Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

118. Address by the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson)¹

Denton, Texas, March 22, 1963.

USIA: A DIALOGUE WITH THE WORLD

For a short while this evening, I will have you at something of a disadvantage. During the next fifteen or twenty minutes, I shall be involved in what is essentially a monologue. I am supposed to talk and you are supposed to listen. (The married men in this audience will have long since adjusted to this kind of situation. And the single men might as well get some practice.) But when I finish my remarks, and we get into a question and answer period, my advantage will disappear.

In fact, the give and take of questions and answers will put us on reasonably equal grounds. Obviously, you will then be able to ask questions about matters that are important to you, matters which may or may not have been covered in my remarks. Furthermore, your questions will derive from your precise knowledge—or lack of it—concerning the work of the U.S. Information Agency; or, at the very least, they will be triggered by something I have said but did not develop fully.

So the exchange may very well prove to be more meaningful to you than my remarks. (But since no one could reasonably be expected to pass up the opportunity of an uninterrupted speech, I’ll persist in speaking.)

In any event, I have noted the contrast between a speech and a dialogue to establish a point that is fundamental to the operations of the Agency which I represent: that an exchange of views is more likely to result in successful communication between individuals—or nations—than is a unilateral exposition of one view.

It would be worthwhile, before I elaborate on this point, to define the role of the United States Information Agency. Because his is the best definition I have yet seen, I will quote Mr. Murrow: “We seek,” he said, “to make the policies and practices of this government and this people everywhere intelligible and wherever possible palatable.”²

There are some interesting aspects of this definition that deserve comment.

First of all, you will notice the very direct relationship between the foreign policies of this nation and the role of the Agency. For that reason, and more than ever before, the views of USIA concerning these policies are heard during the policy formulation process. In effect, we are increasingly able to make our views known before the policies we will be asked to make intelligible are actually established.

The second aspect of our role I want to call to your attention lies in the use of the word “intelligible” before the word “palatable.” There was a time, in the early days of USIA, when the emphasis seemed to be on the word “love.” For that matter, we Americans still seem to be curiously addicted to being loved throughout the world; we have a strange sense of disappointment when we find that not all people love all things American all of the time. “Gratitude” is another word that is brought into play when we try to assess the stance of foreign nations. Americans travelling abroad frequently ask our foreign service officers with whom they come in contact such questions as: “Are the people here grateful for our aid? Do they appreciate everything we’re doing for them? Are they aware of our generosity?”

It would be nice, of course, if slightly unreal, if all nations with whom we are aligned through pacts, common goals, or through common standards of international morality were indeed grateful for our efforts, or felt a warm surge of romance when the United States was mentioned.

It would be nice—but it would be relatively unimportant.

It is far more worthwhile, far more important to the attainment of our foreign policy objectives, to be clearly understood. Understanding is not an assurance of agreement, but it is an assurance of respect. You and I may argue over an important issue, but we will respect each other’s argument if we understand the reasons underlying it, the logic that created it. So it is with nations.

Our emphasis, therefore, in the U.S. Information Agency is to create understanding of our policies, not to play the role of Cupid. Strangely enough, cupidity—a derivative of Cupid—means avarice and greed, not love.

We seek, as I said earlier, intelligibility and, where possible, palatability. And it is these words which lead us back to my earlier comments about the dialogue. For no policy of this government can be made intelligible to people that we do not understand. We must know what motivates our audience; we must understand, and respect, the culture, the history, the aspirations, the national interest, the politics and the problems of the people to whom we address ourselves. With this as a basis of the dialogue in which we seek to engage, there can be—and frequently is—an effective exchange, an effective communication of views.

And it would all be relatively simple except for the fact that in the process of international communications, we come up against three hard and difficult realities.

The first of these complications is that we are seen so differently by so many nations that we cannot talk intelligently about the American image abroad. In each of the more than 100 nations where we work, there is a separate and distinct image of the United States. And why not? Each nation is itself separate and distinct and each has emerged from a distinct background, and each necessarily sees and judges others within its own frame of reference. Some of these nations are wholly literate; some are mostly illiterate. Many view us through the philosophic calm of Buddah or Confucius or through the philosophic detachment of Hinduism. Others are the inheritors of the Christian or Moslem faiths.

