Mr. Day to Mr. Adee.
(For the President. Special.)
Secretary Moore has just sent telegram advising of Spanish reply received yesterday, translation finished this morning; also advised our intended course which I hope you will approve. As to negotiations preceding protocol there are sharp differences in some respects between Cambon’s reports as quoted by Spanish Commission and my memoranda of same conversations, which you remember were made shortly after each interview, submitted to you, corrected and transcribed in typewritten form, which I have with me. You can read in connection with this [the] correspondence leading to protocol, pamphlet publication. Copy in the Department of State if you have not one at hand. After delivery [of] our note [of] July 30 to Duke de Almodovar, Cambon came to White House August 3. They quote from his report:
I availed myself of this declaration to request the President to have the kindness to state as precisely as possible his intentions in regard to the Philippine Islands. On this point I told him the answer of the Madrid Government was drawn up in such way as to admit of all demands on the part of the United States and consequently of all kinds of apprehensions on the part of Spain in regard to her sovereignty. Mr. McKinley answered: “I do not want any misunderstanding to remain upon this subject, and neither of the two countries shall be the ones to be called upon to decide what are the permanent advantages we shall ask for in the archipelago and finally those to decide the intervention (contrô1e), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands;” and, he added, “the Government of Madrid can rest assured up to the present nothing against Spain has been settled a priori in my own mind, as I myself consider that nothing is decided against United States.”
My memorandum shows on same date, August 3:
Ambassador reported Spanish Government had received American answer; that it would be regarded by Spain as very severe, etc. French ambassador said there was a disposition to believe in Spain that United States intended to take the Philippine Islands group. That Government appreciated that reforms were necessary in the government; that American privileges be granted in the islands; but that Spanish suzerainty should not be interfered with was a matter that Spanish minister would insist upon. President answered that question of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Ladrones, and West India islands admitted of no negotiation; that the disposition of the Philippine Islands must depend upon the treaty that might be negotiated; and that he, the President, could not make any change in the terms heretofore submitted. The ambassador called attention to the wording of the note of July 30 as to possession of the city, bay, and harbor of Manila to be retained during the pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be done with them afterwards. President said that must depend upon the terms of the treaty. Ambassador inquired whether the United States had prejudged the matter of the Philippine Islands and the rights to be acquired therein by the United States. President said case has not been prejudged as far as concerns this Government or the Spanish Government. Whole matter would be left to the Commissioners for negotiation to be settled by the treaty of peace. In the meantime the United States would insist upon holding Manila as laid down in the note. Its disposition thereafter, as already said, would depend upon the terms of the treaty.
Spanish Commissioners then take up Cambon’s report [of] interview July 30 and our note of that date presented to him for transmission to Spain. Spanish Commissioners state Cambon’s report as follows:
The demands formulated in Article III, I [Cambon] said to the President, are apt to endanger in Madrid the success of this preliminary negotiation, especially if the word “possession” is retained in conjunction with control and government of the Philippine Islands, as it seems to put in doubt for this moment the sovereignty of Spain over that colony. You will notice the President of the Republic told me that [Page 956] his demands in Articles I and II admitted of no discussion. “I [the President] leave it to the negotiators to decide the question of the Philippine Islands.” Seeing that the President of the Republic was firm in not changing the terms of Article III, I made such an urgent appeal to his generosity as to secure his order to use the word “disposition” instead of “possession,” as the former does not prejudge the result of negotiations and has not the comprehensive meaning which belongs to the other word.
My notes show that at that time, July 30:
The President said that as to the Philippine Islands the note expressed the purpose of this Government, and their final disposition would depend upon the treaty to be negotiated by the Commissioners and ratified by the interested governments. Ambassador read the paragraph concerning the Philippine Islands and characterized it as harsh.
“These are very hard terms,” said the ambassador; to which the President inquired in what particular? The ambassador suggested, in regard to the Philippine Islands, that it might be the acquiring by the United States of all of them, to which the President replied, that would be determined by the treaty. The ambassador said that if it was a station or commercial base, that might be conceded by Spain. Ambassador added particularly that the word “possession” translated in Spanish in such wise as to be regarded as an expression of a severe, threatening nature, and suggested a change in that word. He suggested at first the word “condition.” [The] President said he would not change the word except for a word of similar import or meaning. The word “disposition” being suggested, after considerable talk the President consented that [that] word, not changing the meaning, might be substituted for the word “possession;” indeed, the word “disposition” was the broader one of the two and would clearly include “possession.” Accordingly the note was so changed without other change and was handed to French ambassador to be communicated to Spanish Government. These reports, not difficult of reconciliation, have less difference than reports concerning interviews of August 9, when the Duke of Almodovar’s note of August 7 was presented to the President.
