Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress
Mr. Dix to Mr. Seward
Sir: At the request of Mr. Bareiro, charge d’affaires of Paraguay, I have the honor to enclose a printed paper signed by him, dated Paris, 10th of July, 1867, and entitled an “Answer to the attacks upon Paraguay contained in the note of the 12th June last from the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Brazil, to his excellency the minister of foreign affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of the French.”
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
Answer to the attacks upon Paraguay contained in the note of the 12th June last from the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Brazil to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of the French.
The note which I had the honor to address to their excellencies the Marquis de Moustier and Lord Stanley, ministers for foreign affairs of their Majesties the Emperor of the French and the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the 3d of last June, has been the subject of a similar note of Mr. de Macedo, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Brazil, to his excellency the Marquis de Moustier, which contains accusations to which I see myself with regret under the necessity of replying.
This note, printed and distributed among a great number of persons, came to my cognizance in the same manner in which mine came to the cognizance of Mr. de Macedo.
I should have presented my observations ere this had I not been officiously informed that another note, with the same destination as that of Mr. de Macedo, was to be written by the minister plenipotentiary of the Argentine confederation; but it not having yet appeared or not having been seen by me, I can no longer delay my indispensable answer to Mr. de Macedo.
The government of Paraguay finds itself again in presence of the allegations refuted a number of times, but always again reproduced, that it commenced the war without reason and without a declaration; that it has conducted it treacherously, with barbarity and ferocity, &c. For my part, Tarn accused oí falsity like all the agents of the President of Paraguay, like my immediate chief, Mr. Berges. The tactics of all advocates who have a bad cause to defend consists in employing in their arguments violence instead of reason, personality and insult instead of logic. These tactics will not be mine. His excellency the Marquis de Moustier must have appreciated but indifferently the word razzias which these tactics suggested to Mr. de Macedo to express the barbarity and ferocity of the Paraguayans. Mr. de Macedo, it would seem, is not aware that this word is employed officially in the bulletins of the French army to designate certain war operations of Africa, carried out by that brave and loyal army which is assuredly neither barbarous nor ferocious. With the injurious sense attributed to it, neither this nor any other similar word ought to have found a place in a Brazilian note, because it resembles so much that of Californias, of so different a signification, which is of pure Brazilian origin, as is the event which gives it its meaning, which does not refer either to war properly speaking or to regular armies, but to pillage, the trade in whites, and the assassination practiced extensively by the Brazilians of Rio Grande against the Orientals of Uruguay. Whatever be the case, I repel, with energy, if not the word itself, at least the wrong meaning which Mr. de Macedo attaches to it, considering that Paraguay did not for one moment deviate from the usages of war in fighting its enemies. Mr. de Macedo is unable to say as much for his country.
I extract from the note of Mr. de Macedo the following allegations in order to reply to them categorically:
I. “The Brazilian provinces were entirely without defence at the ti me Paraguay invaded them.
II. “The protest addressed to the minister of Brazil at Asuncion, the 30th August, 1864, was not a declaration of war.
III “The government of Paraguay had nothing to do with the contentions of Brazil with Uruguay in 1864.
IV “The declaration of war by Paraguay to the Argentine Confederation was not known [Page 273] at Buenos Ayres until nineteen days after the city of Corrientes had been occupied by the Paraguayan forces.
V. “Mr. Thornton, her Britannic Majesty’s minister at Buenos Ayres, testifies to the insufficiency of the reasons alleged by Paraguay for waging war on the Argentine Confederation.
VI. “Brazil was entitled since 1845 to the gratitude of Paraguay, at that time feeble, men aced and abandoned by the whole world.
VII. “If the independence of Uruguay was menaced, the government of Paraguay had only to address itself to the government of Brazil, of the Argentine Confederation, of France and England, who were under stipulations to guarantee it; it had only to arouse these governments if it thought them asleep.
VIII. “Messrs. Berges and Bareiro speak vaguely of projects of absorption, of traditional pretensions, and of the encroaching policy of Brazil. The proofs of these assertions ought to have been given. The proofs which attest the moderation and pacific character of the government of the Emperor of Brazil are before the eyes of the whole world.
IX. “If there had been found among the papers of Colonel Campos, president of Matto Grosso, the slightest proof against the pacific intentions of the Brazilian government with regard to Paraguay, which seeks so many sophisms and false allegations to justify its aggression, the Paraguayan government would not have preserved such proof a secret.
X. “The Paraguayan armies when they invaded Matto Grosso and Rio Grande found only 120 men to defend the dilapidated fort of Coimbra, and a few squadrons of national guard gathered hastily before San Borja de Rio Grande.
XI. “It is known to the whole world that Brazil, when she saw two of her provinces invaded by the troops of Paraguay, had only 14,000 soldiers of all arms scattered in small detachments over the twenty provinces of the empire; that her border provinces were defenceless; that her forts were poorly armed, dismantled, dilapidated; that her fleet was composed of the vessels only which she usually maintained for the defence of her coast; in short, that she was without vessels of war drawing the proper depth for a war upon the waters.
