Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, Nicaragua (Mosquito Territory)

No. 91.
Mr. Herbert to Mr. Gresham.

Navy Department,
Washington, August 15, 1894.

Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith copies of two communications, both dated Bluefields, Nicaragua, July 21 and 25, respectively received from Commander Charles O’Neil, U. S. N., commanding the U. S. S. Marblehead, relating to the political situation in Nicaragua.

I have, etc.,

H. A. Herbert,
Secretary of the Navy.

[Inclosure 1 in No. 91.]

Commander O’Neil to Mr. Herbert.

U. S. S. Marblehead,
Off Bluefields, Nicaragua, July 25, 1894.

Sir: (1) In my last letter I referred to the fact that I had addressed a letter to the Mosquito chief, inquiring if he felt able to maintain order and guarantee the protection of Americans and their property, and inclose copy (marked A) of his reply.

I had an object in procuring his views in the matter, being inclined to the opinion that they would prefer to have our men embarked and the British sailors on shore, and I thought I would manage to have him put himself on record and request me to continue our men on shore rather than to have him tell me later on that he did not wish them there.

Of course he speaks only through his council, in which are some Americans, and they are only too anxious we should remain; but leaving out the question of their wishes, I think prudence demands that they shall for the present stay on shore.

(2) In my first letter after the troubles broke out on July 51 stated that the attack on the Government house, in my opinion, had no connection with the affairs which followed and was simply the work of a mob; but as things leak out and are talked about I am led to believe that it hail been contemplated before, but was precipitated by the events of the dry, that is, the nonpayment and harsh treatment of the police. On that evening not only were Jamaica negroes out in force, but some white men, and they were in search of one Dr. Kuhun and one Higley, two Americans who had been identified for some time with the Nicaraguan commissioner, and who were very unpopular, and had they found these two men that night it would probably have fared badly with them. Some Americans were with the crowd that night, and are anxious to prove now that, though they had arms, they did not fire on the Government house.

(3) Immediately after the chief had issued his proclamation on July 6 an American named George B. Wiltbank was appointed magistrate by the Mosquito party, and he appointed as chief of police an American named Folks or Foulke. The latter, as soon as he was appointed, wrote a letter to the Nicaraguan soldiers stationed at the bluff, directing them to surrender, and this letter was taken down by the party that surprised and captured them, and is said to be in the hands of Nicaraguan officials at Rama. Foulke has just left the country, I understand, being of the opinion that it would not be a good place for him here if the Nicaraguans return. He is said to have given as an excuse for his actions the reason that, as chief of police, it was his duty to remove as far as possible any causes which might lead to trouble, and so, as a precaution, he proposed to remove the Nicaraguan soldiers.

(4) On the day the trouble broke out (5th instant) a young American named Williamson, in the employ of the Bluefields Banana Company, in a half intoxicated condition, went into General Cabezas’s office and flourished a revolver, declared himself “governor of Bluefields.” I am sure the general would have been justified in having him locked up for breach of the peace, but he let him go.

(5) At Principulca I am told by good authority that the Nicaraguan governor got alarmed and left, and that the Americans elected one of their number as governor and hoisted the American flag, but that since then a Mosquito official has been there and installed a magistrate.

(6) I mention these matters to give the Department a correct idea of how Americans have mixed in local matters, and it will, readily be seen how it complicates the situation. I think they are beginning to be thoroughly frightened, however.

(6a) Under Mosquito rule the planters hired or leased land at 3 cents an acre per annum for fifty years, and at present value of local coin their rental is 1½ cents per acre in United States currency. The Nicaraguans do not look with favor upon such leases.

(7) The inclosed letter (marked B) was received on the 24th from the British vice-consul, and seemed so urgent that I wrote a reply, saying that I would be glad to extend the same protection to such of Her Majesty’s subjects who had not been participators in political affairs as to our own people, and then hurried on shore to see what the matter was, and concluded that the vice-consul had become unnecessarily alarmed on account of a letter he had received from Rama.

That part of his letter in which he says: “What have we as foreigners to do with, this question?” is, to Bay the least, entertaining, as the foreigners seem to have been at the bottom of the whole business, and Her Majesty’s subjects are a pretty bad lot of Jamaicans, who are Mosquitos or otherwise, as suits the occasion. At first I thought they were working up a scare to get the British sailors on shore as soon as the Mohawk returned; but I think they were really alarmed, and my advice was, be neutral and remain tranquil.

