Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch, No. 36, of February 23, 1864, and am most happy to reply that your advice, by the authority of the President, “I recommend to you the practice of prudence and reserve in the excited debates by which you are now surrounded,” has been my will of action in the past, and will be implicitly pursued now, confirmed by your instructions in the future. I am a mere “looker on here in Vienna,” and report to you, sir, the impressions of passing events, mixing facts with inferences, leaving to your superior judgment and information to draw correct conclusions.
The heart of Sweden and Norway palpitates in sympathetic accord with their brethren of Denmark, resisting with stout courage the force of apparently irresistible numbers. I feel for this brave nation; their past history appeals to the general student, their present to all advocates of republican institutions.
Throughout Sweden and Norway relief societies and aid committees are formed to collect money, clothing, &c., to which all contribute. The sufferings of the Danish army have been and are intense; from my own observation, the powers [Page 361] of this stout northern race surpass all belief; they are out in all weather—as thoroughly at home in snow and ice as in rain and mud. They are no unworthy descendants of those Cimbriâns who astonished the Romans of Marius so many centuries since, by sporting half naked in the snow and making sledges of their shields to slide down the icy slopes of the Alps—a rehearsal of the frolics they were wont to indulge in at their northern home, and a custom, in all its ancient primitive simplicity, retained to this day. Of the excellence of the Danish troops no doubt can be entertained. The rigor of the climate seems to make no impression upon them. The fact is, the Scandinavians are all educated, highly civilized men; they have a self-respect and dignity which stand them instead of the most efficient discipline; and they are treated by their superiors with a familiar friendliness which could only be safely shown to men who know their places. The Danes are anxious for a fair trial of strength with their enemies, and the mere apprehension of a cessation of hostilities is gall and wormwood to them. They think that the advantages of their present position fully counterbalance the fearful numerical odds by which they might so easily have been overwhelmed at the famous Dannewerk, though, I must confess, to me it looks like “hoping against hope.”
The Germans have now the whole of Schleswig in their hands, except the petty island of Alsen and the four square miles of ground adjoining it on the mainland. That the position of Dybböl and the island are strong and formidable, and that the Germans are aware of its strength is a matter of certainty, for they turned all their endeavors against it in 1849, when it had hardly more than its natural advantages to rely upon, and were driven from it again and again. They appear to dread an assault, and the slaughter and loss it must entail, and seem disposed to resort to the tedium and delay of a regular siege in preference. What European complications may take place from this war, if prolonged—a war, the origin of which is so shrouded in words that no two men can agree as to its cause, purpose, object, demands, or probable conclusion— who can say? England, on two separate occasions, has inflicted much evil and great wrong on the little kingdom of Denmark. Yet England only (with Sweden) has entreated, remonstrated, expostulated, but been seconded by none. No nation in Europe was so faithful and suffered so much for Napoleon the Great as Denmark—the last to desert the fallen fortunes of the empire—but the ties of gratitude for old and disinterested services do not move France. A single word from the Emperor would have prevented the invasion of the duchies. For what reason that word was not spoken events must tell. The Germans are now quarrelling among themselves, and of the two contingencies it seems more probable that the present year will see a revolution in Germany than witness the dismemberment of Denmark.
With the departure of the King and his ministers to Christiania, all demonstrations on the part of the populace have subsided, and quiet is restored once more to this most peacable capital.
One word more as to the question of Scandinavian union, and the creation of a great northern power, of which much has been said and written. From all I can see, hear, and learn, there is not the most remote probability of such a result. In the three kingdoms the advocates of union are few and destitute of importance. The question of. the capital would be a “bone of contention” always existing, ever irritating; but more than all, the old union of Calmar, and its fearful consequences, loom up portentously before the vision of every Swede.
By telegram we learn that the Norwegian special session of the Storthing adjourns next Thursday, and that they have made all the appropriations for military and naval purposes recommended by his Majesty. They also express their great sympathy for Denmark, and approve of the conduct of the government in not taking separate action, but doing all in their power, in conjunction with England, to aid Denmark. From this action of the Storthing indorsing the policy of the [Page 362] present ministry, Sweden and Norway will give no material aid to Denmark except in joint action with other powers, or at least with England. What restrains them now is prudence, and the knowledge that their aid alone would he futile, tending to unite and excite Germany to greater exertion.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary o State, Washington, U. S. of A.