XII. “It is entirely natural to suppose that the Brazilian plenipotentiary had instructions to induce the Argentine Republic to an alliance; but besides, fifteen days are more than sufficient to draw up a treaty, to send it from Buenos Ayres to Rio de Janeiro and receive the answer.
XIII. “Whilst Brazil had not a single means of aggression, Paraguay, on the contrary, was solely occupied in training soldiers, in acquiring instruments and munitions of war. She gave the greatest dimensions to the fortress, already formidable, of Humaita. She had the best and the most numerous artillery that South America had ever seen. She lost men and munitions in enormous quantities, notwithstanding which she still has many, although she has been blockaded by land and by water since two years.
XIV. “It is a novel moral to pretend that after two years of war and torrents of blood spilled without result, peace was desirable.
XV. “The President of Paraguay is a capricious and ambitious potentate, during whose presence the allies cannot lay down their arms without having obtained guarantees for the future.
XVI. “The government of Brazil leaves it to be decided by all just men whether it would be justified in leaving this germ of trouble and disquietude in the condition under which it began its ravages.
XVII. “The principle of public law by which it is attempted to deny nations the right to depose from power a chief who has abused it and who has become a perpetual menace to his neighbors, is a principle contrary to the constant practice of civilized nations of all ages. Mr. Bergès himself speaks of the alliance into which. Paraguay entered to depose the dictatorship of General Rosas.
XVIII. “Without entering upon a recital of the plans of his government or of the allies, Mr. de Macedo is still instructed to declare on all occasions that it is their firm intention to maintain the independence of the republic of Paraguay, to leave her the choice of a national government and of such institutions as she may wish to select.
XIX. “Mr. de Macedo refrains from speaking of the manner in which the war has been conducted by Paraguay;” however, he immediately thereupon adds this: “On the banks of the Paraguay and the Parana, justice is opposed to the spirit of usurpation and of conquest. That wise policy which lends life to commerce, to industry, and to the progress of nations, no matter under what form of government, is opposed to the most absurd system of commercial restriction and monopoly. In short, civilization is opposed to tendencies towards barbarism.”
The preceding allegations are generally accompanied by that oratorical precaution, which I have suppressed for the most part, namely, that the facts stated are incontestable and completely established; that they are known to and before the eyes of the whole world, &c. This precaution, which has been dropped since a long time from all serious discussions, ough to have so much the less suggested itself to the mind of Mr. de Macedo, since it is, in more than one instance, in manifest contradiction to that which is known, I will not say to the whole world, but, at least, to those who read his note, especially to his excellency the Marquis de Moustier.
I shall endeavor in the first place to show this contradiction, and then I shall establish, by [Page 274] a summary recital of the events which preceded the present war, that Paraguay was provoked to the strife, and, that in appearing as the attacking party—that which her adversaries consider in her so great a crime—she in fact only practiced her right of legitimate defence, and that under circumstances the most serious to her honor and independence.
To the allegations I, IX, X, and XI, I reply that the Paraguayans, when they penetrated into the province of Matto Grosso, found a large number of cannon of heavy calibre, and munitions of war in abundance. Fort Coimbra, dismantled, according to Mr. de Macedo, had 37 of these cannon, and Fort Albuquerque had 23. I borrow these figures from Mr. Thornton, who transmits them to Earl Russell in his letter of the 24th of January, 1865. The Paraguayans took still other cannon besides those of Coimbra and Albuquerque. According to official documents of Paraguay, they took 87 in all. Mr. de Macedo would have it that with 37 cannon of heavy calibre, Fort Coimbra was poorly armed; while the little fort of Curupaity only has 10, if I have a good memory, and with this armament, to which are added a few field pieces, it has victoriously resisted the attacks of the allies since 15 months.
There were not, perhaps, found among the papers of Colonel Campos any hostile instructions, neither were there found pacific instructions; very probably Colonel Campos had received only verbal instructions; but he had with him worse than hostile instructions against Paraguay, he had officers, provisions, and money for the province of which he was proceeding to take command; he continued the clandestine arming of that province or of vessels, as had the Marquis de Olinda, who transported him himself, previously brought the cannon of which I have just spoken, because similar matter could not have come to Matto Grosso except by water and clandestinely, since the treaties relative to the navigation of the Paraguay are expressly opposed to their transportation on that river as long as the question of boundary should not have been settled. This arming, and the violation of the treaties in order to accomplish it, do they not witness sufficiently the hostile intentions of Brazil with regard to Paraguay? Was it necessary to prove them that written instructions should have been given to Colonel Campos? Besides, other authorities of Matto Grosso were found with written instructions, and their papers, which were published at Asuncion in 1865, fully confirm the occasion of the measures taken by Paraguay.