(8) As the Department is aware, the chiefs Clarence, was brought here from Pearl Lagone some weeks ago by H. M. S. magicienne, and on July 3, just before the outbreak, the vice-president, Paterson, and attorney-general, Cuthbert, of the old Mosquito Government appeared on the scene, and it is thought that a coup d’ etat was to be made, but not expected so soon or in the manner it finally assumed.

(9) There are a good many waifs of all nationalities in the community here, cast up by the collapse of the Panama and Nicaragua canals, and they are ready for anything.

(10) This vessel will probably have to go somewhere for coal in three or four weeks, and unless there is a marked improvement in the situation by that time we ought to have another vessel here, unless matters are left to the British war ship for the time being.

(11) The United States consular agent at Grey Town has written to our consular agent here that there is a prospect of trouble there of a political character, and they, too, would like to have a man-of-war visit the port.

(12) Some of the Americans here who have accepted civil office under the Mosquito Government, such, for example, as members of the council, have asked me how it affected their status as regarded their own country, and I have said that, in my opinion, in ordinary times if the Mosquito constitution permitted aliens to be members of its council, and they chose to give their services in such purely civil capacities, I did not think there was any impropriety, if by so doing they could benefit the community in which they dwelt, but that in in times of political disorder they ran the risk of becoming entangled, and if they got into difficulty thereby they had not the same claim to protection as if they had taken no part, even though it be a civil one, in local affairs, and they become marked ineu and are liable to suffer in some way if the opposite side gains the ascendancy. They say they have great interests at stake, and so have many Americans, and it is only by taking part in such deliberative and executive bodies as are open to them that they can protect or have any say as to the management of their affairs.

(13) I believe that one of Nicaragua’s arguments against the Mosquito Government is that it has been subverted and has lost its identity as a purely local government by and for the Indians, having passed into the hands of Jamaica negroes and other foreigners, which is doubtless correct, and since the port of Bluefields has become so important and so much foreign capital, mostly American, has been invested in the country, the foreigners found the Mosquito Government dominated by Jamaica negroes—so inefficient and ignorant and unequal to keep pace with the growth of the place that they were greatly dissatisfied, as there were no competent courts, nor means for protecting commercial interests in a legal way, and all important matters had to be settled “out of court”—hence they felt it necessary for their own protection, when the way was open for them to sit in the council, to do so.

(14) July 26. H. M. S. Mohawk has returned from Port Limon and brings me a telegram dated the 19th instant, from United Spates Minister Baker, at Managua, to the effect that Madriz, the Nicaraguan minister of the interior, had left for Bluefields and would bring me letters from him (Baker). This is the most hopeful sign yet, as it indicates an intention on the part of Nicaragua to investigate matters rather than to resort to immediate violence. I sent a note to Rama at once to inform General Cabezas that Minister Madriz was on his way here.

(15) The commander of the Mohawk (Stuart) informed me that, in reply to a dispatch sent by him to his Government, he had been directed to abstain from any interference in local matters and to use his best efforts to prevent a conflict. If the Mosquito faction knew this, they would collapse, I am sure, for they have [been] counting all along on British support.

(16) Commander Stuart also told me he did not intend to land men unless it became absolutely necessary to do so to protect his countrymen, and he did not think it was advisable to have parties of sailors of different nationalities on shore at the same time, and I agree with him.

(17) Minister Madriz was here before, soon after the Cleopatra incident, and understands the situation fully.

(18) At this moment things are quiet, and there is no news to add concerning the situation.

(19) Commander Stuart of the Mohawk has written a letter to General Cabezas in a very friendly spirit, offering to use his good offices in any way to restore order, and saying that, if he will give him the names of any British subjects who took part in the attack on the Government house or on the Nicaraguan soldiers, he will take them to Jamaica and hand them over to the authorities there.

Very respectfully, etc.,

Charles O’Neil,
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.

A.
Chief Clarence to Commander O’Neil.

Bluefields, Mosquito Reservation, July 23, 1894.

Sir: I have the honor respectfully to acknowledge receipt of your letter of this day’s date as follows: “As yon are aware, a party of sailors and marines were landed from this vessel on the 6th instant, before yon issued your proclamation on that day announcing that you had resumed your rightful authority, etc. The object of this landing was to protect, if necessary, American citizens and their property, which, owing to the disturbed state of the community, seemed to he insecure,” etc.

