Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress
Senor Romero to Mr. Hunter
The minister of the Mexican republic presents his compliments to William Hunter, esq., and has the honor to transmit several late articles from the Paris press relating to Mexican affairs and containing important information, showing the change of public opinion in France in regard to that delicate question.
[From La Liberté.—Translation.]
THE EVACUATION OF MEXICO.
The recent news from Mexico is of a serious nature that does not surprise us, but requires prompt action on the part of the government. Why should we be longer deceived by words and illusions? Everybody believes that the Mexican empire is near its end, and we need not try to prolong the agony of a dying government. The truth is we had better wind up the unfortunate affair at once. It is plain that France only makes additional sacrifices in endeavoring to carry out an expedition that should not have been commenced. To keep up the empire we must support Maximilian with fifty thousand men and five hundred millions of francs, and risk a profitless war with the United States: and it is certain France will not consent to such a sacrifice, so the business better be closed up at once. First, let Maximilian resign. On this point there will be no trouble. He accepted the place reluctantly, and he will [Page 380] give up without hesitation. His ignorance of the country, and what he was to undertake, will excuse him before the world.
When Maximilian is gone France will be in the same position towards Mexico that she was before the vote of the notables electing him; that is, she will front an enemy, with whom she will have to treat on the best terms. She will not venture to start another government, but will treat with Juarez, because he is our opponent, and his re-establishment is the only-way to get out of the difficulty. But will Juarez grant us the conditions we want? We are not sure, but it is certain he will purchase our evacuation on the best terms. Another question is, will Juarez’s terms be enforced by Mexico? We fear not. But as it would be the same with any other ruler, better trust him.
What he can grant is the lives of our countrymen, and that is of the most importance at present. The Mexican expedition will be a serious loss in money, and it will be a check to our progressive policy, but it cannot be prevented. But we must not shock the world, with the sad sight of our murdered countrymen, when it is known the expedition was got up to protect them. That would be worse than all, and our last duty now is to prevent it.
We have conquered the Mexicans wherever we have met them, and all we have to keep us there is our regard for Maximilian, Let him abdicate and restore us to our liberty, and all that will remain for us to do will be to secure the safety of our countrymen.
But the most important, what is absolutely necessary, is a prompt and energetic decision to put an end to the crisis instead of prolonging it.
The Mexican empire.
The following telegram from the emperor Maximilian was handed to the Patrie yesterday by the Mexican legation:
[Valentia, October 9—1 o’clock a. m. ]
Chapultepec, September 27.
To General Almonte, Paris:
You will inform the legations that excellent spirits prevail among all classes. The cabinet is formed at last. We are on the best terms with our allies. The railway is open to Apizaco.
The Mexican debt.
October has come and the holders of Mexican bonds are asking if their arrearages are to be paid.
The empress Charlotte’s late visit to Paris; the interviews of that young, intelligent and courageous sovereign, evidently on a secret mission; the last exaggerated accounts from Mexico, from United States correspondents, without doubt, have excited all sorts of suspicions.
These questions are put:
Is the French government responsible for the principal and interest of the Mexican bonds? What is the extent and character of that responsibility? We have already said what we think of the duties of France towards Mexico; we will now examine its financial responsibility for the loans negotiated by the state.
In the first place, we must consider the origin of these loans, the part our government took in their issue, and the use made of the sums realized.
As regards the use of the funds, we will borrow from an article of A. Cochut in the Temps, which is known not to favor the Mexican expedition. Maximilian accepted the empire by the treaty of Miramar. In one of its clauses it says: France shall be paid the expenses of the expedition, for all private claims, and the war shall be carried on by the forces of the new empire with those of the allies.
By virtue of that clause the Mexican government negotiated a loan of 16,762,000 francs, in six per cents., at 63 francs, in 1864; 6,600,000 of this went into the treasury for indemnities. The rest was raised in London and Paris, and amounted to 102,000,000.
In 1865 there was a second loan, 500,000 bonds at 340 francs, giving a total of 170,000,000, both loans yielding 272,000,000; expenses to be deducted 26,000,000, leaving a net profit of 246,000,000.
[Page 381]The was sum used in this way: For reimbursing the principal in fifty years, 34,000,000 francs; interest, premium, &c., 54,000,000 francs; the old Mexican debt paid in London, 22,000,000 francs; to the government, for war expenses, &c., 102,000,000; making the entire sum realized on both the loans, 212,000,000 francs. Of this Mexico got only 34 millions, with the 22 millions paid to London.
