Mr. Motley to Mr. Seward.
Sir:Since the date of my despatch of last week, No. 33, I have had an interview with Count Rechberg. Nothing, however, has up to this moment been decided in regard to the expected offer of the proposed Mexican throne to the Archduke Maximilian. The affair, so far as the imperial royal government is concerned, remains as before. The deputation from Mexico is expected in the course of this week to arrive at Miramare, the archduke’s residence near Trieste.
I could not learn from the minister what conditions would be laid down by the archduke as necessary preliminaries to his acceptance of the crown, but I understood him to say that no binding arrangement would be concluded with this deputation, although it would probably be received.
I understood him, also, to repeat, as often before, that the Austrian government considered the matter as a purely personal one, regarding the archduke himself and his imperial brother only, and that the imperial royal government had not the means nor the inclination to send out forces to Mexico to maintain the new empire.
I do not think it worth while to report any of the observations which I unofficially made on the subject myself, and which were simply those which any loyal American, belonging to any section or party of the United States, would be always sure to make in regard to this overturning of a republic, and the substitution for it of a monarchical government on American soil, and upon our frontier, by means of foreign armies and navies.
It seems to me that public opinion does not need much enlightenment as to the effect likely to be produced upon the people of the United States by this European armed intervention in the affairs of an American republic. I suppose that the French emperor is hardly acting in ignorance of American opinions and feelings, but in defiance of them, and that the archduke in going forth upon this adventure to improve imperial institutions upon the ruins of a democratic republic, can hardly have failed of weighing all the possible consequences of such a step, and that he is not likely to have reckoned on the sympathy and support of the United States government and people.
I intimated to Count Rechberg that there were rumors of the impending recognition of the so-called southern confederacy by the provisional government [Page 115] now established in the city of Mexico; I understood him to reply that the Austrian government knew no such provisional government, and that a communication which had been received from that source had not been and would not be answered.
I alluded also to the daily rumors in the European journals of intrigues and secret understandings between the agents of the insurgent government in the seceded States and the Emperor Napoleon, in which recognition of that organization as an independent power by France was announced for the immediate future, coupled with cession of territory so far as such agents had the power to cede it to the new Mexican empire, as the price of French recognition and French alliance. He said that the archduke held himself aloof from all such intrigues. In regard to the expected recognition by the new Mexican empire of the so-called confederacy, he observed that it would be easy for the United States government in a moment to make such a step impossible.
If the United States should themselves recognize the new government of Mexico, of course such recognition by so important a power would be far more valuable than any political relations that might be established with the southern States. He observed that everybody knew that the previous attacks upon Mexico and the disposition to extend the United States dominion over the soil of that country had always proceeded from the south.
I answered, that the recognition by the United States government of this new empire seemed to me impossible. Instead, however, of saying anything more upon this topic myself, my personal opinions and feelings having been often enough and strongly enough expressed, I proposed reading to him your despatch to Mr. Dayton, of March 3, 1862, which, so far as I knew, had never been published, but of which a copy had been forwarded to me at the time, and which I had brought with me. He readily assented, expressing at the same time a strong respect for yourself and your character as a statesman. I thought it could certainly do no harm that the Austrian government should be in possession of so wise and temperate a statement of American thought on that all-important subject, and accordingly, after reading the paper, I took the responsibility of promising a copy, which has subsequently been communicated to the imperial royal foreign office.
If I have done wrong in this you will let me know. I thought it might have some effect in causing reflection at this critical moment, and I relied on an observation in one of your despatches to me, that our government has no concealment in this matter.
I think you will hardly wish me to enter into academic or prophetic speculations upon this grave incident in our history. You are informed of the exact relations between the United States and France, while I am necessarily in the dark.
Rumors, suspicions, threats, in regard to the attitude of that power towards us fill the atmosphere of Europe. It seems impossible to doubt that the tendencies and sympathies of the French government are towards the slaveholders’ insurrection, and that a recognition of the so-called confederacy is an ever-impending event.