In reply I beg leave to state to yon that the same has had my serions attention and consideration, and I have observed that yon say “before landing any men, I called upon the then recognized authorities, that is, upon the acting commissioner to the reserve, representing the Government of Nicaragua, and by virture of his office as president of the provisional council, representing the local government, to ascertain if there was any objection to our landing, and in the presence of the United States consular agent was not only told that there was none, hut that under the circumstances it seemed a prudent thing to do, and a written communication to that effect was given me.”

I have also to commend your action as being a prudent thing, as the presence of your men insured confidence and prevented some serious consequences.

I observed also that yon had Said that you “would have withdrawn your men ere this but was requested not to do so by some of the Americans, who feared that permanent order had not been restored.” I further see that you are desirous that your men should return to their vessel, and beg to inquire, as I have been in undisputed possession of the place for sixteen days, whether I can and will guarantee the security of your countrymen and their property residing in this community or whether, in my opinion, it is desirable that you should continue your men on shore for a longer period.

As to my opinion, I could not guarantee the security of your countrymen or their property residing in this community from the attacks of any armed force or forces, but I am satisfied that the quiet and peaceable inhabitants are law abiding, and I have exercised my every influence to restore the peace and tranquillity of the people. Under these circumstances, as you have a personal knowledge of the state of the community, I would earnestly advise you to use your best judgment and discretion, with the advice of the commander of Her Majesty’s ship Mohawk, as to the great interests of your countrymen and the safety of their families.

I have, etc.,

Robert Henry Clarence,
Chief and President

B.
Mr. Hatch to Commander O’Neil.

British Vice-Consulate,
Bluefields, Mosquito Reservation, Nicaragua, July 23, 1894.

Sir: I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter received this evening from Rama. Being so late I do not wish to disturb the American consul, but it seems of such importance that I think it better to advise you at once, in the absence of H. B. M. S. Mohawk our lives and that of our families are in jeopardy. I ask your earnest consideration of our serious position. What have we as foreigners to do with this question?

In the name of Her Majesty’s Government I ask your advice and assistance in such a grave matter. The three guns are in Rama. Please advise Captain Stuart of H. B. M. S. Mohawk on her arrival.

I have, etc,

E. D. Hatch,
Acting Vice-Consul.

[Inclosure 2 in No. 91.]

Commander O’Neil to Mr. Herbert.

U. S. S. Marbmshead,
Off Bluefields, Nicaragua, July 21, 1894.

Sir: (1) I have previously informed the department that General Cabezas, the acting commissioner to the Mosquito Reserve, had with-, drawn to Rama, which is up the river Escondido about 60 miles above Bluefields, and just outside the limits of the reserve. He left here on the 11th, and arriving at Kama on the 12th declared that place under martial law on that date. A copy of his proclamation is sent herewith, marked B.

(2) On the 14th I received a petition from some of the native residents (copy herewith, marked A), followers of the Mosquito chief, asking me to protect them. I have not made any reply, as I can do nothing for them except to advise them to try and make some compromise.

(3) On the same day I received from the United States consular agent notice of the detention at Kama, by order of General Cabezas, of the tug Ada Hart, owned by an American Company (The Bluefields Banana Company); also of a barge at the same place belonging to the same company, containing 1,500 bunches of bananas, which had been cut to be shipped in the company’s steamer John Wilson, then in the river below, but the tugs were not permitted to tow the barge below Rama.

(4) I immediately addressed a letter to General Cabezas, protesting against the restrictions placed upon American boats and demanding their immediate release.

(5) The next morning (the 15th instant) the Norwegian steamer Uspana came out from the river and anchored near us, and a Mr. Orr, representing the firm of Orr & Lauberheimer Company, of Mobile, and a Mr. Tally, representing Messrs. Brown & Harris, agents for the Southern Pacific Company, all American firms and individuals, came on board with copies of protests made before the United States consular agent, to the effect that their tugs had been stopped from going below Rama and in consequence they could not carry on their business.