But here are some other inaccuracies which escaped the too little cautious zeal of Mr. de Macedo. At the time Paraguay invaded the province of Matto Grosso, Brazil, according to Mr. de Macedo, had only an army of 14,000 men of all arms, scattered in small detachments over the 20 provinces of the empire; her fleet was composed only of the vessels required for the usual defence of her coasts; she had no proper vessels for a war upon the water. Mr. de Macedo forgets that Paraguay did not invade Matto Grosso until the month of December, 1864, 15 or 20 days after the first bombardment of Paisandu by the Brazilian fleet of Admiral Tamandaré, two months after the occupation of the territory of Uruguay by the troops of General Menna Baretto, and more than five months after the ultimatum in which Mr. Saraiva announced his intention to appeal to his two general officers, the one stationed in the waters of the La Plata, where he certainly could not have been guarding the coasts of the empire, the other encamped on the borders of Uruguay with his army, apparently somewhat more numerous than a small detachment. These are indeed strange inadvertencies for a diplomatist so prompt to accuse of falsity the arguments of his adversaries.
It ought to be true, however, that Brazil did not expect to enter upon her war on Paraguay in 1864. According to her plans she was not to attack until 1865, and she had no suspicion that she could be anticipated. Paraguay to anticipate her (Brazil’s) projects ! to assume the odium of the first attack ! That could not enter into her plans. She thought herself perfectly sheltered under a like contingency, although the true fact had been officially announced to her, and quietly expected her time.
To allegation II, I answer that, in effect, the protest of the 30th of August, 1864, was not a declaration of war; but this document is not the only document preliminary to war which the government of Paraguay has addressed the government of Brazil. Four days after, the 3d of September, it confirmed the above by adding this significant declaration, that, the case occurring, it would with regret support it by force (de hacerla efectiva;) in short, the 12th of November following, by a final note to Mr. Vianna de Lima, it broke off all relations with the government of Brazil, and declared peremptorily that in consequence of the invasion of Uruguay by Brazil, the moment had arrived for Paraguay to make use of the means which she reserved herself in her protest of the 30th of August. This last note has so much the character of a declaration of war, that on the 17th of the same month the Paraguayan government gave a copy of it to the representatives of the foreign nations accredited at Asuncion, expressing at the same time an intention to lessen the evils of the war as far as it should be concerned. Surely, the government which proceeded in this manner was not wanting in the usages of civilized nations. But admitting that it had been wanting, that which for my part I could never admit, is it for Brazil to declare herself scandalized? Did Brazil declare war to Paraguay when, in 1850, she seized without a single formality the Pan de Azucar, a part of the Paraguayan territory? And did she declare it to her, in 1855, when she ascended the Parana with a fleet and threatened her coasts with bombardment, at the same time assembling an army at San Borja to invade her? “There is no longer any doubt,” said then the President Carlos Antonio Lopez, in a proclamation to the Paraguayan people, “that Brazilian forces have entered the waters of Paraguay; there has not been addressed to us a single [Page 275] word of courtesy; we are invaded; we are forced to defend our territory, our independence, our honor, our existence ! Yesterday, the 20th, (February) a battle may perhaps have taken place with our battery at Humaita.” * * * * In a similar proclamation to the Paraguayan army, the same President said further, “a Brazilian fleet has entered the Rio Paraguay, without the government who sends it or the chief commanding it having given the slightest notice to the government of the republic.” * * * * This manner of doing seems habitual to Brazil, because she proceeded similarly several times against Uruguay, especially in 1812 and 1816, at which time that country was not yet independent. With the government of Mr. Aquirre, in 1864, she contented herself with pronouncing that the special mission of Mr. Saraiva was terminated, and that reprisals (which do not yet mean war) would be resorted to by the fleet and the armies of Brazil, until satisfaction should have been given to the imperial government. The bombardment and destrustion of Paisandu, in concert with a Uruguayan general revolt against the government of his country, when considered as coming within the acts of reprisal of Brazil—which do not yet mean war—are acts, among others, truly contrary to the usuages of civilized nations ! In truth, one could not be more unhappy than Mr. de Macedo is in the choice of the grievances with which he reproaches Paraguay.
The fifth allegation loses its value after my comment upon the preceding. At all events, it is still not for Brazil to declare herself scandalized. As to the government of Buenos Ayres, it had too many reasons not to appear more scandalized than its Brazilian ally. That allegation reposes entirely on the testimony of the Argentine minister, who may have reasons for misstating the truth, as he has done various times on the subject of the treaty of 1856 between Paraguay and the Argentine Confederation. It is true that Mr. Thornton reproduces the same allegation; but the testimony of Mr. Thornton may have no other foundation than the very exceptionable testimony—I am sorry to call it so—of the Argentine minister
The sixth allegation is not serious, and I could dispense with replying to it. The good offices in question consisted simply in the fact of the recognition of the independence of Paraguay on the part of Brazil. Paraguay had enjoyed her independence for over thirty years without interruption, or claim against it, before Brazil recognized it; moreover, the recognition of Brazil was not disinterested, because she contemplated to open hostilities against the dictator Rosas, against whom Brazil had at that time some grievances. Paraguay could nevertheless appreciate the recognition by Brazil, and show her her gratitude; but was her gratitude to extend to a forgetting of her rights, her duties, and her dignity? Shall I be here mindful of that disdainful remark that Paraguay was feeble, menaced, and abandoned by the whole world when Brazil recognized her independence? If she was feeble, why seek her support against the dictator Rosas? That alleged feebleness did not prevent her from consolidating her independence, preserving peace beside neighbors distracted by anarchy, and repelling victoriously all attacks against her autonomy and territorial integrity What Mr. de Macedo terms her being abandoned by the whole world was nothing but a voluntary insulation from which she emerged voluntarily. Would Brazil to-day make her regret it?