Thus France made one hundred and two millions out of the Mexican loan.
The 6,600,000 in the treasury of the ’64 loan were exchanged, in 1865, for 174,000 bonds of the second loan, and 60,000 of them were recently sold. This seems to be assuming a responsibility for the loan.
According to Cochut, then, there are yet 114,000 bonds in the treasury unsold; 47,000 reserved to pay French claims, leaving 83,000 to the credit of the Mexican commission. 756,000 bonds, making the sum of 192,000,000, have been put into the French treasury by individuals, to pay the expenses of the expedition. It seems to us that the French government ought to be responsible for the people’s money used by it for the Mexican expedition.
Now, if the Mexican empire fails, the French creditors lose, and the government ought to pay them. We do not hesitate to say, then, that we are in justice bound for the Mexican bonds to French creditors. If Mexico cannot pay, France must; that is the short of it.
Let us look into the Moniteurs of the 11th and 12th April, 1865. Here we find the report of Mr. Costa encouraging the new monarchy, and the minister of state repeats it to the public; but he takes care to add: “It is not a question of responsibility for the Mexican loan.” It is plain the French government is not legally responsible for the loan. But the bondholders reason after this fashion:
The government authorized the loan, and employed its officers to negotiate it; it formed a Mexican finance commission to act for its interests; a minister of finance was sent to the emperor Maximilian; the useless bonds of the first loan were exchanged for good ones; it paid the troops in Mexico with our money; old Mexican debts were paid in London with our money; for these reasons the French government is responsible for the Mexican loans.
We will speak plainly.
We cannot deny that Mr. Costa’s report, the support of the plan before the legislature, the authorization of the government, the Mexican commission, had a certain influence on the sale of the bonds; but the twelve per cent, interest and the prizes had a greater. The government ought not and will not deny its responsibility in this affair; but to charge the French people with the entire burden of those loans would be too much.
The fact is this:
France favored the issue of the loans, hoping to establish a new nation as the result of its expedition. It used a large portion of the money raised to pay the expenses of the expedition and put down Juarez. It took part in the loan, and is certainly liable as far as the advantages it derived from it.
If the bondholders have not the law on their side, at least they can rely upon the honesty and justice of France in all her transactions.
The end of the Mexican business.
Of all affairs occupying the public at present we may truly say that none hangs so heavily on the mind as the prospective and much desired end of the Mexican expedition.
We do not intend to go over an affair we have so often discussed, but we have a fact to state: our flag is about to quit the shores of Mexico. Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, in his despatch of the 6th of April last, closing his long correspondence with the United States, used these formal words:
“The Emperor has decided that the French troops shall quit Mexico in three detachments. The first is to leave in November, 1866; the second, in March. 1807: and the third, in November of that same year. You will please inform the Secretary of State officially of that decision.”
If this is not exactly a formal promise to the government of the United States, it is at least an official notice of a disposition to accede to the wishes of that government, and puts an end to a long correspondence on the important subject. We are assured that the evacuation will begin next month. But, rumor says, since that despatch, the French government is convinced that withdrawing the army in parcels will leave the rest unprotected, and there is hope that the whole army will return in November.
What will take place in Mexico after the army leaves? It Maximilian is as firmly fixed as he says, he will have to depend entirely on “the good disposition that everywhere prevails,” and go on with his hard work of founding an empire.
If, on the other hand, his government cannot get on without our aid, he will return to [Page 382] Europe with our army. At all events, he has played his part in Mexico; our fear of a war with the United States is over, and we shall spend no more money for Mexico. We will then attend to our own business at home, and watch affairs in Europe. That will be quite enough to keep us busy, and our people’s minds will be relieved from a great weight.
But the relief would be greater if the government would say if it intends to secure two points of exceeding interest to Frenchmen, viz., will it protect our countrymen in Mexico, and will it pay the Mexican loan debts? We don’t know how we can protect our friends in Mexico after our army has left. That depends on circumstances; but we hope the government will do its best to shield them amidst the anarchy that will prevail when our troops are gone.
As to indemnification to the bondholders, that is easy. It is generally believed the government will pay them. Most of the loan went into the treasury, and of course the government will repay what it took from the people. We cannot say for certain what the government will do; but it must do something, and that promptly. Quod facis fac citius! must be the motto, for two reasons; one is, all delay in financial matters causes loss. If there is delay, the purchasers at a low rate will be gainers; the other is, to bury the Mexican expedition as soon as possible in oblivion, and have its funeral preached to calm the world.
