Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part I

Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.

No. 599.]

Legation of the United States, London, February 18, 1864.

Sir: Despatches from the department, numbered 822 to 825, inclusive, have been received at this legation. This leaves 821 not accounted for. I shall endeavor to follow out the general directions which these papers contain.

More or less discussion of American affairs has been held in the House of Lords through the past week. I endeavor to send to you printed reports of them in the most complete form, as they appear in the Times. You will scarcely fail to perceive that the object of most of the speakers, who initiate the debates, is more of a partisan character to annoy and harass the ministry than to substitute any policy of their own. Thus far it does not look as if they had gained much ground. The continuance of this administration depends upon other questions than those connected with America. No material improvement has yet taken place in the state of affairs on the continent, and the uneasiness in regard to possible complications grows rather than diminishes. Whilst this lasts no serious demonstration will find much support in either house in regard to the United States.

The publication of the correspondence concerning the claims made for the ravages by the Alabama appears to create some excitement. The paper of Historicus on the subject in the London Times (see Times of February 17) is herewith transmitted. Whatever may be the degree of confidence with which that claim is resisted, so far as the original outfit is concerned, there is perceptible embarrassment in regard to the subsequent acknowledgment and reception of that vessel in British ports. I should not be surprised if some prohibitory course Were before long adopted.

The first symptom of this may, perhaps, be found in the orders sent to Cape Town, which have resulted in the detention, at Simon’s bay, of the barque Conrad, captured by Captain Semmes, and converted into the Tuscaloosa. I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter from Mr. Graham, the consul at Cape Town, dated the 4th of January, and of the accompanying papers. It would seem from this that the extraordinary legal opinion pronounced by the official attorney at that place has been disavowed by the crown lawyers, and that both the barque Conrad and the cargo of the Sea Bride, so far as found, are to be restored to the legitimate owners. This decision, though obviously nothing more than is just and proper, will create both surprise and consternation among the official people in the British dependencies, who have heretofore been under an impression that the government would be languid in the enforcement of its obligations. I am encouraged to hope that the lesson which the Alabama teaches will ultimately inure to our benefit, by compelling this government to take such measures with the so-called authorities at Richmond as may either abridge their facilities of carrying on the war from this kingdom or bring down on them a sharper penalty for their perseverance.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Hon. William H. Seward, &c., &c.

[Enclosures.]

1. The Times’s parliamentary report, &c., February 16, 1864.

2. The Times’s parliamentary report and letter of Historicus, February 17, 1864.

3. Mr. Graham to Mr. Adams, January 4, 1864.

[From the London Times, February 16, 1864.]

[Untitled]

parliamentary Intelligence.

HOUSE OF LORDS, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15.

The Lord Chancellor took his seat on the woolsack at 5 o’clock.

THE BRITISH AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS.

Earl Russell said: The noble earl (the Earl of Derby) put some questions to me the other evening to which I was not at the time prepared to give an answer. He referred to several despatches and notes of Mr. Adams, and expressed a wish to know how far the conduct of her Majesty’s government had been influenced by those communications. I have since been looking to the dates, and so far from the conduct of her Majesty’s government being influenced by the notes of Mr. Adams of the 4th or 5th of September, which did not reach me until a day or two later, I find that on the 3d of September the decision was taken to detain and prevent the departure of the iron-clads from Birkenhead. On that day Mr. Layard wrote to the Treasury desiring that they should be stopped. On referring to private letters of my own I find that I wrote from Scotland to Lord Palmerston on the 3d of September:

“The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the iron-clads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained.”

And on the 4th of September I wrote to the noble lord:

“The pressing matter, however, is that of the iron-clad rams. I have desired they should not be allowed to leave the port of Liverpool.”