Within each of these nations, we may find ourselves speaking to communists, socialists or capitalists. And it is inescapable that the monarchist sees us differently than the Marxist.

The reverse of this coin is the second of the three major problems in international communications; we ourselves do not project a unified image of America. Which of our many voices is authoritative; which represents the real America; which the common denominator or the consensus?

To whom shall the foreign audience listen? To conservative American or liberal; to the northerner or the southerner; to the Democrat or Republican?

Is the Federal Government’s strong support of James Meredith’s entry into the University of Mississippi the true picture,³ or does the true picture really consist of riots and demonstrations and racism?

Hemingway, Faulkner, Frost, Whitman—do they speak for America? Or shall we be judged by the racy murder and sex writer whose works are found in the newsstands around the world?

The dialogue, you can see, is not nearly as easy to carry on effectively as it may appear at first glance. And we have yet to consider that third most pressing and omnipresent problem of all. I shall have more to say about it later, but let me note for now that we are faced with a worldwide propaganda campaign undertaken by the Soviet Union and the communist apparatus. This voice, by comparison is monolithic. This voice is not bound by truth nor is its audience exposed to an open society on view for the world to see.

This, I need not tell you, is a problem of some consequence.

How then are all of these problems, these challenges, met? Within the framework of these problems, how does the U.S. Information Agency undertake its tasks?

If I may continue for a moment to generalize, we do it in two primary ways.

First of all, we use all possible media in communicating with the nations and the people of the world. You are probably most familiar with the Voice of America, our radio complex which only recently nearly doubled its power with a new installation in Greenville, North Carolina,⁴ and which broadcasts 740 hours weekly in 38 different languages. We have a press service which radioteletypes 10,000 words a day to all of our posts, bringing them the important policy developments and policy statements. We have a films division and a television division which, together, reach tens of millions of people yearly. We use books and pamphlets, libraries, exchange programs, English teaching programs, and exhibits.

But most of all we use people, our people. For on nothing do we place a greater stress than on personal contacts by our officers in the field. Nothing that we say through any of the media can be really effective without these all-important personal contacts. It is these that produce the dialogue, and it is the dialogue that gives us a deeper insight into the people whom we are trying to convince. Conversely, it is the personal contact that gives these people a deeper and more accurate insight into America and Americans.

So it is the very essence of our operations that all of our officers devote themselves, first and foremost, to meeting and talking with the people who constitute our audiences.

We are, of course, selective in this audience. We have neither the resources nor the physical capability of reaching everyone. Instead, we single out those groups important to the present or future determination of the policies of their country; or those who can directly influence opinion in their country. We meet with the leaders of government, the opposition leaders, and the editors and publishers. We meet with the student, the teacher, the labor leader, the young intellectual—that group which is usually the core of ferment, particularly in the underdeveloped country.

In fact, we emphasize contact with the youth and labor groups, for recent history has demonstrated conclusively and dramatically the unique importance of these two groups, almost everywhere in ferment, looking for new answers to old problems that will no longer be put aside; and in many places capable of changing the course and destiny of their nations.

Now it is time to turn from these generalizations to some specifics and I should like to single out, for concrete examples, an area which I know has great interest for you—Latin America. More than anything else in recent history, perhaps, the problem of Cuba has drawn our urgent attention to the problems of all of Latin America.

It has also drawn the attention of the Soviet Union, whose propaganda effort in that area is significant in scope. Let me draw from my recent testimony before the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee⁵ to give you a quick picture of the Soviet propaganda effort in South America:

—In radio, the total Communist effort, including the Cuban, Soviet, European satellites and Chinese shortwave broadcasts, comes to 415 hours of broadcasting a week.