Since the revelations of the British Parliament by Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay, it would be folly to doubt the feelings of the ruler of France. At present the see-saw of his policy between Poland on the one side and Mexico on the other seems to incline towards our side of the world.
The diplomatic correspondence between the three powers and Russia seems to have come to an end for this year, and it can hardly be said that the Czar’s government has sustained a defeat in the encounter. Meantime the Poles, in their struggles for independence, have been for nearly a year in vain supplicating the great powers for that recognition as belligerents which was so very promptly conceded, at the very outbreak of the revolt, to the insurgent slaveholders in the United States. This is a fact which history will forever hold fast.
[Page 116]The Poles are left to fight single-handed and naked as it were against the whole power of Russia, for a winter’s campaign in that direction on the part of France alone is hardly among the probabilities. The Gulf of Mexico seems more tempting at present, and you are better aware than I am how much or how little danger there is of that last chance of the insurgents, a foreign war against the United States. I am sure that the President will avoid such war with any power so long as the national honor and the national safety will permit.
I observe this morning a single paragraph in a widely circulated Vienna newspaper which is worthy of your attention. It is in an article defending the probable acceptance by the archduke of the Mexican crown. “According to latest accounts from Mexico it is hardly to be doubted that all inner discord in Mexico will come to an end so soon as the archduke shall tread its soil. * * * Also, the French government is supposed to have arranged with the American southern States for the cession of Texas. It is confidently assumed that the overwhelmingly German population of Texas would readily submit themselves to a German prince. It is apparently not feared that in consequence of this cession a war would arise between France and North America; should, however, the north of America, besides the still-continuing contest with the confederates, be willing to burden themselves with such a war in addition, then France would not object, perhaps even wish for it, in order at least to be able to interfere with armed force in favor of the south.”
This is in a journal which is generally supposed—I know not how justly—to be “inspired” occasionally by government. Of what use, then, would be talk or argumentation on our side as to Mexican politics, if such views could find general acceptance?
Whether the Germans in Texas, who probably did not emigrate from their fatherland because fanatically attached to monarchical institutions, are grown so disloyal to their adopted country as is here represented, you can judge better than I can. My impression has been that they were not only strong and sincere democrats, but on account of their warm attachment to the United States government they had suffered much persecution from the. insurgents. But under whose authority has Texas been ceded to France? Even were the insurgent government in as triumphant as it is really in desperate circumstances, on what theory and by what machinery is Texas to be ceded?
At least an ordinance of secession out of the confederacy, on the part of the State government, might be thought necessary, or it is supposed that the government at Richmond has spare troops enough at its disposal beyond the Mississippi to deliver over Texas, bound hand and foot, to the new Emperor. Cessions in the Nice and Savoy fashion are not so easily accomplished in our hemisphere. Of course, the Emperor Napoleon, or any foreign potentate, is competent to attempt the conquest of Texas or of any other United States territory with with or without “an arrangement with the southern States,” but it would certainly be something new in the history of the world that the conquest of such a province, 237,000 square miles in extent, and with a population of 600,000, the acquisition of which has cost a war, besides $10,000,000 in money, should be effected without the inconvenience of a new war.
In conclusion, I should say, although I am unable to give you authentically the conditions to be laid down previous to the acceptance of the transatlantic crown by the archduke, that this will undoubtedly include a goodly number of French bayonets for a considerable number of years, a recognition of the throne by France and England at least, and some more substantial manifestations of Mexican opinion in regard to the proposed revolution of the government than the shadowy phenomena which have thus far been visible.
I should say, also, that this whole matter is an embarrassment to the imperial [Page 117] royal government. Offence might be given to France should her fatal present be refused, while acceptance can bring no possible good to Austria.
“Timeo Danaos etiam dona ferentes” is, I suspect, the secret thought of the government.
I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.