The seventh allegation is not more serious than the sixth; besides, it has something of the derisive in it which is not usual in diplomacy. To direct Paraguay to the governments of Brazil, Buenos Ayres, France, and England, when the independence of Uruguay is threatened by two of these governments, because all four have more or less guaranteed the independence of Uruguay; to counsel her to awaken these same governments, if she thinks them asleep, according to the ingenious expression of Mr. de Macedo, is assuredly to mock her, and I doubt whether the cause of Brazil can gain anything in Europe by this manner of arguing. Brazil, through the organ of Mr. de Macedo, does very much like the incendiary who thrusts back the succor of the neighboring proprietors of the house which he has set on fire, and who sends these proprietors to the insurers of the person on whom the incendiarism has been committed, to arrest the flames.
To the 12th allegation I reply that the alliance between Brazil and the Argentine Republic existed for a long time, in fact. The proof of it is io be found in the note of the Oriental minister, Mr. Juan José de Herrera, to Mr. Saraiva, of date August 9th, 1864, which note shows that in expressing his final views on the question of the reclamations of Brazil, Mr. Saraiva was instructed to come to an understanding with the government of Buenos Ayres, which he did, in fact, because on the very day of his return from Buenos Ayres to Montevideo, the 4th August, 1864, he addressed to the Oriental government his ultimatum, evidently drawn up at Buenos Ayres, and with the concurrence of the Argentine government, according to all appearances.
As to the assertion that 15 days are more than sufficient to prepare a treaty, send it from Buenos Ayres to Rio de Janeiro and receive the answer, Mr. Macedo did not consider it sufficiently. Of these 15 days, 12, at the least, were consumed by the steamer which carried and returned with the project of the treaty from Buenos Ayres to Rio. Now, the three remai-ing days were rather a short space for preparing, drawing up, discussing, and definitively executing the form of a document of that importance, of which the one of the contracting parties, if not all three, had never thought before. But Mr. de Macedo has not even the resort to these three days, nor that other, that it is natural to suppose that the plenipotentiary of Brazil had instructions to induce the Argentine Republic to an alliance; for it is known from a letter [Page 276] of Mr Thornton to Earl Russell, dated the 20th April, that the Brazilian minister, signer of the treaty of the 1st of May, did not arrive at Buenos Ayres until the 16th of April, and that he did not present his letters of credence until the]8th, which only leaves him 12 days for preparing the treaty and sending the project to Rio de Janeiro. Mr. de Macedo will find it difficult to convince persons who are informed as to the history of the La Plata for the past years, that the treaty of the 1st of May was not conceived and executed a long time before Paraguay commenced the war against the Argentine Republic, and even against Brazil.
What shall I say to the 14th allegation? I leave with Mr. de Macedo all the responsibility of the strange pretension that it is a novel moral to wish for peace after a war already long and specially baleful to humanity. The government of the United States and Mr. Wash-burn, its minister, profess in that respect opinions differing from those of Mr. de Macedo, which the protest of Mr. Washburn goes to prove. That which is unfortunately not novel, is the immorality of prosecuting to extremity an unjust and cruel war, entered into from ambition and continued from pride, as is that which Brazil and her allies are waging against Paraguay.
The 15th, 16th, and 17th allegations present the president of Paraguay in the light of an ambitious and capricious potentate who sows the seed of trouble and disquietude around him, who ravages the territory of his neighbors, and who must be deposed at all events, according to the constant practice of civilized nations of all ages, according to the practice of Paraguay herself, who allied herself with Brazil in December, 1850, to depose the dictator Rosas. His excellency, Marquis de Moustier, will not learn without astonishment that a country erewhile feeble, menaced, and abandoned by the whole world, has become suddenly the empire of a potentate capable of creating trouble and disquietude with his neighbors. His excellency will rather see in this singular hyperbole of Mr. de Macedo an unfortunate attempt to excuse the long-planned intentions of Brazil towards the country whose territory she covets. If any doubt should still exist in his mind on that subject, the transparent language of the 16th allegation will dissipate it in an instant.