It is therefore impossible that the course then pursued could be influenced by letters written by Mr. Adams on the 4th and subsequent days. With regard to the language used in the correspondence between Mr. Adams and myself with respect to these vessels, I do not mean to say that if the language had been more intemperate I should at all have desisted from the course which I took. As soon as I had come to the conviction that the iron-clads were intended for the confederates, it appeared to me my duty to take steps to detain them until we could obtain full evidence of their destination. I am quite of the opinion of Mr. Canning, that, whatever we do, we ought not to sneak into a war, and I thought it my duty to detain the iron-clads, believing that they were intended to depart from this country for the purpose of carrying on war against the United States. The noble lord went much into the question as to what it was my duty to represent to the United States government; and although he has not directly charged me, he has insinuated that I failed to notice Mr. Adams’s language. In answer to that I beg leave to read from the papers presented to Congress, which will show the tone of the correspondence. Referring to his letter of the 16th of September, I said to Mr. Adams on the 25th of September:

“I can assure you that I am not less anxious than yourself that the duties of neutrality should be performed strictly and impartially by the government of Great Britain. There are, however, passages in your letter of the 16th, as well as in some of your former ones, which so plainly and repeatedly imply an intimation of hostile proceeding towards Great Britain on the part of the government of the United States, unless steps are taken by her Majesty’s government which the law does not authorize, or unless the law, which you consider as insufficient, is altered, that I deem it incumbent on me, on behalf of her Majesty’s government, frankly to state to you that her Majesty’s government will not be induced by any such consideration either to overstep the limits of the law or to propose to Parliament any new law which they may not, for reasons of their own, think proper to be adopted. They will not shrink from any consequences of such a decision.” [Hear, hear.]

That was the language which the noble lord must have read in the papers laid before Congress, but, having access to those papers, he did not think fit to quote it. Although the noble lord was anxious to know what language was used by me after the notes of the 4th or 5th of September, he never reverted to the despatch which I have now read. In return I got a letter from Mr. Adams in the following language:

“Legation of the United States, London, September 29, 1863.

“My Lord: I have the honor to acknowledge the reception of your note of the 25th instant. I shall take pleasure in transmitting a copy to my government. I must pray your lordship’s pardon if I confess myself at a loss to perceive what portions of my late correspondence could justify the implications to which you refer. So far from intimating ‘hostile proceedings towards Great Britain, unless the law, which I consider as insufficient, is altered,’ the burden of my argument was to urge a reliance upon the law as sufficient, as well from the past experience of the United States as from the confidence expressed in it by the most eminent authority in the kingdom. Neither do I feel any ground for the other implication. It is very true that I have deeply regretted the supposition that her Majesty’s government should admit itself powerless to execute any of those obligations which are recognized by the consent of civilized nations as well as the faith of treaties to be binding equally upon all, and I have taken the liberty to point out the consequences which follow that inability, in the absolute necessity imposed upon an aggrieved party to defend itself from the worst of injuries. This is the principle which I have been directed to maintain, not from any idea of presenting any form of condition whatever to her Majesty’s government, but from a confident expectation that an address to its sense of right may avail to gain for the United States exactly the same measure of justice which it would expect from that country in return, were the respective situ ations reversed. If in any respect I have appeared to transgress the line of argument here laid down, I pray your lordship to consider the fault as one not of intention on my part, and not at all belonging to my government. In transmitting your lordship’s note, without farther comment, I shall hope to be able to submit the question in what degree its sentiments may have been in any particular misinterpreted by me. I trust that it is unnecessary for me to make any assurances to your lordship of the earnestness with which I have ever striven to maintain to the utmost of my power the relations of amity and good-will between the two countries. I pray your lordship, &c.

“CHARLES F. ADAMS.”

I will not quote any more; but there was afterwards a despatch to Mr. Stuart expressing a hope that the relations of the two governments might be carried on with good-will on both sides without any misinterpretation of each other’s intentions. I consider, therefore, that if there had been any intimation of a threat, that threat was entirely withdrawn [hear, hear,] and that the assurances given to us by the government of the United States were that they wished to maintain the most friendly relations. [Hear, hear.]