—In books, the Soviets alone have boosted their output of Spanish-language titles by more than 30 percent during the past year. In this past year they have put out some 1.5 million books, more than 40 percent of which were overt propaganda.

—In the field of periodicals, the Communists leave no audience untouched. Special magazines, generally well-produced, are directed at women, youth, workers, movie fans, and intellectuals.

—There are 326 Communist controlled newspapers and periodicals in Latin America.

—Students are a special target of Communist cultural activities, and this attention includes scholarships to study in the Soviet Union.

—There are films and speeches and seminars; and, through all media, the distortions and attacks on the policies of the United States.

So the number of images which already compound our problem are added to, if not multiplied, by Communist propaganda.

What then are we doing in Latin America? Here again, let me draw for you a quick but representative picture:

—Two years ago, the Voice of America broadcast in Spanish one hour a day, and not at all in Portuguese. Today we are on the air 12 hours a day to Latin America, nine in Spanish and three in Portuguese.

—This may concern you if you remember the figure of 415 hours of broadcasting a week by the Communists. But what I haven’t yet told you is that in Latin America USIA is placing 10,000 weekly hours of taped programming on 1500 Latin American stations that are heard in the cities, towns and villages of that continent.

—Through our cultural programs in Latin America, we give assistance and support to 119 binational centers in 19 countries. Within the walls of these centers, we teach English, arrange lectures, art exhibits, film programs, concerts, and courses in American literature and culture.

—We also maintain 11 regular USIS libraries and information centers which carry on active programs and are the locales for exhibits on such themes as the Alliance for Progress, U.S. space accomplishments, and the broken promises of the Castro regime in Cuba.

—Our press file is teletyped in Spanish to all posts except Brazil, which receives it in English and translates it into Portuguese. How is it used? In Mexico, to cite just one example, our post reports placement of 90 percent of the material in Mexican newspapers and magazines. Here again, the themes of this material range from the Alliance for Progress to Castroism, from American art to American science.

—In our publications program, we have produced and distributed, amongst other things, eight million copies of six cartoon books on the record of Castro in such fields as education, labor and religion.

—Motion pictures add still another dimension to our coverage of Latin America. We have a monthly film magazine covering the continent; we produce documentaries on the Alliance for Progress. We point up the failures of Cuban communism. These films are seen in commercial theaters in the major cities and the small towns; they are screened in special showings for diplomatic and leadership groups; we send projectors and our films to schools, universities and labor unions. In Brazil alone, our films are shown in over 2000 commercial theaters with a combined seating capacity of over 1.5 million people.

—USIA television covers Latin America, with an audience that runs to the tens of million. Television is a fast medium and it enables us to move rapidly and effectively. The chronology of the Cuban crisis provides a dramatic illustration.

You will recall that on October 22, the President made his address to the nation.⁶ Videotapes of that address with Spanish and Portuguese translations were air-expressed to all Latin American countries having videotape facilities. Films and kinescopes covered the rest. By October 26, just four days after President Kennedy’s speech, USIA had dispatched 30 prints each of a six-minute commentary on the crisis; a special report on the meeting of the Organization of American States; Secretary Dillon’s address to the meeting of economic ministers in session at Mexico City;⁷ the President’s special message to the Mexico City meeting, read by Secretary Dillon;⁸ the President of Mexico⁹ speaking to Cuba; and a 20 minute special report on the OAS meeting. Every evening during the crisis, a special five-minute commentary on the day’s events was air-shipped to our posts in Latin America. A TV documentary on Cuba went out with multi-language sound tracks. And our weekly TV news magazine covered events and highlights. This magazine, incidentally, has a regular weekly audience of over 10 million.

I told you earlier about our emphasis on youth and labor groups throughout the world.

In Latin America, we now have nine Labor Information Officers utilizing information techniques to build support for democratic solutions to Latin America’s problems, particularly as these solutions are embodied in the Alliance for Progress.

—At our Regional Service Center in Mexico City, a USIS labor editor assists in the production of publications targeted for the Latin American labor movement.

