Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward
Sir: In my last despatch, dated at Humaita, November 6 th, 1866, I mentioned the illness of President Lopez, as the probable reason why he did not invite me to visit him at his encampment. Since then there has been no opportunity to communicate across the lines, and, of course, I could send nothing further to you. The sickness of President Lopez was very severe, and from all I learn, I conclude he was very near dying. On his recovery I was invited to visit his encampment, and a steamer was furnished me to come down the river. I accordingly left Asuncion on the evening of the 20th instant, and reached Humaita on the morningof the 22d, and came out to this place in the afternoon.
I had a long interview with the President the same evening, and learned what I could from him in regard to the prospects of the war. Since the 22d of September, when the allies made an attack on Curupaiti and were defeated with a loss of from seven to ten thousand, the Paraguayans losing less than a hundred, there has been no fighting of any importance.
There are little skirmishes quite frequently; and nearly every day the Brazilians throw a lot of shot and shell towards the encampment at Curupaiti but having no other effect than to amuse their enemies by their bad firing. The latter always answer back, probably with little more effect. What the allies are doing during all this long delay since the repulse at Curupaiti is not well known here, but it is supposed they are waiting for re-enforcements. Lopez is confident he has sufficient force to beat them back again, but this he can hardly do many times. Of the troops raised, the larger part have already fallen in battle or by [Page 706] disease, and I don’t think it would be possible to raise five Hundred more men in the whole country, able to carry a musket. The country is thoroughly exhausted. All the manual labor is done by women. The women must plant what of corn or cane or mandioca there is planted, or nothing can be raised. Women yoke the oxen and serve as teamsters; women are the butchers to slaughter the cattle, take them to market, and sell the beef in the stalls; they do all the rough labor that elsewhere is done by men, for there are no men to do it. Of course, this state of affairs cannot always endure. President Lopez, however, seems to be in full faith that he can hold his enemies at bay a good while longer. But it is clear that, if the allies continue united in prosecuting the war, Paraguay cannot always hold out. By the terms of the triple alliance, the allied governments cannot treat with President Lopez; the first condition being that he shall resign his power and leave the country. This, he says, he will not do; but will fight to the last corner, and till the last man is gone, and then he won’t do it. So now it looks as though it were meant to be a war of extermination to this nation, at least to the whole male population. This will be a sad termination, for these people have shown a courage and endurance during this war deserving of a better fate. In fact, their fighting qualities are most astonishing: whether it be the discipline or the natural valor of the race that renders them so, their insensibility to fear, and their courage to obey orders in the face of certain death, almost exceed belief. No Paraguayan ever retreats without orders. They are commanded to fight to the death, and they obey, and it is only by dint of their fighting valor that they have, held out so long.
It has been the hope of President Lopez that even should the allies keep united, some foreign intervention would take place. The prospect that it may come in time to avert the final catastrophe appears to me very slight unless the Brazilians show less activity than they have yet done. They have done nothing for the last three months, but I apprehend another general attack soon, and, most likely, another defeat to them. But these people cannot stand many more victories.
In view of the events that may happen soon, it seems to me to be highly necessary that there should be some neutral war vessels in the vicinity. I apprehend there would belittle difficulty in going up the river to Asuncion now, as the river is some ten feet higher than when I came up in the Shamokin, and the obstacles that at low water rendered the navigation dangerous have since been carried away, probably by the force of the current.
This despatch I shall send through the lines by flag of truce. President Lopez has offered to send out such a flag, and pass over to the other side any despatches I may have to send, and I avail myself of the offer, as I hope at the same time to receive my correspondence from below. I have received nothing from you of a later date than May or June, (I am not able to say precisely, as my papers are not here,) and therefore I know not what subsequent instruction you may have sent me. I shall therefore write to General Asboth to send up whatever there may he for me by special messenger, or, better, to come up himself if possible.
I have thought it probable that my long detention by the allies would call for further explanation and satisfaction than were given in the bare permission to allow me to pass without firing into me, and when I know how that affair is regarded I can judge better how to act in contingencies yet to arrive, when it is reasonable to suppose I may be called upon to take some part.
I therefore make this effort to get any later instructions, and, to be more sure of them, shall request that a special messenger be sent from Buenos Ayres.
My arrival here was hailed with great delight by the people of all classes. It was the first ray of light from the outer world they had had for a long time, and as I came on a national war vessel forcing the blockade, they seemed to think that peace was at hand. The question I am asked by all is, Can I not do something to bring about peace ?
[Page 707]I can give them no hope, though God knows I would be glad to do so, for if suffering and valor entitle them to rest they surely deserve it. The Paraguay people have always treated me with great kindness, and especially since my return have they tried in every way possible to show attentions to myself and family. Is not spine intervention possible whereby Brazil may retire without too great a sacrifice of pride, and these people spared further sacrifices? If intervention is out of the question, and the war should last for several months longer, can there be no such thing as mediation offered that may promise to be successful? On this point I would ask for some instructions.
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I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.