Regarding the alliance of Paraguay with Brazil in 1850, to depose the dictator Rosas, it presents this considerable difference from the alliance of the governments of Brazil, the Argentine Confederation, and Urugay, in 1865, to depose the president of Paraguay, that Paraguay, in 1850, had never been recognized by the Argentine Confederation, of whom General Rosas was more or less the legitimate chief; that she was in constant hostility with the latter country and her chief, whereas in 1865, Brazil, the Argentine Confederation, and Uruguay had recognized her since a long time, as well as her president. In order to war against the dictator Rosas, she did not consider it necessary to profess a fallacious respect for the nation whose chief she was attacking, as do at this day Brazil and her allies, with regard to the Paraguayan nation. The laws of war authorized her to fight both the Argentine nation and its chief for her own better security.
To the 18th allegation I have the deep regret to reply that the official declarations of Brazil in Europe, as those of the Argentine Confederation, have lost considerably of that credit which they ought to inspire, since they have been preceded at London and Paris by those which the unexpected publication of the secret treaty of the 1st of May so deplorably belied. His excellency, Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, whose imposing authority Mr. de Macedo will not challenge, in 1866 said in his Expose de la Situation de l’Empire as follows:
“The basin of the La Plata has been the theatre of renewed hostilities. To the contest which raged before between Brazil and Uruguay, has succeeded a war in which these two States make common cause with the Argentine Confederation against Paraguay. The result of it is still uncertain, but it would seem from assurances given by the allied States, that it is not their aim to effect any change whatsoever in the territorial limits.” * * *
Finally, to the 19th and last allegation, I reply that if in the course of the war in question the law of nations has been violated, it was the enemies of Paraguay who committed that violation of the modern spirit by enlisting Paraguayan prisoners under their banner, by forcing the destitute to take up arms against their country, (see, among other proofs, a letter of Mr. Lettsom, chargé d’affaires of England at Montevideo, to Lord Stanley, of date the 27th August, 1866, Blue Book,) or by reducing them into slavery. (See the Diario de Rio de Janeiro of the 14th October, 1865.) I confine myself to producing this single proof because it emanates from a Brazilian paper. Mr. de Macedo accuses Paraguay of barbarism. * * * I have already spoken of those savage expeditions of the Brazilian province of Rio Grande, which have taken from the cynical language of those engaged in them the significant appellation of californias. Shall I speak now of those other californias which are practiced in the same province towards shipwrecked vessels which are pillaged, and towards their crews which ——— disappear. * * * Let Mr. de Macedo be careful how he evokes in Europe the poignant recollections which to this day. close the doors of his country to European colonization ! He likewise accuses Paraguay of a spirit of conquest; but he will never be able to make men at all versed in the knowledge of the particulars of our South American history believe that in South America any such spirit actuates Paraguay. I deem that it is wanting in respect for a minister of a great country like France to bring the accusation to him that Paraguay aspires to conquer Brazil and the Argentine Confederation ! The use of the hyperbole has limits beyond which it is dangerous to employ it. With regard to the commercial restrictions and monopolies of which Mr. de Macedo accuses Paraguay, I must recall to notice [Page 277] that of all the states of the La Platan Paraguay was the first to claim and proclaim the free navigation of the rivers, whereas Brazil and Buenos Ayres have been the last opposed to it, and still oppose it as far as they can, as is proved by the treaty of the 1st of May.
I shall now reply to the 3d, 5th, 8th, and 13th allegations in taking a cursory historic view of the events which preceded the present war, from which the States of the La Plata suffer so cruelly. If I do not succeed in clearing my government of the imputations so often repeated against it, but with so little foundation, of ambition, caprice, a spirit of conquest, &c., it will be my fault, not that of the circumstances which are convincing in themselves to those acquainted with them.
I shall not notice the pretensions of Brazil to the possession of the whole oriental portion of the basin of the La Plata, which are anterior to the 19th century. They are to be found noticed in all the boundary treaties between the Portuguese monarchy and the Spanish monarchy. It is safe to assert that they date back to the first occupation of America by the Europeans. They assume for the first time an authentic character in the bull of Alexander VI, of the 4th May, 1493. However, this length of time will suffice to justify that which I have said of their traditional character with Brazil.
Since the last century their character has appeared still more distinctly perhaps. In 1808, (I shall cite only the most salient facts,) the prince regent of Brazil, afterwards King of Portugal, with the name of Jean VI, caused a proposal to be made to the cabildo of Buenos Ayres to take him under its protection, together with the whole vice-royalty of the La Plata— that is, to unite that whole vice-royalty with Brazil, under the pretext that Charles IV having abdicated, and Ferdinand VII being a prisoner, the claims of Spain to America resulted to the Princess Charlotte, sister of Ferdinand VII, and wife of the author of this proposition. In case the cabildo would not agree to this proposition, Brazil would see herself under the necessity of making common cause with the enemies of Buenos Ayres. (Buenos Ayres and the Provinces of the Rio de La Plata; by Sir Woodbine Parish. London, 1852.) In 1812, the prince regent puts this measure in execution, and invades Uruguay in the name and as ally of the same sovereign whom a few years previous he considered as having forfeited his rights. In 1816, that prince regent sends troops into the oriental province of Uruguay, which he finally seizes, and several years after annexes to Brazil, with the name of Cisplatine province. Forced to abandon her prey, Brazil did not abandon her prospect of reconquering it. In 1830, notwithstanding the treaty of 1828, in which she assumed, under the moral guarantee of England, the obligation to respect, and, in case of need, to enforce respect for the independence of Uruguay, now become a sovereign State, she issued to her special ambassador in Europe, the Marquis de Santo Amaro, the instructions, then secret, bat at this day well known, from which I extract the following passage:
“7. Concerning the new Oriental state, or the Cisplatine province, which is not part of the Argentine territory, which was incorporated with Brazil, and which cannot continue independent, your excellency is to endeavor, on proper occasions, and frankly, to prove the necessity which exists for its being again incorporated with the empire. * * * It forms the natural frontier of Brazil, and its reunion to the empire would be the best means of avoiding future causes of differences between Brazil and the States of the south.”