—In Caracas, we produce a bi-monthly labor magazine that has a circulation of 30,000 and which President Betancourt praised for its usefulness in presenting democratic viewpoints and for its support of responsible leadership in the Venezuelan labor movement.

—We have six Student Affairs Officers attached to our USIS staffs and 25 Student Affairs Grantees in Binational Centers. Their work, which ranges from the all-night bull session to promoting student peace-corps type operations and teaching English in the universities, is bringing the U.S. message to the Latin American students at the individual level.

—Our highest priority is given to our program to make important books available in Latin America in Spanish and Portuguese. One year ago, we contracted for 856,000 copies of 92 different books. During the current fiscal year, we have more than doubled our budget and have contracted for 1.5 million books. We have asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation that would give us an additional 2 million books; and this year we hope for still additional funds to permit this program to continue to grow.

These books, indeed all of our programs, are designed to further the goals of the Alliance for Progress, strengthen the sense of identity of interests and values between the United States and Latin America, and demonstrate that Castro-communism is not the answer to the economic and social problems of the Western Hemisphere.

Yet, with this look at our efforts, I have still not given you a complete picture of the work of the United States Information Agency, neither in Latin America nor the world. You will begin to see, I think, that we are involved in a serious and imaginative effort to make our policies intelligible and palatable. It is an effort we would have to undertake, in this complex world, even if we were not confronted with the threat of communism. That communism exists simply makes our work that much more imperative.

What does this work cost you?

This year, we are working on a budget of approximately $122.6 million and we shall go before Congress asking for a modest increase next year. Perhaps this figure needs some perspective.

In 1961, General Motors budgeted $141.5 million for advertising; Proctor and Gamble budgeted $132.7 million, and General Foods budgeted $105 million.

I would suggest that the U.S. Information Agency is not working on an inflated budget.

USIA is in a serious business; the business of making our nation respected and understood; of lighting beacons of hope for freedom and progress; of pursuing freedom and progress for all men everywhere. I believe victory will be ours ultimately; but it will not be ours easily.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director; Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials; 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 37, Donald M. Wilson Speeches, 1961–1969. No classification marking. The text of the address is USIA Release No. 10, prepared in the Office of Public Information. Wilson delivered this address at the annual banquet of the Southwestern Journalism Congress.
2. Wilson is quoting Murrow’s statement made during the March 14, 1961, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing regarding Murrow’s nomination to be the U.S. Information Agency Director. See footnote 5, Document 8.
3. See footnote 2, Document 95.
4. The new transmitter complex opened on February 8. Remarks by President Kennedy, which he recorded earlier that morning at the White House, were broadcast overseas via the new transmitter during the opening ceremony. (“New Facility Gives ‘Voice’ Power Boost,” The Washington Post, February 9, 1963, p. A5) For the text of Kennedy’s remarks, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, p. 156.
5. Wilson testified before the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee the week of February 18 on the subject of the threat of Castro-Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere. McCone, Ryan, and former Prime Minister of Cuba Manuel de Varona also testified. (Congressional Record, February 21, 1963, pp. 2677–2678) The transcript of Wilson’s testimony was not found.
6. See footnote 2, Document 98.
7. Dillon delivered his address on October 23, 1962, in Mexico City at the OAS Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting, held to review the first year of the Alliance for Progress. He left the meeting early after being recalled to Washington by Kennedy due to the Cuban missile crisis. For excerpts of Dillon’s address, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 508–512.
8. Dillon read Kennedy’s message on October 23 immediately prior to delivering his own address. The President’s message in part explained the reason for Dillon’s early departure and also told the gathering of Finance Ministers from member states that “the future success of the Alliance for Progress will be the final vindication of the resolute course we are undertaking today.” (William L. Ryan, “Continue Alianza Parley, Kennedy Asks Ministers,” The Washington Post, October 24, 1962, p. C13; Paul P. Kennedy, “Dillon Reassures Latin Aid Parley,” The New York Times, October 24, 1962, p. 23)
9. Adolfo Lopez Mateos.