(6) As the Espana was chartered by the American firm of Orr & Lauberheimer and has only been permitted to take on board half her cargo, that is, fruit from above Kama only, I concluded that the best thing to do was for me to go up to Rama in her and see General Cabezas, and take such steps as might be necessary to enable the cargo below Kama, which was cut and on the river banks, to be shipped, to do which it was necessary that the company’s tugs Alerta and Buena Ventura should be permitted to go down the river.

(5) I accordingly went on board the Espana, and she proceeded, stopping at the bluff to take in tow our steam cutter with crew of nine men and a 1–pounder gun, as I might require her to return in.

(6) Reaching Rama at 5 p.m., I went on shore and saw General Cabezas, and asked him what he meant by practically seizing steamers which were American property and engaged in their legitimate business. He began to talk about precaution and military necessity and that the town was under martial law. I told him I had come up to talk over matters with him, but before going further I had to request that he would give orders for the immediate release of the tugs, and that the Espana might be permitted to load and proceed on her voyage at once, as every hour’s delay was disastrous to her cargo of fruit. After some little discussion the necessary orders were given, and the steamer and tugs proceeded down the river.

(7) I told General Cabezas that until the port of Rama was officially closed and notice thereof sent to the foreign consuls and naval commanders that American citizens, with their boats and other properties, should be allowed to pass unmolested, and that should he choose to close the port he must give due notice and allow foreigners to depart if they choose; and I asked him to sign a written assurance to the effect that he would guarantee it, but he did not like the form I put it in, but agreed in substance, and I secured the release of five tugs and launches owned by Americans. I was glad he released the boats, for I intended to take them down the river with me if he refused, and my visit was quite opportune, as three fruit steamers have arrived since, and had no arrangements been made as to the use of the tugs they could not have received their cargoes.

(8) I told General Cabezas his Government would have to pay for the 1,500 bunches of bananas he prevented the steamer John Wilson from taking.

(9) I regret to say that some injudicious Americans have been active participants in the political affairs now in such a tangle here. The Mosquito chief was undoubtedly induced to proclaim himself by promises of assistance from foreigners, and a few Americans have figured in a prominent manner in the Mosquito council and local government; and worse yet, it is pretty well known that at least two Americans were concerned in the attack on the Nicaraguan soldiers at the bluff.

(10) The Jamaica negroes, who form a large portion of the supporters of the Mosquito chief, seem to have been clever enough to make use of the willing services of some foolish Americans, and they have all pinned their faith on the coming of a British man-of-war to support them in the stand they have taken.

(11) I advise them to try and effect some compromise or settlement in order that they may be relieved from their present state of anxiety, and the wiser ones are already beginning to agitate the subject, for they are getting tired of patrolling the streets at night and not knowing how they stand with the outside world. With perhaps a couple of exceptions, the Americans mixed up in [the] affair do not represent any interest worth speaking of. Those who stand best in the community have kept out of it, though their sympathies are not with the Nicaraguans, whom they consider oppressive, and the Mosquitoes they consider a& in competent.

(12) The trouble is, there is no one to make terms with who can be relied upon.

(13) Our men are still on shore, having been there two weeks. I would like to get them back on board, but the American residents are so worked up and alarmed lest there should be a Nicaraguan invasion that the men can not well be withdrawn at present, and as our force is small and the complications seem to increase rather than diminish, I sent a dispatch to the Department, via Port Limon, on the 16tb, that another man-of war was required, and as I see no prospect of a settlement, I think one is. A small vessel to enter the river would control the situation, or else a large one with a good-sized crew and plenty of officers, to lay outside.

(14) It is generally believed that the Government of Nicaragua will forcibly occupy the reserve as soon as it can do so.

(15) There is no particular change in the political situation, and nothing has been done as yet looking toward an adjustment of difficulties.

(16) The British man-of-war Mohawk arrived this morning from Kingston, Jamaica. Her captain had very vague ideas as to what had taken place, but had seen some exaggerated dispatches in the newspapers at Jamacia. He said he had no orders of any kind, and has just gone ou shore to look about for himself. I gave him such information as I had concerning the state of affairs.

* * * * * * *

(18) An Englishman named Salter was here a couple of days ago from Grey Town, and brought with him a letter from one Rivas, the governor of that place, addressed to “The rioters and revolutionists,” commanding them, in the name of the President of Nicaragua, to disperse, and restore the former order of things, or troops would be sent to punish them, etc. This letter was presented to the Mosquito council, and Mr. Salter was informed that any written questions he might ask would be answered in writing, but he had no questions to ask, and has returned to Grey Town.

