Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward
Sir: I have to acknowledge the reception of despatches from the department numbered 1278 and 1279.
I had the honor to forward to you on Wednesday a report of the debate in the Commons on Monday evening, on the relations between the two countries. The effect of it in quieting the panic so artificially excited by the London Times, on the one side, and the rebel agents and sympathizers on the other, has been very considerable. I am now in hopes that matters will go on for a while more quietly in Parliament. The effects of the rashness of Lord Derby have been neutralized by the wiser and more statesman-like tone of his friends, Mr. Seymour Fitzgerald and Mr. D’Israeli. On the part of the former of these two the action is the more worth noting, that he has heretofore been well known as entertaining a decided sympathy with the rebel cause. The speech of Mr. Bright is universally admitted to have been one of the most brilliant specimens of his peculiar style of oratory. In its reminiscences, equally unwelcome to both sides of the house, it was yet received after the fashion of an unpleasant medicine, which has the aid of a strong and savory medium to overwhelm the nauseous taste.
But although the mischief-makers are for the time defeated, it is not the less important to continue mindful of the machinations to which they are prone to resort on every opportunity. Manifestly the sore point is Canada, where the [Page 247] want of proper foresight on the part of the home government has furnished the means to the rebel intriguers of operating to irritate our countrymen to such an extent that the possible consequences to that possession can be no longer overlooked. It cannot be pretended that you did not give them early and full warning through this legation. The record will remain beyond the possibility of obliteration. But it has always been a characteristic of the British government to fail in promptness—to act in anticipation of evils. The conviction of the necessity is not reached until after the moment when it has ceased to be of practical use. It was this peculiarity which gave rise to the war with us in 1812, a war which is now acknowledged to have been unnecessary and unwise. At the same time it may equally be affirmed that had we studied more closely this characteristic, and been patient and forbearing a while longer, while awaiting the end of this process, the war itself might have been wholly avoided. The obnoxious measure which immediately brought it on was actually rescinded after it was too late to escape its consequences. This is a lesson not unworthy of study in the light of recent events. It is to be remembered that almost in every instance in which we have made representations and remonstrances throughout this struggle, they have been met, at the outset, coldly or with decided resistance. Yet it is equally true that, in the end, the justice or reasonableness of them has been either directly or incidentally conceded. The remedies have never been seasonably or effectively applied. But the fact that they have been resorted to is a substantial and enduring recognition of the obligation, and a great security to the maintenance of a policy of peace.
I have already, in preceding despatches, dwelt so fully upon the necessity of keeping under close observation the several changes of popular opinion as they occur, as well as of adapting ourselves carefully to the immediate emergency, that it is needless for me to enlarge upon it further. It is enough to say that the first sense of deep disappointment among the higher classes at the proper result of the struggle is slowly passing off. They are more or less prepared for a restoration of the Union, but the position of Canada will yet be for some time a ground for alarm, and possibly for much manifestation of ill will, if any circumstances should appear to justify it. I have taken some pains to ridicule the notion that we have the smallest desire to appropriate Canada by conquest. The ill-founded and unfortunate opinion expressed by Lord Russell in the early part of the contest, that, on our side, it was waged for empire, has been twisted to confirm an impression that we intend to spread our armies not merely over the slaveholding States, but over Canada on the one side, and Mexico on the other. It is of no avail to represent to them that even were it admitted to be our policy to acquire those countries, the true way to bring it about would be by patience, conciliation, and the establishment of a harmony of interests that would bring on that end as a perfectly natural result. These are not European ideas, and, therefore, stand no chance of being appreciated. The sense of the presence of half a million of men in arms, and of a powerful naval armament, with nothing to do, is much more distinctly defined to the imagination. It may not, therefore, be wholly unadvisable to bear in mind the existence of these apprehensions in shaping the tone and language that may be used to denote even constructively any ulterior policy of the government.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of Stale, Washington, D. C.