In 1852, Brazil caused herself to be recompensed for her participation in the downfall of the Dictator Rosas, the consequent deliverance of Uruguay and Montevideo, by a cession of Uruguayan territory. When she saw she could not take all at one time, she took in small portions; it was so much gained towards her unchangeable object. Not satisfied with this acquisition, she interposes almost immediately after in Uruguay; she procures the election of her protege Don Venancio Flores, then colonel, (1853,) as president of that republic, and maintains a garrison at Montevideo. Compelled to retire before the reclamations of the guaranteeing powers of the autonomy of Uruguay, she carries with her in her retreat (1855) her protege Don Venancio Flores, and if she did not then make a breach in the Oriental territory, it was because circumstances did not permit it.
New reclamations bring her back, in 1864, to the Oriental territory. It is the policy of the Brazilian empire always to have some reclamations pending against her neighbors, be it on account of questions of boundary or from any other cause, in order always to preserve a pretext for an intervention with them when occasion appears to her favorable. She does not claim seriously except to intervene and intervenes only to conquer. Even after she has intervened she still preserves some questions pending for future interventions. At this moment, though she no longer claims anything from Uruguay, as is proved by the convention of February, 1855, she still continues to occupy her territory. Don Venancio Flores, her protégé and accomplice as of ten years ago, has become provisional governor, or rather the dictator of that republic, under the protection of Brazilian bayonets, and, without doubt, reserves some great calamity for his country to the advantage of his protector if circumstances should permit it.
Mr. de Macedo will no longer charge me with not giving proofs in support of my assertions concerning the traditional ambition and encroaching policy of Brazil in regard to the La Plata, and yet this ambition and that policy are no secret except with him. They are publicly discussed in the parliament of Rio de Janeiro, and freely confessed at the private meetings at Paris. They are even to be found written in a sufficiently clear manner on the officail geography of Brazil, among which the map of the South American empire is to be found [Page 278] delineated with as much care and detail in the whole Oriental portion of the basin of the La Plata, which comprehends the republics of Paraguay and Uruguay with the two Argentine provinces of Eutre-Rios and Corrientes, as it is in the vicinity of Rio de Janeiro, whereas the occidental portion of that basin presents a blank as a foreign country bordering on the empire. A final proof of that ambition and policy is contained in the geographical chart annexed to the book which Brazil has just published for the occasion of the Universal Exposition of 1867, in the Champ de Mars. In that chart, in fact, may be seen, independently of the circumstance of the delineation above mentioned, the Brazilian frontier in the direction of Paraguay pointed in conformity with the treaty of triple alliance of the 1st of May. This circumstance is the more curious since not only does Brazil not occupy the territory of Paraguay, which she ascribes to herself, but, on the contrary, Paraguay continues to occupy to this day a portion of Brazilian territory.
But will Mr. de Macedo say on this occasion these matters concern only Uruguay, and the government of Paraguay has nothing to do with the contentions of Brazil with Uruguay? I come to facts which do concern Paraguay, and I hope to be able to show the intimate solidarity which has united this republic with that of Uruguay since at least ten or fifteen years in the ambitious policy of Brazil.
Brazil recognized the independence of Paraguay in 1844. I have already stated that this measure, though an act of friendliness to all appearance, was really a measure of hostility against the Dictator Rosas, who had refused the year previous to ratify a treaty signed at Rio de Janeiro by her mandatory, General Guido. This treaty is another evidence of the ambitious policy of Brazil in the La Plata, because it had the double object of re-establishing. the weakened authority of the empire in its southern provinces, and of introducing the Brazilian fleets into the Argentine rivers in order, to rule over them as at this day.
At the same time that she recognized the independence of Paraguay, Brazil proposed to her a boundary treaty, very advantageous to the empire, which the government of Paraguay showed itself disposed to subscribe, as much out of gratitude for an act which did not cost Brazil anything, whilst it was not even spontaneous, as from a sincere desire to obviate all matter of disagreement between the republic and her dangerous neighbor But Brazil, who doubtless did not expect so much good will, perceived that she had not been sufficiently exacting, and resolved to exact more; she exacted so much that the treaty of boundaries proposed by her became impossible. This was the beginning of her official relations with Paraguay. It is evident that she did not modify her traditional policy.