French interests.
To questions put by La Liberté, the Pays makes this reply on Mexican affairs;
“We answer the questions in La Liberté after this fashion: The mental condition of the empress Charlotte is unfortunately very serious. This blow, adding to Maximilian’s other troubles, will most likely cause him to relinquish his hard task. We do not want the public to be deceived by the despatch we published yesterday. The French government is deeply interested in Maximilian’s return from Mexico, and General Castelnau is the bearer of definite instructions, though we cannot say precisely what they are. But one thing is certain, Napolcon will never consent at any price to give up Mexico without securing French interests, let it cost what it will.
“PAUL DE CASSAGNAC.”
Such is the question, and now we will give the answer. The Pays agree with us that Maximilian must abdicate; so we tell the Patrie the empire is done, according to the Pays’ candid confession. But how are we to protect our countrymen when Maximilian quits? That is what the Pays cannot tell us. It says the government will not give up Mexico without giving the most complete guarantee to French interests. How is the government to do that? we ask our honorable colleague. We see no other issue than that proposed in the treaty of Soledad, three years ago. Are the French interests the Pays alludes to in France or Mexico? If they are in France, why prolong the Mexican expedition? Nothing has been gained by it yet. We went to war for a few millions, and we have spent two hundred and fifty millions. First, the French claims, including Jecker’s, amounted to a few millions; now, they amount to many millions. At first, Frenchmen were treated as well as any other foreigners in Mexico, now we don’t know but they may be murdered to-morrow. That is the balance sheet! After making the mistake of trying to found an empire, now it is down, let us resume our liberty of action.
Must we be responsible for a new government that can be no better than the first? Must we risk a war with the United States by staying in Mexico? That is what the Pays means by saying the Emperor will secure French interests at all risks. It wants a new sacrifice of men and money; it wants a war with the United States.
We do not regard French interests in that light. It was not to the interest of France to begin the Mexican expedition; and when commenced, it was France’s interest to stop at Sole-dad with England and Spain. When France was left alone, it was her interest to treat with the Mexican government after the capture of Puebla and the occupation of the city of Mexico. After founding a government and assuming a guardianship of it, France ought to have lent it money at six per cent., and not have cheated it out of many millions.
We have said this before, and not in passion or with a party spirit. Now we say there are but two roads to pursue in Mexican affairs:
If we try to make Mexico a French province, we shall have war with the United States; if we withdraw with Maximilian and treat with Juarez, we shall have peace. As we have always been victorious in Mexico, we can retire with honor, which is of great importance. There remains then but one political mistake to correct, one debt to liquidate. “A money wound is not mortal,” says the proverb. That is true, if it be properly dressed and not allowed to mortify.
CLEMENT DUVERNOIS.
[Page 383]THE RIGHTS OP JUAREZ.
All the papers favoring French intervention in Mexico make much noise about the differences between Juarez and Ortega, and with strange inconsistency grant rights to the latter which they refuse to the former.
For the benefit of history we will correct these mistakes. According to the constitution of the Mexican republic, in case of the President’s death, the president of the supreme court succeeds to power. Now, in 1862, Ortega was president of that court, while Juarez was President of the republic. During that year Ortega was made chief of the eastern division of the army, and marched to defend Puebla. While besieged in that city, congress, mindful of the risks he ran there, deposed him from chief justice and put a lawyer named Ruiz in his place.
When Juarez’s time expired in 1865 extraordinary circumstances induced a large number of Mexicans to re-elect Juarez. Ruiz protested against that election. Ortega’s protest was null and void, for he was no longer president of the supreme court, and had no right to the presidency of the republic. The government at Washington is right; for as long as it has a minister accredited near Juarez, it will not notice the pretensions and protests of Ortega.
Let us finish the Mexican business.
All the papers this morning are commenting upon the telegram sent by the emperor Maximilian to General Almonte, his representative in Paris. It seems all is going on well; all the people are well disposed; the cabinet is formed; and the best understanding prevails between Mexico and its allies. There is no doubt about this, for the information comes from the emperor himself. Since things are going on so well there, why does not the French government take advantage of circumstances, put an end to the unlucky expedition, and withdraw our army? What prevents it from giving this satisfaction to public opinion? Unfortunately the Moniteur keeps a sullen silence on this serious subject. Nobody knows what will be done, and guessers have full play. Foreign papers are filled with Paris correspondence purporting to be reliable, giving all sorts of plans and projects and impossible combinations, which the cunning use to the great damage of the credulous.
