Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton
Sir: Your confidential despatch of March 18th has been received. We are still expecting that the ships-of-war on which the insurgents are relying will not be suffered to depart from European ports.
In the confusion incident to national legislation and to the speedy organization of vast forces, it has happened that superior advantages have been unconsciously afforded to military enlistments over enlistments for the naval service. In consequence of this error the navy is now suffering for the want of twelve thousand seamen, while the armies of the United States are filled to the entire satisfaction of the government. Measures have, however, been taken to correct this inequality promptly, and I do not apprehend any inability to maintain our blockade and to restore the national prestige on the ocean.
You intimate a dissatisfaction with the military operations of the season, and you seem to apprehend a recognition of the insurgents by maritime powers if we shall not be more successful. I do not think that this country can again be alarmed by the fear of foreign recognition of the insurgents. We believe that the war has passed the crisis when recognition could guarantee success to the enemy. Recognition could, therefore, in our view, only enlarge the field of war. At the same time, I am sure that I need not say that we are no less earnestly [Page 59] desirous than we have been, at all times heretofore, to guard against any new complication in our foreign affairs. I think that the discontent with our military operations, which you are experiencing, is the consequence of expectations unreasonably excited by the press of the United States. The defeat of General Seymour at Olustee, in Florida, was a surprise and was a disaster, but it was no more than that; it drew neither serious consequences nor strategic embarrassments after it. All our armies have been renewing themselves by the reenlistment of veterans, whose terms of service were to expire in the spring, summer, and autumn. With a view to this end, many regiments have received furloughs of thirty days upon their re-enlistment, and thus the armies in the field have been temporarily much reduced during the inclement season, so that necessarily only two great military movements have hitherto been attempted or even meditated. The first of these was a movement of Sherman through central Mississippi, from Vicksburg to Meridian, with a view to break up the communications of the enemy, and relieve this government from the necessity of maintaining a large force on the banks of the Mississippi river during the coming campaign. Grierson’s and Smith’s movements were merely diversions auxiliary to, but not indispensable to the success of this purpose; and Admiral Farragut’s demonstration against Mobile was a movement of the same character. Sherman accomplished all that he proposed, and so the one end of all these movements was attained. The Adjutant General is now placing colored troops in the garrisons on the river, while the veteran forces are proceeding to active duty elsewhere. The other movement which, as I have said, was contemplated in the inclement season, was an expedition up the Red river, to scatter the insurgents and destroy stores and communications on the west side of the Mississippi, so far as the border of Texas. The movement is now in progress, and thus far has been attended with success. We last heard of the combined land and naval force at Natchitoches, in Louisiana. It is not surprising that the enemy took alarm at these movements, and attributed to our generals designs more stupendous and much more hazardous than those really entertained. Our own press, of course unenlightened, gave license to its imagination, and promised achievements which were not even meditated by our commanders.
It is not unlikely that similar expectations may be based upon the reports of the press concerning the campaign which General Grant, who now is in command of all the military forces of the country, is organizing. It will be well, therefore, to be on your guard in this respect. What you may be assured of is, that our forces in the field and fit for duty are, independently of the new conscription, eight hundred thousand men; that they are distributed with a view to hold all the country we have reclaimed, and to bring the insurgents into battle whenever the circumstances are favorable. We do not expect cheap or easy victories, but we look for firm and steady progress. In this view the operations of the present year, although they have disappointed the public, have not been unsatisfactory to the government. It is the insurgents and not we who are the weaker for what has thus been done.
I ought not to overlook the important fact disclosed by the elections in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana, namely, that the population of several of the insurgent States, where it has not already been reclaimed to the Union, has been successfully divided, whereby the insurrectionary armies are continually reduced, and our own considerably augmented. If you study the publications of the day you will learn that free labor is already asserting its ability to produce cotton on the banks of the Mississippi, and upon the sea islands. There is a development of another kind too important to be overlooked. A great number of the people of the insurgent States, wearied of the war, and despairing of the restoration of order and peace there, are emigrating to the western territories. Governor Doty, of Utah, a very intelligent pioneer, estimates the augmentation of the population of the Territories, during the present year, at [Page 60] 500,000—equal to one seventieth part of the population of France. It can hardly be necessary for me to point out to your sagacious observation the value of these facts, as showing that every wound which is inflicted on the Union in one part results in our increase of strength in every other part. We need not fear that a political system which is so vigorous will perish.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
William L. Dayton Esq., &c., &c., &c.