Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay.
Peking, China, February 21, 1901.
Sir: I have the honor to confirm my telegram of the 18th instant and your reply thereto of the 19th, concerning the order of Count von Waldersee referring to the possibility of a resumption of military operations on a large scale because of the present conditions of peace negotiations, and to inclose a copy of the order as transmitted to me for information by General Chaffee.
There is little doubt that the order was intended as a bluff to frighten the Chinese into an immediate compliance with our demands, as it was given out that the operations contemplated a movement in force to Sian Fu, which is practically impossible and was never intended to be executed. But there has been a constant disposition upon the part of most of the military commanders to do something or go somewhere with their troops upon the flimsiest of excuses, so that during the winter a great part of this province has been gone over.
The probability was that under this order some kind of a movement would be made which might seriously disturb our present efforts at negotiation, frighten the court, make its return to Peking less probable, and jeopardize the final settlement. Having all joined in the peace negotiations, no single power has any right to pursue independent offensive operations. Such a course would disturb harmonious action and might at any time break the concert; therefore I have insisted with my colleagues upon the principle set forth in the following statement which I made to my colleagues in the meeting of the 18th instant:
It is currently reported that some of the military commanders are discussing the possibility of, and making preparations for, an early active resumption of military operations on a large scale, because of the present course of peace negotiations.
I do not desire in any way to criticise the military; but in view of the fact that all the governments have jointly entered into negotiations for a peaceful settlement, it is hardly competent for any of the powers to disturb the harmony, endanger the concert, or jeopardize the result of negotiations by resuming military operations without the consent of all.
I signed the joint note in which our demands were formulated under the express stipulation that it in no way committed my Government to further military operations. And the note was finally agreed to after the declared understanding that the last clause, which was added by our British colleagues, limited military operations to the occupancy of Peking and this province.
If this report as to proposed military movements proves true, and my colleagues are of the same opinion, I suggest that the ministers recommend to their respective military commanders or to their governments the postponement of any contemplated military operations until the arrival at such a stage in the peace negotiations as the governments agree will warrant their resumption.
I made this not so much as a protest against this particular proposed movement as against the assumed right of any independent action which might endanger the success of negotiations, and which several of the powers seem determined to exercise.
I have, etc.,