They quote Cambon as follows:
Duke Almodovar: Again has it been at the White House, in the presence of Mr. McKinley and at his express request, that I have communicated to the Secretary of State the note of August 7 in which your excellency declares that the Government of Spain accepts the conditions imposed by the United States. This reading visibly displeased the President of the Republic and Secretary of State. After a long silence Mr. McKinley said to me: “I had asked of Spain the cession, consequently the immediate evacuation, of the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Instead of the categorical acceptance I expected, the Spanish Government addresses me a note in which it invokes the necessity of obtaining the approval of the Cortes. I can not lend myself to going into these considerations of an internal nature.” I [Cambon] observed that the Government of Her Majesty in complying with its constitutional duties did no more than follow the President, upon whom like obligations are imposed, and that in his reply of July 30 he had expressly reserved the ratification by the Federal Senate.
The Spanish Commissioners further quote:
President ended by answering Mr. Cambon, who questioned him as to the pledges of sincerity Spain might give, as follows: “There must be a means of putting an end to all misunderstanding. We might draw up a project which shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain in the same terms in which I have already framed them and which shall establish the terms within which there shall be named, on the one hand, the plenipotentiaries charged with negotiating the treaty of peace in Paris, and on the other hand, the special commissioners intrusted with the determination of the details for the evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico.”
Spanish Commissioners add the important comment:
Neither the President nor the Secretary of State advanced any reason for their displeasure other than the foregoing, and, according to Mr. Cambon, these gentlemen said nothing during the conversation respecting the said reservation made by Spain of her sovereignty over the archipelago, nor regarding anything else whatever, save the reservation of the Spanish Government as to the approval of the Cortes.
My notes show, as to that part in reference to the Philippine Islands:
While in one part it [the note of August 7] stated its acceptance, in another it seemed to retain the full right of Spanish sovereignty, with such reform, etc., as that Government might see fit to grant. President said that the text of the note was not satisfactory to the United States. Ambassador said allowance must be made for difference [of] translations and for the desire of the Spanish Government to express regret at the loss of its colonies; that he (ambassador) was very confident the intention was to accept in full the terms of the United States. He asserted that it was a full and unqualified acceptance of the President’s terms. It was then suggested that if this be true the best way to settle the matter was to put the terms in the shape of a definite protocol which the President would authorize the Secretary of State to sign for the United States; the ambassador to submit to the Spanish Government its exact terms and the answer to be had, whether yes or no. If the Spanish Government accepted the protocol that would end all controversy. Ambassador concurred in this view and said that if the protocol was drawn up in a definite form he would submit it to the Spanish Government, and if authorized would execute on its part.
Spanish Commissioners having heretofore asserted that Secretary of State at Washington, in note of August 10, admitted that Spanish note of August 7 contained in its spirit an acceptance by Spain of conditions imposed by the United States, in answering this we quote in full in our last memorandum my note of that date. Spanish Commissioners now say they correct former assertion, but had based it on a telegram from Mr. Cambon, of August 11, in which he said:
Duke: Upon transmitting to me the draft of the protocol, text of which I wired your excellency, Secretary of State addressed me a note which might be epitomized as follows: “Although the note delivered yesterday at the White House conveys in its spirit an acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by the United States, in its form it does not so specify with sufficient explicitness, owing doubtless to its having to be translated and put in cipher several times.” This note, [the] Spanish Commissioners say, led them into error, and they nobly comply with the duty of so admitting.
In framing our answer we shall maintain our version is taken from memoranda made by the then Secretary of State directly after the conversation, submitted to the President, by him revised, and then reduced to type-written form; and likewise correspond with the recollection of the interview now entertained by the President of the United States and the then Secretary of State. I shall be obliged for any comment you may see fit to make in reply hereto.