Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

143. Letter From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the Special Assistant to the President (Schlesinger)¹

Washington, September 23, 1963.

Dear Arthur:

The international exhibit issue raised by Secretary Hodges with the President is not new.² It reflects a basic difference of opinion that has existed between the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Information Agency virtually since the inception of the Government’s exhibit program over nine years ago.

Despite the fact that from the beginning, the wording of both enabling and appropriation legislation, legislative history, and expressions of Presidential intent have clearly defined the purpose of the international exhibit program as psychological, Commerce sought to make of the operation a trade promotional venture. The Agency has consistently held that in consonance with the clear legislative and executive intent, it should be primarily psychological. Since the inauguration of the present Administration the officials of Commerce responsible for the operational aspects of the program have been in more substantial agreement with USIA. There are several reasons for the Agency position.

First, by its very nature, the large exhibition is a propaganda spectacular. Its psychological impact is implicit in its existence. When the exhibit is American, the host populace expects the unusual. Properly handled, the show becomes a propaganda instrument of superb visual force. Assembled haphazardly and without planned message content, it can be a source of disappointment, even ridicule.

The Soviets recognized the propaganda impact of the exhibition substantially before the U.S. Government officially took notice. The late 1940’s and early 50’s saw a crescendo of Soviet participation at international trade fairs, unopposed by any official U.S. effort. Even Red China got into the business ahead of the first American endeavor. Our absence was noted. In fact it was the rapid psychological success of the Bloc’s exhibitions effort that prompted U.S. Government entrance into the field. Several Congressional representatives, having observed abroad the results of Soviet efforts, urged President Eisenhower to propose legislation and fiscal support that would enable this country to compete. Congress responded and the program was born in the late summer of 1954.

Since then, we have frankly competed on the international trade fair and exhibit stage with the Communists, and whether we state so publicly or not, the sphere of competition has generally been propagandistic rather than commercial.

A second reason is closely akin to the first. The Communist nations are still intent on proving to the world’s developing nations that their system is best designed to make an industrial giant of a once backward country. Thus, the average Soviet (or Bloc nation) exhibit is characterized by massive arrays evidencing industrial might. Industrial display is for the Communist nations synonomous with their propaganda message. But America’s reputation as an industrial power is already made and little doubted abroad. Conglomerate arrays of our productive capacity achieve little propaganda impact that we have not already won many times over. Instead, we find ourselves in need of proving such theses as: (1) the aspirations we enjoy in common with peoples of the country hosting the fair at which we exhibit, and the concerted friendly manner in which America strives to promote our common goals; (2) the cultural accomplishments of American society; (3) the humanity, social concern for, and contribution of our economic system to our people; (4) the vitality, variety, and pre-eminence of our scientific achievements. A strictly commercial fair competes unnecessarily with the Bloc on ground we have already mastered, while losing by default areas of ideological competition we should seek to win. Only by conscious planning of the exhibit for propaganda impact do we reach these goals.

But there is still a third reason for the Agency position, grounded in legislative-executive intent and history. I have already alluded to the fact that Congress created the program as a weapon of ideological competition with the Communist world. Throughout the remainder of the preceding Administration, the propaganda intent of the international exhibit program was reaffirmed by: (a) Congressional re-enactment and refinement of the original legislation (in PL–860 of August, 1956—the “International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act”);³ (b) Executive Order 10716 of June 17, 1957;⁴ (c) Bureau of the Budget Report No. MO-60-100, entitled: “Survey of U.S. Overseas Exhibit Activities” issued in the summer of 1960;⁵ and (d) Executive Order 10912 of January 18, 1961.⁶ Congress has for nine years appropriated funds for this program with the express understanding that the money was being used for the attainment of propaganda objectives abroad. Its consistent use for other purposes would be a technical illegality, and most certainly would cause Congress to reassess the validity of making any further appropriation under this legislation. Congressional reaction to such misuse has now been made doubly certain by the fact that Commerce has sought and obtained, under a different authority and separate appropriation, funds for trade fairs of a strictly trade promotional character.