In 1850, Paraguay was menaced by General Rosas, in the direction of Comentes. It is a moment which Brazil chooses to break in upon her territory and take possession of the Pan de Azúcar, from which it became necessary to dislodge her by active force. In that conjuncture Brazil does not interpose; all occasion for it is wanting; she invaded without striking a blow, and simply and purely took possession of the undefended territory which she coveted, and did not even deem herself restrained by the preliminary forms with a country feeble, menaced, and abandoned by the whole world. However, she was repulsed, and her policy thenceforward was to resert to means less primitive.
In 1855, she proposes to herself a brilliant revenge. Experience has taught her that she is powerless against Paraguay by land; she will therefore seek a road by water. However, she has no longer the contempt for her new adversary entertained in 1850, and thinks of procuring support in the La Plata; besides, it would not be prudent to leave three hundred miles of river in the rear of her with a population, perhaps, hostile or at least neutral; and then it became expedient to operate at the same time against Uruguay and Paraguay. In this manner arose the solidarity of these two republics in the policy of Brazil. In 1853-‘55, in fact, Uruguay is occupied by Brazil, who establishes in it her protégé Flores, and constitutes that republic the base of her operations against Paraguay.
In 1855, Brazil had not, as in 1865, the excuse of an anticipated attack by Paraguay; however, she prepares for the attack. A pretext will not be wanting; in case of necessity one can be created, and, in fact, one is created,. The Emperor Don Pedro has, however, given his sovereign assurance to the Brazilian Parliament that it will not result in an armed conflict; but Brazil seems to have undertaken to vindicate the policy of the celebrated expression attributed to a modern diplomat, “that words were given to men to conceal their thoughts,” and Admiral de Oliveira ascends the Paraguay with a fleet considered sufficiently strong to subdue the Paraguayan government. Admiral de Oliveira penetrates the Rio Paraguay as far as Cerrito. There he finds a Paraguayan launch which summons him to stop, and he does stop, but he declares that he is instructed to continue his voyage to Asuncion; he consequently requests (the moment does not seem to him to have yet arrived for proceeding otherwise) the necessary permission from the government of Paraguay, threatening to force his passage it’ he does not receive a favorable reply within six days. The government of Paraguay replies to him that he may pass alone with the vessel carrying his flag, but that his other vessels must immediately leave the Paraguayan waters. This answer, at once proud and conciliatory, awes the Brazilian admiral, who begins to understand that his country has not the proper appreciation of Paraguay, her resources and government. However this be, he obeys the injunctions of the Paraguayan government, and profits by the friendly advice which he likewise receives not to provoke on his way the population of Paraguay, which was deeply indignant at the unexpected menace by his vessels. It was several days previous to this [Page 279] exchange of communications between the Brazilian admiral and the government of Paraguay, that President Carlos Antonio Lopez addressed to the army and people of his country the proclamations from which I have already cited two passages, and from which I shall restate the following, as showing the anguish and firmness of that statesman, who has never been accused of ambition or of a spirit of conquest: “Yesterday, 20th, a battle may, perhaps, have taken place with our battery at Humaita.”
The war which appeared imminent did not break out. Admiral de Oliveira, who had full powers to open it or to treat, deemed it more prudent to treat. His government disavowed his action; it thought it a weakness on his part; the present war proves that he judged rightly. Whatever the case, the pending question of limits between the two countries was not then solved any more than previously. The admiral had offered to settle it in a short space of time, but in disavowing his action, the cabinet of Rio did not pay the least attention to his engagement. The question is first postponed to 1862, and after 1862 it is evaded. Brazil continued true to her policy of equivocation and ambush during the peace, making her dispositions for a more favorable opportunity for war.
I come to speak of the battery, now fortress of Humaita, of which Mr. de Macedo gives such a flattering description to the Paraguayan military, at the same time deducing an argument from it against the purely defensive policy of my country. It is an occasion which I seize to explain the transformation of it into a fortress, or something like it. This transformation commenced in 1855, at a time when Paraguay, menaced by Admiral de Oliveira, was obliged to improvise means of defence for which she had not, until then, felt the necessity. At that period General Don Francisco Solano Lopez, now President of Paraguay, returned from Europe. He was charged by his father to organize in haste measures to oppose Admiral de Oliveira. It seems that he labored with success, since the admiral renounced his belligerent projects. Afterwards the temporary works of the fortress of Humaita were completed under the same superintendence, and experience has further proved the competency and foresight of the military genius who undertook it. The fortress of Humaita, as far as it is a fortress, is, therefore, the indirect work of Brazil, and it does not become Mr. de Macedo to complain of it. As regards the other armed preparations, they are explained in the same manner. I concede that they are unwelcome to Brazil and her allies, but their complaints on that score are really superfluous. Besides, I take pleasure in informing them that the future has new matters of astonishment in store for them if the war should continue. If it was their object to ascertain to what degree of heroism a nation defending its firesides, its independence, its honor, and life can rise, they will learn it from that nation of Paraguay, ere-while feeble, menaced, and abandoned by all the world, as Mr. de Macedo says, who evidently does not understand either its character or its patriotism, or its resources.
