categorical
refusal to the last demand of the French Admiral regarding the
surrender of arms. It was even signified that the Admiral’s
insistence and the idea of imposing this demand by force would
inevitably provoke a conflict. Nevertheless the Admiral ordered
the carrying out of the expedition against the capital, the
object of which was, according to the orders seized on a French
transport waggon, to occupy several points in the city,
barracks, and arms factories, in order to threaten the capital
and oblige the Royal Government to agree to the requirements
made.
The Royal Government always hoped that the Admiral, in view of
our firm resolution to resist every attempt to seize by force
the arms and guns demanded, would take into consideration the
results of such action. That is why it gave strict orders to the
troops to avoid all provocation, enjoining upon them not to be
the first to make use of their arms.
Already for some days the Allied aeroplanes had been flying about
the palace. Automobiles containing foreigners had been perceived
making reconnaissances about the barracks, the stadium, and
sundry important points of the city. Maps had been made by the
Allies, upon which were marked in different colours the public
buildings of the capital, the barracks, and the royal palace in
particular being noted. A plan of the town well drawn in squares
was to serve for the fire of the fleet and indications of sundry
movements, which were to be effected in the centre of the city,
had been distributed to the troops.
The morning of December 1 about 3,000 men had disembarked at the
Piraeus and marched in three columns upon Athens. They advanced
methodically, driving in or taking prisoners our outposts and
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seized the powder
factory and the engineers’ barracks. Towards 10 a.m. one of our
small detachments, which was withdrawing from the powder
factory, was assailed by the French. At 11.15 another small
detachment, which was at the observatory, was likewise attacked.
On the hill of Philopappos 70 Greek soldiers were suddenly
surrounded by three companies. The Greek soldiers were resting,
when they saw themselves attacked by the French troops without
having time to defend themselves. Four Greek soldiers were
killed by French officers, five others were wounded.
About the same time 400 Allied troops occupied the powder
magazine near the cemetery, capturing the five men of the guard.
At the first shots, heard from a distance, the Allied troops
were the first to open fire with rifles and machine guns upon
the Greek detachment of 70 men, which was opposite the powder
magazine. Finding itself under the fire of the Allies, our
detachment was obliged to defend itself by the bayonet and
dispersed the foreign detachment, of which 180 men succeeded in
shutting themselves up in the magazine. Meanwhile the firing
spread around the Zappion, behind which was a Greek detachment,
posted there for the defence of the royal palace. This
detachment had a field gun. About 2 p.m. this Greek detachment,
perceiving that the Allied troops shut up in the Zappion were
preparing to make a sortie and fearing that they were going to
attack the royal palace, gave orders to fire one cannon shot to
intimidate the aggressors. A fusillade commenced, but the fire
was arrested immediately, thanks to the intervention of the
commanders of the two detachments.
About 5 o’clock the sound of shots revived a general fusillade in
the Zappion sector. The Green commander, again suspecting an
attack of the Allied troops against the palace, ordered a few
rounds of cannon. Fortunately, strict orders were immediately
given and the fusillade ceased. During this interval Allied
warships fired about 50 projectiles of large and small calibre,
most of which fell about the palace. Several houses were damaged
and we had some civilian victims to deplore.
Towards evening the order to cease firing was given on both
sides. By an agreement between His Majesty the King, the Royal
Government and the Ministers of the Entente, it was decided that
the Allied troops should retire to their ships while the Royal
Government accepted to deliver six mountain batteries, instead
of the ten demanded in the Admiral’s note.
While these engagements were taking place, Venizelist agents,
wishing to take advantage of these circumstances for the
premeditated purpose of abolishing the existing order of things,
endeavoured to inspire
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a
panic in the city by firing shots from the windows and balconies
of several houses. This movement was quickly repressed and the
judicial authorities were instructed to take measures in the
matter.
Our losses in officers and men are important. There were 4
officers and 26 soldiers killed, and 4 officers and 58 soldiers
wounded, without counting the losses incurred in the suppression
of the sedition.
Complying with the orders given by the military authorities, our
soldiers avoided as much as possible coming to blows with the
Allies. Our troops showed the greatest discipline, because
although driven from the posts which they occupied, they
abstained from making use of their arms and did so only when
forced to defend themselves against the fire of the Allies.
It is strictly proved that our soldiers obeyed entirely the
orders they received, which were to maintain a passive attitude
and not to attack first in any case. The capture of our
soldiers, the occupation of our posts, the free passage of the
foreign detachments proceeding to the Zappion, the residence of
our troops amongst the Allied troops, are proofs that no act of
treachery was committed by our soldiers, who could easily have
dispersed the foreign troops during their approach to the
Capital.
Orders given by the French Admiral and seized among the papers of
landing parties, concerning the “demonstration” at Athens, say
literally that “force must not be employed except after a
summons to retire shall have been made to the troops,” and
further along: “Firing shall not commence, unless we should be
clearly menaced.” These orders prove once again that a simple
menace on the part of our troops was sufficient to provoke the
fire of the Allies. The order of the commander of the landing
parties also provided that “the detachment must establish
itself, if necessary by force, in the positions, the occupation
of which by our troops constitutes a menace against Athens.”
We note that the landing troops were supplied with 96 ball
cartridges and a certain number of blank cartridges per man, the
latter probably being intended to intimidate the Greek troops,
but which unfortunately could not help provoking a conflict.
The descent of the Allied troops upon Athens certainly could not
have been made with a friendly purpose. The installation of
these troops amidst our own and the orders given to them, which
did not exclude the employment of armed force, brought about
inevitably this sad incident, which our military authorities
sought to avoid by every means, recommending the Greek troops to
abstain from firing first and to show themselves excessively
conciliatory toward the foreign troops.