Early in the spring of 1961, discussions that Ed Murrow and I held with Fred Dutton (then in the White House)⁷ reaffirmed the psychological purposes of program, while reasserting USIA authority and responsibility for it. The climax of this reaffirmation, however, occurred during Fiscal Year 1962:

(a) On August 11, 1961, the President addressed a letter to Ed Murrow reasserting this authority for coordination of the International Exhibits Program and strongly emphasizing the program’s propaganda purpose (copy attached).⁸

(b) On September 21, the President approved the so-called Fulbright Hays Act (Public Law 87–256), officially known as “The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961”.⁹ This Act, a codification and amplification of many existing cultural-psychological laws, replaced old PL 860, but incorporated and in some ways expanded all its provisions regarding U.S. participation in international exhibits. Again, the purpose of the Act is psychological impact abroad.

(c) Executive Order 11034 of June 25, 1962,¹⁰ delegates to the Director, USIA, the authorities of the Act concerned with fairs, expositions, and demonstrations held outside the United States. The letter from Elmer B. Staats, the then Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, transmitting the proposed Executive Order to the President,¹¹ specifically continued the responsibility of the Agency’s Director for coordination of the program as set forth in the above-mentioned Presidential letter of August 11, 1961. The corresponding appropriation measure is now known as the “Special International Exhibits Program”, or SIE.

Since the beginning of this Administration, most officials of the Department of Commerce directly concerned with this program have openly recognized its propaganda purposes and are making sincere efforts to reorient the exhibit staff in that direction. In fact, so clear is this recognition, that in its FY 1963 Budget Request, Commerce sought and obtained—under authority of its basic legislation—an appropriation separate from the Special International Exhibits (SIE) appropriation, specifically for the purpose of staging exhibitions at international fairs where the principal purpose is recognized to be trade promotion. Most fairs in Western Europe are now conceded to be of this nature. Fairs behind the Iron Curtain are generally recognized by State, USIA, and Commerce as being held primarily for psychological impact. Such is the case with the fair at Brno, Czechoslovakia,¹² about which Secretary Hodges spoke to the President.

Sincerely yours,

Donald M. Wilson¹³

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Files, Subject File 1961–1964, Box WH–12, International Expositions and Trade Fairs. Limited Official Use.
2. In a September 11 letter to Hodges, the President requested the following “That you undertake an interdepartmental review of this problem [the need for government policy on international expositions and world fairs being organized In the United States], with special emphasis on plans for 1975–76;

   “That the first purpose of such a review would be to establish an accurate catalogue of American cities with existing plans for world fairs;

   “That the larger purpose would be to develop an exposition policy to help the Federal Government exercise selectivity over competing American cities with world’s fair aspirations;

   “That, in the latter regard, the possible use of a device such as a Presidential Commission which was employed in 1959 to determine the site of the 1964–65 world’s fair should be considered; and

   “That such a review should include recommendations on the foreign relations aspect of these fairs and expositions, including the attitude of the U.S. to the BIE, possible membership therein, and the feasibility of reserving six months for the 1975–76 period for an officially-approved exposition in which BIE nations might participate.” (Ibid.) Hodges’ reply was not found.

3. See footnote 7, Document 2.
4. For the text of Executive Order 10716, “Administration of the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956,” signed June 17, 1957, see 22 Federal Register 4345, June 20, 1957.
5. Not found.
6. For the text of Executive Order 10912, “Amending Executive Order No. 10716 of June 17, 1957,” see 26 Federal Register 509, January 20, 1961.
7. Not further identified.
8. Not attached; printed as Document 45.
9. See footnote 2, Document 52.
10. See footnote 4, Document 84.
11. Not found.
12. Hodges visited the Brno trade fair on September 8. (“Hodges at Czech Fair,” The Washington Post, September 9, 1963, p. B21)
13. Wilson signed “Don” above his typed signature.