122. Memorandum From the Agency Planning Officer, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (McKnight) to the Director (Murrow)1
SUBJECT
- Agency’s Lack of “Memory”
A memorandum listing some of the major problems the Agency faces (as I see them) is en route to you.2 Its purpose is to try to establish some order of priority among them, to the end that they may be tackled systematically.
However, as I say in that memorandum, there is one problem I consider of such overriding importance that I wish to put it before you separately.
This is the fact that the Agency does not sufficiently bring to bear on the problems of the present and future the experience of the past.
This is partly—perhaps chiefly—because its “memory” is not good. If we do indeed read the minutes of the last meeting (and not all of us do), we quickly forget them. And when we want to call them back to mind, we have no easy way to do it.
The written record is, often, hard to come by. It has not been very well kept, for one thing: not until you directed Oren Stephens to undertake the job, so far as I know, was there any methodical effort to write the history of the Agency. Such documents as exist are scattered through countless files; and the keepers of those files are usually our lower-grade employees, uninterested in their contents and so unlikely to be able to jog our memory. For this, we are largely dependent on the failing recollections of our oldtimers; and these usually are not at hand at the time we need them.
I feel very strongly that we shall not be able to see where we are going, or even where we want to go, unless we see clearly where we have been, and along what roads, and how far, we have come.
[Page 319]I know that this problem has been much on your mind: witness your instruction to Oren. I know that Oren himself has done much thinking about it. I know that Bill Grenoble is concerned that training does not take sufficient account of the lessons of the past.3 I know that IOA has people looking into data retrieval and other uses of the new electronic techniques.4
Withal, I think the problem of such importance that I suggest it be tackled with all urgency.
Recommendation: That IOA and/or IRS be directed to arrange for a study of the problem, with a view to proposing a solution or solutions. This study might be undertaken by our own people. Or it might be contracted to an outside entity knowledgeable in the field. Or the study group might be a combination of both.
I should expect that the group’s recommendations might, int. al., include some or all of the following:
1. Consolidation of all files (now scattered through two or three dozen elements of the Agency) in one place, IRS or the Secretariat.
2. A thorough winnowing of the files to get rid of the chaff (most of it), keep the grain. (Program people would have to supervise this.)
3. Extensive indexing and cross-indexing, under the direction of an experienced librarian.
4. Foreshortening of the IRS timetable for getting into electronic data processing, retrieval, and analysis; and earmarking for this purpose of considerably more than the $50,000 yearly set out in the May, 1962, five-year projection.
Solution of this problem will, of course, be vastly facilitated by solution of another you are working on: our sore need for our own building, especially designed to fit our needs, and big enough to house all domestic elements of the Agency.
For one thing, that would let IRS bring together in one place its library, now scattered among several buildings. If this comes about, I should like to see the library put on the ground floor of the building, and made into a real showplace. In the areas of the Agency’s special interests, the library now constitutes perhaps the best collection of materials in the United States, if not in the world. Properly organized and housed, it could become a Mecca for serious students (especially [Page 320] for visiting foreign ones) in the field, and so a standing advertisement for the Agency.
Solution of the problem is of course not easy.
This memorandum was submitted in draft to Lew Schmidt. Since I knew that IOA had done some work in the field, I wanted to be sure that he thought the problem one worth putting before you. Agreeing that it was, he had this to say:
“I am not convinced that what is being done on the subject of Agency ‘memory’ is adequate. As a matter of fact I set up a small task force over a year ago to make a preliminary study as to how ADP might be applied to Personnel information. The purpose of this group was to study the possibility of establishing on electronic equipment a ‘memory’ of certain factual material on the collective judgments of Agency officers, particularly those in the Foreign Service.
“So far we have not progressed beyond the factual data step. The reasons are three fold: (1) The absence in the Agency now, or in the immediately anticipated future, of the type of equipment necessary; (2) the truly Herculean task of reducing to agreed-upon personnel judgments the material to be placed in our electronic brain; and (3) the cost involved both in money and in personnel in obtaining, utilizing, and developing systems for such equipment.
“I have not mentioned another factor, which is the existence of some entrenched opposition to the use of automatic data processing equipment for the storing of such information. The latter can be overcome but impedes the achievement of the various steps in the process.
“I am one who believes that within reasonable limits this collective judgment can be brought to bear both in the personnel and the substantive program field sufficiently to record usable material in an electronic memory system. There are many who do not. When you get into this subject, you immediately find that it is not a simple matter of stating historical facts. Even recent history is subject to a tremendous variation of interpretation, depending upon whose memory is being tapped. Collective judgment even on recent ‘historical facts’ sometimes requires extensive argument and compromise.
“I believe we should go ahead, but before we do, we must realize that the task will involve months and perhaps a year or two of preparatory work. It should involve the full time of a small staff of the Agency’s best senior officiers. And it should not be undertaken unless we are prepared to undergo the expense either of acquiring the necessary equipment, or of participating in a lease arrangement with some central [Page 321] servicing organization that makes a business of using ADP equipment on behalf of contracting agencies and organizations.5
“Finally, utilization of the system will not be accomplished without additional personnel. The history of the use of these machines has proven that we may “live better organizationally but not that we will live more cheaply.”
- Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 11, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1963. No classification marking. There is no indication who drafted or cleared this memorandum. In the upper right corner, Murrow wrote his initials, “ERM.” Above and to the right of Murrow’s initials, Harris wrote his initials, “RH,” and the date, “5/2.” At the top of the page is a typewritten note that reads: “E.R.M tel. conv. with Mr. McKnight 5/3/63.” Copies of the memorandum were sent to Sorensen, Schmidt, and Stephens.↩
- Not found and not further identified.↩
- An unknown hand, presumably that of Harris, underlined the passage: “Bill Grenoble is concerned that training does not take sufficient account of the lessons of the past.”↩
- In the right margin next to this paragraph, Harris drew a vertical line and wrote next to it: “Morgan, head of Foreign Service Inst. made same point today in speech. RH.”↩
- “I believe that the actual development of a system for ‘storing’ our material can be done on a contractual basis. The collection, synthesis, and evaluation of the material to go on the machine can be done only by Agency personnel with extensive experience and judgment.” [Footnote is in the original.]↩