(19) On the 14th instant, having learned that a boat owned by Americans had been used for military purposes, I had a notice printed for distribution (copy herewith, C). The Mosquito chief addressed me a three-page letter in consequence, to explain that he and his followers were not revolutionists.

(20) There has been rioting at Corn Island and some overthrow of officials, but the Nicaraguans are still in power. Six or seven Jamaica negroes concerned in the matter, who claimed to be British subjects, were sent here to the British vice consul, but nobody wanted them here, and they were allowed to depart.

* * * * * * *

(22) What the ultimate outcome of these affairs may be it is impossible for any one down here to predict. The Mosquito Government is and has been inefficient, and, should it continue, it would simply be the tool of influential foreigners, so that it seems to me that the best thing that could happen would be the absorption of the Nicaraguan Government of the Reserve, provided that the vested rights of Americans, secured under the Mosquito Government, should be secured to them by some binding obligation. Otherwise they will be sacrificed. * * *

(23) Since writing the foregoing Commander Stewart, of H. M. S. Mohawk, has been on shore, and called on me on his way back. He told me what I already knew—that a Jamaica negro had gone into the shop of a Chinaman and pointed a gun at him in fun, which the Chinaman took in earnest, and shot and killed the negro. There was much excitement over the affair, and the negroes threatened to lynch the Chinaman, who was lodged in jail.

(24) Commander Stewart said that, just as he was leaving shore, the magistrate, who is an American named Wiltbanks, in the employ of the Mosquito faction, told him that the Jamaica negroes, who claimed to be British subjects (but who, in fact, are the disorderly and dangerous element of the Mosquito faction), had threatened to disturb the peace, and evidently some influence was brought to bear to induce Commander Stewart to land some men to keep “British subjects” in order. He said he asked to see some of the men who were conspicuous in the matter, and, on being confronted with them, he told them that if the Chinaman in jail was lynched he would hang the ringleaders in the affair. So far as Commander Stewart is concerned, I am satisfied that he is sincere in his desire not to become entangled with the affairs on shore, of which, as a newcomer, he has but little knowledge; but from what I know of the situation I fully believe that some pretext, even to a riot, if necessary, will be found by the Mosquito faction to get his men on shore, and even if they do nothing, it will be made use of by them to help along the Mosquito cause, as it will stiffen the backbones of the weak among them, who are taught to believe that England is behind them.

(25) Commander Stewart told me he was perplexed, and I advised him to form his own opinions after he had been here longer and understood matters, and not let people on shore do it for him. He said he did not wish to do anything that I disapproved of, and I told him that I certainly was not the judge of his actions, nor did I doubt his good faith in the matter, but if I thought at any time that his actions affected the political situation in any way, whether intentionally or unintentionally on his part, I should consider it my duty to report the fact to my Government.

(26) Commander Stewart said, finally, that he was going to Grey Town to send dispatches, to-morrow, and would simply leave an officer on shore here to look around and see what the conduct was of the turbulent Jamaica negroes.

(27) The arrival of the British ship Mohawk will have quite an effect upon the Mosquito faction, whose leaders were beginning to waver, but now they will brace up again, and the Nicaraguan commissioner at Rama understands this, for in speaking with me as to the possibility of coming to terms with the people here he remarked that, if done, it ought to be done before the arrival of the British man-of-war, showing that simply the presence of one would affect the situation.

(28) I see no urgent reason at the present moment why the British ship should land men, but I can see reasons why the supporters of the Mosquito faction desire to have them landed.

(29) There are no British interests or subjects here except the Jamaica negroes, who form the rank and file of the Mosquito party, as the Indians count for but little except from a sentimental point of view. These negroes are not in need of protection of anybody, unless it should be that the Nicaraguans come to take the place, in which case the British would hardly care to interfere, I imagine.

The negroes are an unruly set, and need keeping in order, but I should regard a landing on their account as more of a pretext than a necessity.

(30) When our men were landed, on the 6th instant, the Government of this place was in the hands of the Nicaraguan commissioner, who represented the sovereign authority, and the provisional council (of which this same commissioner was president) representing the local authority. I received a written request to land men, from said commissioner, before they were landed.

