Mr. Stevens to Mr. Gresham.
Honolulu, March 15, 1893.
Sir: That the Department of State may fully understand the present status of affairs here, it is necessary for me to state as accurately as possible the practical working of the qualified and restricted protectorate which the United States officials are exercising here. We have never understood this practically to allow us to go much, if any, beyond the spirit and terms of Secretary Bayard’s dispatch to Minister Merrill of July 12, 1887, in printed volume of Foreign Relations of that year, page 581, and both the Provisional Government and myself have ever construed it as strictly within the limitations specified in Secretary Foster’s dispatch 71 of February 11, 1893, fully understanding that the United States representatives here shall not interfere with the sovereignty nor with the administration of the public affairs of these islands. This restricted protectorate has proved more necessary and beneficial than was fully perceived when assumed.
When the Hawaiian monarchy collapsed and the Provisional Government was instituted, there were corruptions and abuses wherever the palace power had exercised predominating influence in the selection of officials. Time was necessary for the eradication of these evils, for the creation of a reliable police, and for the organization and drilling of a small military force. Besides the English minister, for reasons indicated in previous dispatches, was bitterly dissatisfied that I had acted independently of him, landing the men of the Boston when they were imperatively needed, while there was then no British vessel here. According to what was anticipated might occur, not long after our restricted protectorate was assumed the British war ship Garnet arrived. It was then too late for the English minister to make effective any demand to land troops or to insist on dual action with the United States minister. Still more, the Japanese commissioner arriving here but a short time before the fall of the monarchy, and not fully understanding the situation, began to manifest a wish to land men from the Japanese [Page 416] war vessel in the harbor, and telegraphed Tokio via Saa Francisco, two days after the fall of the monarchy, for another war vessel, and February 23, as previously stated in my dispatch 88, one of the largest ships of the Japanese navy arrived here. But it was then too late for the intrigues and pressure of the English minister and the arrival of the increased Japanese naval force to intervene. It was found that the prompt American action had given so much moral support to the new Hawaiian Government that neither the Government nor the United States officials here would consent to any temporary dual or tripartite arrangement as to Hawaiian affairs.
Yesterday, the 14th, the British ship Garnet left for Vancouver, and to-day or to-morrow the Kongo, the smallest Japanese ship, will leave for Japan. There is no doubt that but for our protectorate, restricted as it is, the British minister would have insisted on the same right to land troops that he had formerly exercised here, while our action of February 1 and of the days preceding closed the door against complications, saved the Provisional Government from foreign pressure, leaving the United States complete master of the situation. The Japanese commissioner and naval commanders now fully recognize the Provisional Government by official and ceremonial calls, and their attitude toward this legation and our naval commanders here appear to be cordial. But I have learned positively and beyond all doubt that had not the monarchy here fallen and this Government had remained in its former condition of weakness, it was the intention of the newly arrived Japanese commissioner to have demanded the same political rights in Hawaii, including the voting franchise for Japanese, as, under the constitution of 1887, have been exercised by resident foreigners of Christian nations. I am equally convinced that with annexation to the United States the Japanese Government will attempt no pressure of this kind, that Government fully understanding that the United States is a reliable friend of Japan and that the Japanese subjects in these islands will be well protected should Hawaii come fully under the rule of the United States. While I say this I shall be allowed to express the opinion that there is occasion for keeping a sharp eye on Tokyo and British and perhaps other foreign intrigues there against our plans of predominance in the North Pacific.
I am, etc.,