Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

55. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, October 20, 1961.

You requested information on Castro’s present influence throughout Latin America. Attached is a one-page summary produced by our research department. They read a wide variety of Latin American newspapers as well as study intelligence reports and State Department cables. This represents their considered opinion at the present.

I have instituted a new survey to be conducted at five metropolitan areas where a similar sample of the population was taken in January (we sent you the results of this survey on February 23, 1961).² The five selected cities are Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. These have been selected because we have Regional Research Officers in the first three and there are adequate research facilities available in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. The January sample for these cities was 400 cases each, whereas the new survey will be 300 cases each to lower the cost without materially lessening the value of the results. The estimated cost for this follow-up survey is $7,000. The results should be available within thirty days.³

Donald M. Wilson

Attachment
Summary Prepared in the Research and Reference Service, United States Information Agency⁴

Washington, October 19, 1961.

CASTRO’S CURRENT STANDING IN LATIN AMERICA

Available evidence indicates Castro’s influence is declining in Latin America. Several factors are contributing to this trend. Activities of anti-Castro forces are increasing in several countries. The current U.S. policy of ignoring Castro is robbing him of “Yankee Imperialism” ammunition. And there is an increasing awareness of the possibilities of the Alliance for Progress.

The trend of events in Cuba and the heavy-handed actions of Cuban diplomats, coupled with the tone of Cuban statements addressed to the Latin American masses and the dangerous, sometimes violent, activities of local Castro supporters and Communists, have led the moderate elements to take action. The visible result of this new trend among the moderates has been an increasing number of anti-Castro organizations, more effective measures to control Cuban propaganda, and a subsequent decline in the attendance at pro-Cuban activities.

The decline in the “headline” war between the United States and Cuba shifted the spotlight to Cuba’s attitude towards the other Latin American countries. It was no longer evident that the battle was solely one between David and Goliath. This was dramatically illustrated by the failure of the April invasion,⁵ which made it clear to Latin American leaders and moderates that they would have to act on their own to fend off the onslaught of Castro-communism. This realization has gradually spread to all but the most radical groups.

Though some confusion still exists as to the precise scope of the Alliance for Progress, it is being looked to as an alternative to the Cuban approach. Some of the confusion appears to be deliberately created to serve the interests of particular groups, some conservative and some communist-inspired. Some local leaders are apparently convinced that their ability to prevent the growth of Castroism among the masses depends upon their ability to show that the Alliance can contribute to the fulfillment of their aspirations. Therefore, the failure of these governments to show tangible results and the failure of any reform movements, which could be attributed to U.S. failure to implement the Alliance for Progress, could act to revive the Cuban experiment as an alternative.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/61–12/61. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House on October 20 at 12:46 p.m.
2. Not found.
3. For the final survey, see Document 66. Additional information concerning the research related to this survey is in the National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research, Special Reports (S), 1953–1997, Entry P 160, Box 18, S–60–61 and ibid., Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Field Latin America (IAL) 1961 October–December.
4. No classification marking.
5. See footnote 3, Document 24.