(31) It was but a few hours later on that date (the 6th) that the Mosquito chief issued his proclamation that he had resumed his rightful authority, and it was about noon on the following day that the Nicaraguans withdrew, leaving his faction in control.

(32) I have had no communication with the Mosquito party with reference to our men being on shore, but shall now go to them, they having had control for two weeks, and inquire if they can and will guarantee the security of Americans and their property, and see what they have to say, and shall also assemble the leading Americans and see what they have to say.

(33) The court-house, which our men occupy, and which is the only suitable place in the settlement, will probably be required for its legitimate use in August, and I should not know where to go if we have to leave it and remain on shore.

(34) While we have been located there we have had our ensign hoisted on a staff in front of it, not in any way to supplant the flag of the reserve, which flies from its usual place, and since the Nicaraguan commissioner went to Rama, on the 11th, no Nicaraguan flag has been hoisted. I heard by accident yesterday that some remark had been made as to the propriety of our flag being hoisted at our barracks, but everybody here knows our attitude, and I am sure that no significance has been attached to the fact, but in such a community and at such a time it seemed the proper thing, and no remonstrance was made by the Nicaraguan commissioner, nor, in fact, has any been made by the Mosquitoes.

Very respectfully, etc,

Charles O’Neil,
Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.

A.
Citizens of Bluefields to Captain O’Neil.

Bluefields, Mosquito Reservation,
July 18, 1894.

Sir: We, the male natives of Bluefields, beg to put before you our humble request harem given.

In the incidents which took place on July 6 we did not intend in the least to be rebellions to the sovereign Government of Nicaragua.

As General Cabezas failed to govern and the place was left without a government, we with one accord requested our deposed chief, Robert Henry Clarence to reassume his legal authority. Our chief, after due consideration, consented, and on being reinstated demanded [of] General Cabezas a turning over of the government into his hands. This general asked time for consideration, and in the meantime declared that he would “lay the niggers low” with his men and cannon, which he had at the bluff. Some of us, hearing his threats, volunteered to go and capture this bluff, guard, and cannon.

Having been successful in our undertaking, the General surrendered, falling short of his expectation. Report has since reached us to the effect that General Cabezas has gone to gather a force of 2,000 strong and to return and utterly destroy us and our properties—we who are only 300 in number, know no war tactics, are undisciplined in military organization, and, more than all, wit boat arms and ammunition.

Of your mission here we are all well aware—for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens. Now, therefore, we, your humble petitioners, beg that in affording such a protection you will extend the same to us, our families, and properties, if possible. We are conscious of the nature of your petition, but, as we have said, we are utterly unable to withstand the threatened invasion. We beg to subscribe ourselves,

Yours, in earnest,

• N. S. Wilson.
• Chas. E. Smith.
• Louis Cast.
• R. C. Hodgson.
• Jeremiah Hodgson.
• Elisha Hodgson.

B.

[Translation.]

Rigoberto Cabezas, inspector-general of the Atlantic coast and general intendent of the district of Siquia, considering:

That the public peace has been disturbed in the city of Bluefields by an armed rebellion.

That it is the duty of the authority to resort to the best means for the maintenance of order and security to society in use of the faculties with which I am invested.

Decree.

• First. Declaring the district of Siquia in a state of siege.
• Second. The common offenses during the existence of martial law will be judged by a military council. Given in Rama on the 12th day of the month of July, 1894.

(Communicated.)

R. Cabezas.

C.
Commander O’Neil to owners of American vessels.

U. S. S. Marblehead,
Off Bluefields, Nicaragua, July 14, 1894.

To the owners, agents, and captains of vessels under the flag of the United States trading in these waters:

In view of the fact that there is in effect a revolution going on in the Mosquito Reserve between the chief of the said reserve and his followers and the provisional council, which in a measure through its president represents, or assumes to represent, the Government of Nicaragua, these parties being in a hostile attitude to each other, and the former being at present in possession of Bluefields, you are hereby cautioned and counseled not to interfere with nor take part in the affairs of either faction by permitting the vessels under you charge to engage in any military operations; that is, not to carry bodies of armed men or military supplies, knowing them to be such, for either party, nor to assist in any hostile demonstration, and should either party attempt to coerce you to do so, or interfere with you in the peaceful pursuance of your legitimate business, yon are advised to utter a vigorous protest; to show this notice, and to communicate the facts of the case to me.

Charles O’Neil,
Commander, United States Navy.