In 1864, Brazil flourishes as ten years before, and this time again she has as an accomplice her protégé, now become a general, Don Venancio Flores; but this time she has another and more redoubtable accomplice, Buenos Ayres, now at the head of the Argentine Republic.
Buenos Ayres pretends, and Mr. de Macedo repeats, that Paraguay attacked her without reason, in full peace, at a time when she reposed in all security on the faith of treaties, and observed scrupulously her neutral obligations. She forgets that even before forcing the passage through Corrientes, which she had refused Paraguay, the Brazilians were already established in the port of Corrientes, of which they had made a military depot and a base of operations against Paraguay; she forgets that she had put the Brazilian fleet in possession of the waters, the harbors, and the strategic points of the Argentine rivers; she forgets, further, that she furnished to that fleet all sorts of provisions for its mariners, coal for its engines, and even munitions for its cannons, as is affirmed by one of the most honorable senators of the Argentine confederation, Don Felix Frias, and as was previously affirmed by Mr. Paranhos in the very senate of Rio de Janeiro; she forgets, finally, that she had previously stopped at the island of Martin Garcia, and forced to return the several vessels of the constitutional government of Montevideo, which were proceeding to the Rio Uruguay to battle with the rebel, (this word is not my own, and I employ it only to show the opinion which the English charge d’affaires at Montevideo, in 1864, Mr. Lettsom, entertained of the revolution headed by General Flores, in open alliance with Brazil, and the clandestine of Buenos Ayres, ) Don Venancio Flores.
Paraguay could not but feel that the storm raised by Brazil and Buenos Ayres at the mouth of the La Plata, in 1864, was to burst over her as soon as Uruguay should have succumbed. She had no reason to believe either in the sincerity of the reclamations of Mr. Saraiva, or the professions of neutrality of the Argentine government. She was aware, besides, that since the beginning of 1864 Buenos Ayres and Brazil had had an understanding with each other; that Mr. Saraiva did nothing at Montevideo without the assent and concurrence of General Mitre; that the money and the munitions of Buenos Ayres supported General Flores; that the Oriental government, assailed by the three secret allies who were subsequently to sign the treaty of the 1st of May, was the most enlightened, moderate, and honest which Uruguay had ever had, according to, the testimony, already cited, of the Argentine senator, Don Felix Frias. Knowing all this and many things beside, because in America state secrets are badly preserved, she was consequently aware that such efforts, so many violations of the law of nations, had not the single purpose of placing General Don Venancio Flores on the presidential chair of Uruguay; and she knew, therefore, that it would not be long before [Page 280] she herself would be attacked in her turn, as in 1855, but this time under more threatening and more redoubtable circumstances. The treaty of the 1st of May, which it is attempted to prove the improvised work of 15 days, resulting from the passage of her troops through the Argentine province of Corrientes, shows in the most striking manner that she was not mistaken.
Menaced by enemies, so much more dangerous because they artfully concealed their projects, it became Paraguay to act with vigor and resolution. Each day which passed brought with it a new peril in drawing closer together the circle of iron in which it was endeavored to enclose her. In that situation it became necessary for her to attack in order to defend herself. To wait was to assent to the plan of her enemies; it was putting all the chances of the contest against herself. She had, perhaps, already waited too long. She therefore began the war, but she began it fairly, openly, like a soldier who is only animated by the noble motive of duty. She waged it against Buenos Ayres and Brazil because Buenos Ayres and Brazil waged it on her in an underhand, clandestine, secret manner, as they make treaties. They understand little any country who attribute to it a war of ambition or pride. Paraguay has never taken up arms except in defence of her independence. It is a merit of feeble States, true, but it is a merit of which strong States should be more emulous.
Mr. de Macedo makes a point in his favor of the opinion of Mr. Thornton that Paraguay opened the war on the Argentine Confederation without sufficient motive. It is indeed a cause of regret to my country that Mr. Thornton was not less partial in his conception and feelings in 1865; but in 1865 Mr. Thornton resided at Buenos Ayres; he was not in the secret of the subsequent signers of the treaty of May. In short, he had not confided to him the honor, independence, and existence even, of the country of whose acts he then disapproved.
I stop; further explanation would tire the persons who do me the honor to read this, without adding any to their convictions. One more word, however: Paraguay had nothing to gain from the war, even if she triumphed: why, then, should she have provoked it? Her past bears evidence of her pacific disposition, and, whatever may be said of her government, she would not have allowed herself to be drawn into a contest, disastrous in every respect, without a deep conviction that her honor and independence were at stake, of which she is equally jealous with any country on earth.