Mr. Sanford to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I had, on yesterday, an audience of the King, which I had asked for, in order to express to his Majesty some considerations touching the withdrawal by the great maritime powers of their recognition of the American insurgents as naval belligerents in the sense of your despatch No. 125.
After some conversation on other topics, (which will be referred to in another communication,) in reply to the hope expressed by his Majesty for an early termination of the war, the effects of which were so deeply felt in Europe, I said that my government, and the people of the United States, had full confidence in bringing it to an early termination, and in the only way possible to secure permanent peace—a restoration of the authority of the government over the whole territory of the Union. That after over two years and a half of war, and after furnishing over a million and a half of volunteers and fifteen hundred millions of dollars, the confidence in the result and the determination to put down the rebellion at any cost had been but strengthened, as his Majesty might perceive in the facility with which the government obtained fresh resources in men and money from the people. About five-eighths of the territory and population claimed by the insurgents was already restored to the authority of the government, and the remainder exhausted, crippled, and demoralized, were weaker than that proportion would express.
Without pretending to fix a term to the war, which might be closed the next campaign, or might continue over several, the result, it seemed to me, could no longer be doubtful, and depended upon the action of the great maritime powers of Europe. We were not fighting alone the rebellion, but we had to contend against the support, moral and material, given by those powers in Europe who called themselves our friends. The recognition of belligerent rights had been and continued to be an immense aid to the insurgents. Not alone in stimulating the hopes of their leaders for a political recognition, and exciting to more desperate resistance, but in enabling them to procure the means to exercise, under the protection of those powers, detestable acts of spoliation and destruction of peaceful merchantmen upon the high seas. At this moment there were in the ports of France no less than three English vessels, with English crews and armaments, fitting out to continue their work of piracy under the so-called confederate flag.
If European governments desired peace, let them withdraw their moral support to the rebellion, and refuse the means to the insurgents for continuing the war by inhibiting these vessels access to and protection in their ports. Such course would surely hasten the end. The contrary course would but prolong the struggle and the sufferings in Europe, but could not affect the result which the deliberate resolution of the government and the people of the United States had determined upon. We could, I continued, carry on the war for still a considerable period without serious disturbance to our financial or industrial interests, but could Europe long afford to continue to aid to prolong the war? Every day’s continuance of the war, and a war tariff on foreign goods, was adding to our independence of her and her manufactures, and consequently tending to close her most important markets. Instead of sending two hundred million dollars’ worth of goods to the United States to buy cotton, France and England were now sending specie to distant lands to pay five prices for cotton to people who needed few clothes, and were but triflng consumers of their manufactures. If this were long continued, to the great embarrassments of a financial crisis would be likely to be added the calamity of a monetary crisis, and with [Page 252] it suspension of specie payments. Again, the continuance of the war would but make more wide-spread the desolation in the cotton-producing States, and inflict upon Europe a more prolonged period of high prices for cotton. Was not the time come for this subject to be seriously considered by European governments? Now, the withdrawal of the recognition of belligerent rights to the insurgents would be considered a gracious and friendly act, which would do much to allay the irritation which had been excited among our people; the time might not be far distant when the condition of the south would necessitate its withdrawal, and when we should have a right to claim it from those who would remain our friends. His Majesty had already lent his powerful influence in favor of justice and peace in the matter of the stoppage of the iron-clad vessels building for the confederates in England, and his action, as on other important occasions, had been highly appreciated by my government. Could not that influence, acquired by the exercise of well-directed efforts in favor of peace and of good relations between peoples in both hemispheres, be now employed to promote the cause of peace in America, and would it not be an act of humanity, not only to the insurgents, but to the suffering classes of Europe, to counsel a withdrawal of that aid hitherto given to the rebellion against the government and integrity of a friendly power?
His Majesty listened attentively to the remarks of which the above is the substance, and said I was right in supposing that his earnest efforts in the future, as in the past, would be directed in favor of peace. He would be gratified, he continued, if any way could be found by which that desirable end could be obtained in the United States towards which he had long entertained, as he had now, feelings of special friendly interest, and he hoped to see an early termination to this war, the disastrous effects of which were so wide-spread, and that it should be effected in a spirit of conciliation.
If, he said further, the President should ever desire his aid in the cause of peace it would be cheerfully given. His Majesty, save in expressions of assent to various propositions made in the course of my remarks, did not express (nor did I expect him to) any opinion upon their subject-matter, viz., the expediency of the withdrawal of belligerent rights to the insurgents.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.