Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

102. Editorial Note

On December 28, 1962, the United States Advisory Commission on Information released its 18th report, covering the calendar year 1962. In his letter of transmittal addressed to Speaker of the House John McCormack, Commission Chairman J. Leonard Reinsch indicated that the membership of the Commission had changed during 1962, as President John F. Kennedy had announced the nominations of Clark Mollenhoff and Morris Novik to fill the expired terms of Mark May and Lewis Douglas and John Seigenthaler to fill the unexpired term of Jonathan Daniel. The President had also designated Reinsch as Chairman of the Commission. Reinsch noted that the Commission had met eight times during 1962, visited United States Information Agency (USIA) facilities in Washington and New York, and met with USIA Director Edward R. Murrow. In addition, Reinsch took a 5-week trip to Africa during the summer of 1962 to examine USIA operations there, and Novik visited several United States Information Service (USIS) posts in Europe. The transmittal letter is printed in Eighteenth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information, Letter From Chairman, United States Advisory Commission on Information Transmitting the Eighteenth Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information, Dated January 1963, Pursuant to Public Law 402, 80th Congress, House Document No. 53, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pages IX–XI.

The report began with an overview of USIA’s function:

“The U.S.–U.S.S.R. confrontation over Cuba in 1962 demonstrated once again to the world that Sino-Soviet aggressive intentions are worldwide. Berlin, the Chinese Communist invasions of India, Communist insurrection in South Vietnam and Laos as well as Cuba, are part of geographically separated incidents that illustrate potential threat, menace, and aggression. These events have made it clear to every thinking neutral power the true ambitions and intentions of international communism.

“For example, on October 25, 1962, in the midst of the Chinese Communist invasion of Indian territory, the embattled and disillusioned Nehru was finally compelled to say ‘we are getting out of touch with realities in a modern world. We are living in an artificial atmosphere of our creation and we have been shaken out of it.’

“The task of the USIA is to depict and document these ‘realities in a modern world’ to the peoples of the world; to unmask the true designs of Sino-Soviet communism. USIA must also disseminate information which will help strengthen the economic, political and ideological bases of national independence in order to help make impossible external aggression or internal insurrection and subversion from Communist sources. This is the meaning of the cold war for the total U.S. communications effort. And it is in this context that USIA has a paramount role to play.” (Ibid., pages 1–2)

The report summarized USIA performance during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and highlighted five Agency problem areas before analyzing USIA programs in Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Following an overview of USIA’s history and its broad role, the report turned to a discussion of the “changing missions” of the Agency:

“The changing missions that have been assigned to the foreign information program partly because of changing U.S. strategy, are reflected in the confusion attending the information program’s attempts to adjust to these changes.

“There have been periods when the Agency’s chief emphasis has been placed on ‘long-range cultural programs.’ And there have been other times when Agency policies, programs, and operations were organized primarily around short-range, tactical, day-to-day issues and the elimination of brush-fires. Both the objective reality of international conditions and the strict reality of the budget have affected the courses that the Agency pursued at any given time.

“In periods of intense crisis, such as in times of major U.S.–U.S.S.R. strategic confrontations, the USIA must perforce undertake important functions which are oriented around the work of the fast media and aimed at getting the American position to the people of the world. But, during inter-crisis periods that Agency’s emphasis has fluctuated sharply.

“The difficulty with these fluctuating strategies and missions has been evident in the buildup of certain operations, their drastic reductions or wholesale dismantling when conditions changed and then the long laborious need to rebuild them in one area or another when crises subside, Soviet competition increases, or relatively calm areas flare up.

“Confusion over the purpose and role can perhaps best be seen by examining the mere changes in name that have characterized the Agency’s central policy office during the past 10 years.

“In August 1953 there was an Office of Policy and Plans.

“By September 1953 this became the Office of Policy and Programs.

“In March 1957 it reverted to the Office of Policy and Plans.

“But in April 1958 it became an Office of Plans.

“And in August 1962 it was and remains at present an Office of Policy.

“During this period, in response to the views of different directors and different administrations, the Agency experimented with combining program and policy functions, planning and policy functions, abolishing ‘policy’ or abolishing ‘plans.’

“Perhaps such experimentation was inevitable as the foreign information and cultural programs attempted to satisfy the requirements placed upon them by conflicting views, by different directors, by competing ideas of its proper role and by the objective facts of national and international affairs.

“Throughout these years of changing purpose one other fact also has become evident. During the short history of the U.S. information program relatively little attention has been accorded to long-range planning and policy considerations.