We would like to know the intentions of the French government, not only in regard to our army in Mexico, but in regard to the Mexican debt, which is daily becoming more grievous to the bondholders. The obligations are depreciating, to the great injury of the original purchasers, and the silence of the government increases the trouble. Why not enlighten us on the subject?
This is the propitious moment. Maximilian says he has no more need of us, since harmony prevails among all classes of the population. Let the government then agree with Maximilian upon a guarantee of French interests, and bring our army back as soon as possible, as it will have to be done sooner or later.
The European horizon is gloomy: peace has hardly been signed between Prussia and Austria, when we hear rumors of another war. Prussian papers openly proclaim the warlike projects of the Berlin cabinet. To humble and degrade Austria, destroy her if necessary; to bring Paris to her senses; to impose laws upon the world; nothing seems impossible to King William.
Who knows how far the infatuation of a first triumph may carry him? Only a few days ago Prussia tried to prevent Austria from appointing a certain minister. Prussia might go further, and France might be called upon to stop her in her fits of audacity and folly. But to do this France will want all her forces now scattered over the world. France is strong, but she must let the world know it for once. To do this, we must recall all our foreign expeditions. The convention of the 25th of September recalls our army from Rome; and now we must bring back our troops from Mexico. We should not have gone to that distant country, and our presence is certainly not needed there now. Why delay? If there are reasons for continuing the occupation, let them be known. But there are none. All the interests we have to defend now are the interests of the Mexican bondholders. Let the government think of that and decide. There is no time to be lost, for we are threatened from two quarters. The present condition of Europe requires all our strength at home, and our finances are damaged by the depreciation of the Mexican obligations. We must put an end to this. A decision is urgent, for many reasons, and Maximilian’s despatch makes it easy. France has other and better business than weaning monarchies; she has something more manly to do. The government was mistaken when it thought it could found a monarchy in Mexico. If Maximilian’s despatch is true, the empire is fixed; France has done her work; let her be gone. If Maximilian is mistaken, if France is deceived, if the Mexican baby empire is not viable, let us confess our error and retire, since we have done all we could; we have reached the extreme limit of our sacrifices in men and money. Whatever process of reasoning be adopted, the conclusion must be the same.
Let us finish this Mexican business!
[From the Opinion Nationale.]
We read in the Pays as follows:
“The mental condition of the empress Charlotte is unfortunately very serious. The unexpected attack has so much increased the difficulties of the situation, that it is doubtful if the emperor Maximilian will continue his thankless task. We do not want the public to be deceived by the despatch we published yesterday. The French government is deeply interested in Maximilian’s return from Mexico, and General Castelnau is the bearer of definite instructions, though we cannot say precisely what they are. But one thing is certain—Napoleon will never consent, at any price, to give up Mexico without securing French interests.
“PAUL DE CASSAGNAC.”
These lines give a special character to the paper publishing them, and to which we must call attention. The Pays, after publishing the despatch, says we must not be deceived by it, and assures us the French government is much interested in Maximilian’s return; hence we conclude the empire, founded and maintained by our soldiers, is lost.
We are much pleased with this declaration of the Pays, if it be true, that the French government has decided to give up an enterprise that has cost us so much blood and money, and which should never have been undertaken. Our intervention has lasted long enough. We have injured our finances and unfurled our flag in distant regions, risking a war with the United States, already too long, while events at our very doors called our strict attention. France is certainly opulent and powerful; but while so many changes are taking place in Europe, it is her duty to attend to interests at home.
The regeneration of Mexico, by our arms, or by the efforts of Maximilian, is an impossibility, and we should have known it on the day that Spain and England gave up the expedition to us. It is never too late to do good; and the day that our soldiers quit that unlucky land will be a thrice happy day, even if it be the dying day of the Mexican empire.
When the Pays says that the Emperor Napoleon will not give up Mexico “till our interests are assured,” we readily believe it; but it is easier to write this than to effect it. What does the Pays mean? What will the Emperor do? If the Pays knew, it should have told us. It seems to us that extreme means have already been used by the Emperor, for many years, by an armed and expensive occupation of a vast country without arresting the civil war for a single day or gaining anything but an increase of a debt against a government that is already insolvent.