Mr. Haldeman to Mr. Seward.

No. 37.]

Sir:The enclosed note has been addressed by Count Manderström, Swedish minister of foreign affairs, to the Swedish ambassadors in London and Paris. The note of Count Manderström fully confirms the intimations given in the King of Denmark’s address to the Chambers.

Count Manderström asserts that every pretext for “federal execution” has been removed by the repeated declarations of Denmark; that the invasion of any territory of Denmark must be considered a hostile attack, which it is the duty of Denmark to oppose by all means at her disposal. Count Manderström says, “Things have arrived at a point at which foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Denmark becomes really unendurable; the most extreme measures would be preferable to an unjustifiable submission, in which the Danish people will not acquiesce.”

This is the present state of affairs: that both Sweden and Denmark now submit to the cabinets of London and Paris, claiming protection against German aggression. War can only be arrested by a word from Prussia, which will probably be the agent of the violence with which Denmark is threatened. But as Prussia has the stomach to eat with zest indefinite amount of diet, she will eat this (before war) as a change of diet for health by advice.

Count Manderström’s note is dated 25th September last.

I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

J. S. HALDEMAN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c., Washington, U. S. A.

The following note has been addressed by Baron Manderström. Swedish minister for foreign affairs, to Baron N. Adelsvärd, Swedish ambassador in Paris:

“The important political affairs which, during the last few weeks, have agitated the European cabinets, and engaged their whole attention, have caused facts which would not have failed to excite general attention at a less animated time to pass by almost unobserved.

“Among these is one to which we think it our duty to direct the serious consideration of the government of his Majesty the Emperor of the French. It concerns, as may be easily understood, the new phase upon which the Danish question has entered through the resolutions taken by the German federal diet. In consequence of these resolutions Denmark will soon receive a demand—if, indeed, it has not already been made—to withdraw within six weeks’ time the patent of the 30th of March, 1863, under threat of a federal execution in Holstein. We do not yet know the resolution which Denmark will take, but it appears to us that it cannot be doubted. Things have arrived at a point at which foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Denmark becomes really unendurable. The most extreme measures would be preferable to an unjustifiable submission, in which the Danish people will not acquiesce. We may, therefore, suppose that the Danish government will reply, that by the patent of the 30th of March, 1863, Denmark had conceded to Holstein all the rights which the federal diet has demanded for that duchy. Denmark, therefore, fulfilled all her duties as a federal member, since by this patent the mutual relations of the different parts of the monarchy are established in such a manner that the legislation [Page 351] and taxation in the other parts of the kingdom become independent of that which will be adopted in Holstein and Lauenberg.

“The Danish government will ever be ready to carry into execution the resolution passed in Frankfort relative to the internal administration of these duchies. Every cause as well as every pretext for a federal execution being, however, removed by this declaration, as also by the patent of the 30th of March, the Danish government can only regard such proceeding as having an object entirely apart from the competency of the German diet, and must therefore consider it a hostile attack, which it is her duty to oppose by all the means at her disposal.

“In case this should be the reply of the Danish government, which, as I have already said, appears most probable, it will not be denied that it is based upon facts.

“The demand of the federal diet for a common constitution for the whole monarchy is untenable, because it is the German diet itself, and the Holstein estates, which have rendered such an arrangement impossible. As regards the duchy of Schleswig, it is a fact that the Danish government, after Schleswig’s administrative separation from Holstein, decided to extend the liberties of this province, and that it never took any steps to incorporate it with the kingdom. In any case, this is a question with reference to which the federal diet is entirely incompetent, as regards the claims which, in common with Austria and Prussia, it considers itself entitled to make relative to the negotiations of 1851 and 1852.

“In the meanwhile the diet’s ill-concealed desire to mix itself up in this question causes the danger of the situation, which we can only regard as highly critical, and approaching a crisis which would unavoidably endanger the peace of the north, and very likely of the whole of Europe.

“The government of the King has long avoided a return to this question, but, believing itself to be unable any longer to remain silent, it considers it to be its duty to submit the state of affairs for examination to the cabinets of Paris and London.

“It appears to us that it can scarcely be the wish of those cabinets, particularly in the present state of the negotiations relative to Poland, that a war should break out in the north during the present year. Such an event, however, might happen within a few weeks, should Denmark not meet with such support from those cabinets as would protect her against the aggressive measures of Germany. We will not take upon ourselves to propose the means by which such a contingency might be averted. We believe, howeve, that we have a right to express our opinion upon this question. We have this right, first, on account of the sincere feelings of friendship which bind us to the two governments to whom we address ourselves; and, secondly, because of the serious consequences which might result from a contest from which the force of circumstances could alone prevent us from holding aloof, since our dearest interests would not allow us calmly to see our neighbors oppressed under pretexts which, at a later period, might endanger our own independence.

“I request you to read this despatch to M. Drouyn de l’Huys, and should he desire a copy of it I authorize you to leave one with him.

“MANDERSTRÖM.”