“This Commission believes that the Agency should have both short-range and long-range objectives. It cannot escape the duty of acting as the government’s foreign public relations arm on a daily basis and especially in times of crisis. It has performed well and continues to perform well in transmitting daily foreign policy guidance from the Department of State and in converting it to daily propaganda guidance for the benefit of the fast media.

“The Commission suggests, however, that the Agency must also organize and staff itself to provide long-range, forward-planning that would encompass the most effective use of its information, educational and cultural programs.

“It has been said that creative men build private communications agencies, but that businessmen eventually run them. This Commission suggests that creative plans, policies, and programs are as important as effective executive management and administration. Both are necessary. But a balanced view of and attention to short-range operations and long-range forward planning are also both necessary.

“The occasion of the third major confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is a good time for the USIA and the U.S. Government to review the role of the ideological, information or psychological arm of the government. The purpose of such a review would be to further strengthen its assets and capabilities, shore up and improve its gaps and vulnerabilities, and introduce a strong, effective, forward planning operation which would provide new ideas and a more carefully studied long-range stability to the total U.S. communications effort.

“Another reason for the creation of a small forward planning unit, which as its first task might well start and conduct such a review, may be found in the criticisms of USIA.” (Ibid., pages 18–20)

Following discussion of USIA’s critics, forward planning, and world communications, the report presented the Commission’s conclusions:

“In summary, the Commission believes that the Cuban crisis opened a new phase in the cold war and placed new responsibilities on USIA.

“The Commission has considered the present role, functions and operations of the USIA. It suggests that five important problems require attention. They are:

“1. The need to improve management in USIA;

“2. The need to reduce the number of publications that are no longer useful;

“3. The need to initiate annual or semi-annual reviews of program output by committees whose membership would include outside experts on print and radio;

“4. The need to review the expanding programs in Africa and Latin America;

“5. The need for one USIA building in Washington in order to improve the Agency’s operating efficiency and management.

“This report has also included the major recommendations and observations of the Chairman’s report on Africa. In a continent of many nations, tribes and languages, the USIA cannot assume that techniques and material that have proved suitable in European or other areas are equally effective in Africa. The media support programs for Africa should be reviewed in order to assure that media products are tailored to the problems, interests and conditions in Africa.

“Latin America represents an important challenge that must be met. The entire economy is an explosive one. Population increases steadily. Demands to reduce poverty, ignorance and illness have increased. Such conditions are ripe for the Communist agitator and organizer. This must be understood by USIA in the context of the promise of the Alliance for Progress. Exposure of short and long-range Communist goals for Latin American countries especially as they were manifested by the Russian build-up in Cuba, is an additional task for USIA.

“The Commission is pleased to report that a reappraisal of the Agency’s programs in Western Europe has been initiated by the Director. Its purpose is to redefine the role of USIA in Europe in the light of the emergence of the European Community as a prosperous and powerful force in international affairs.

“The Commission has traced the changing role and mission of the foreign information programs during the past 15 years. These have fluctuated with different national strategies and with the experience and orientation of different directors who guided and directed the program.

“The Commission believes that the Agency has both short-range and long-range objectives. Although USIA has received national praise for its performance in the Cuban crisis, there is a need to develop longer range plans in the light of cumulative criticism of the Agency’s role and approach to the cold war and in recognition of the fact that the U.S.–U.S.S.R. confrontation in Cuba has opened a new phase of this war.

“The Commission has recommended that the Agency establish a high level forward-planning unit staffed with its most senior officers. This staff should deal responsibly with these criticisms and with the new challenges and opportunities ushered in by the recent crisis in Cuba and the Chinese Communist invasion of India.

“Finally, the Commission suggests that the implications and repercussions of TELSTAR, the American communications satellite, may be as far-reaching as the discovery of atomic energy and the explorations of space. It is important to the national interest that USIA exploit and develop this opportunity to the fullest. To do so effectively will require additional research into the opinions, attitudes, misconceptions, taste, and interests of foreign audiences.

“With the assistance, support, and understanding of the Congress, this new mighty instrument of international mass communications can be used to educate and inform the peoples of the world about each other. It will enable the United States to disseminate accurate and authoritative information about its policies, people, and intentions throughout a medium that will have a powerful impact on the peoples of the world. It will demonstrate vividly the goals of the United States and the achievements of free men everywhere.” (Ibid., pages 30–32)