The Earl of Derby. What has fallen from the noble earl shows the great disadvantage at which Parliament is placed by the refusal of the government to place before us the papers which have been already submitted to Congress [hear, hear,] leaving us to gather from scraps here and there what has been the real course pursued by the government. [Hear, hear.] The noble earl has, somewhat gratuitously, charged me with having studied these letters which he has read, and with having deliberately forborne to read them to your lordships. I never have seen one word of these letters. [Hear, hear.] I told your lordships, I think, the other evening, that I would read certain extracts from the correspondence laid before Congress which had been published in an evening newspaper. I said, too, that I knew the papers were in this country, because I had seen the volume myself; but in that volume I had not read one word. The noble earl’s accusation, therefore, is totally inconsistent with the facts of the case. [Hear, hear.] I am glad to find that the noble earl’s correspondence has been of a much more becoming and satisfactory tone, as far as these extracts go, than I had expected from what I had seen of the correspondence. [Hear, hear.] There is one point on which I should wish to have some explanation from the noble earl. Referring to the dates, he says that on the 3d he came to the determination that the iron-clads should be stopped. If that were the case, I want to know how it was that on the 4th there is a letter written by the noble earl to say that the matter is under the serious consideration of the government, and that it was not until the 8th that he wrote to stop the iron-clads. [Hear, hear.] If the government had come to that determination on the 3d, it would have saved much misconception if the noble earl had stated it clearly, and not written on the 4th that the matter was under serious consideration. [Hear, hear.] There is another question which I should like to ask. Has the noble earl asked the government of the United States for any explanation of the extraordinary fact that that despatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams which was never submitted to the noble earl was laid before Congress as having been presented, the American people being thus led to believe that it had been presented and received by the noble earl, and that it exercised considerable influence over our government in their determination? When the noble earl saw this correspondence, he cannot but have asked for some explanation of the fact that a despatch never delivered was actually produced before Congress as part of a diplomatic correspondence. [Hear, hear.]

Earl Russell. Having heard the noble earl say that the despatches laid before Congress were contained in a bulky volume, I concluded, perhaps somewhat too hastily, that he had read it. If he did not, of course what I said entirely falls to the ground, and must be withdrawn. [Hear, hear.] As to the last question of the noble earl, I think it more affects the conduct of the United States government towards their own people than their conduct towards us. It is the habit—and the wise habit, I think—of Mr. Adams to weigh over the despatches which he receives, and when they contain complaints, to consider how he can most effectually urge these complaints, and to endeavor to perform his duty in the most conciliatory spirit possible. [Hear, hear.] I can only say that Mr. Adams has pursued that course from the first. Almost the first time I saw him he told me that he had several despatches couched in strong terms, but he did not think it discreet to read them to me, and he then went on to describe in his own language what the complaints of his government were. I think the conduct of Mr. Adams is calculated to maintain friendly relations between the two governments. I certainly, at present, don’t see the necessity for asking Lord Lyons to call Mr. Seward’s attention to the presentation of this despatch to Congress. No doubt a certain effect may be produced by the publication of that despatch, especially when it is discovered that it never was presented.

The Earl of Derby. I never threw out the slightest imputation against Mr. Adams; on the contrary, I said that he had throughout exercised a wise discretion, and shown himself the friend of the two countries. The noble earl surprised me by saying that Mr. Adams had communicated to him the substance of this despatch.

Earl Russell. No; what I said was that it was Mr. Adams’s habit, when there was any substantial grievance to complain of, to communicate to me his views of the despatch. [Hear.]

The Earl of Derby. The noble earl has not told us how it happened that, having come to the decision on the 3d to stop the steam rams, he wrote on the 4th to say that the matter was under consideration.

Earl Russell. The matter was still under correspondence at the time. Mr. Layard had written a letter to the Treasury, and the matter was under consideration still in the Treasury, and we had to wait for their answer. I being in Scotland at the time, my letter, I suppose, would not reach Mr. Adams until a day or two after. When the matter was under consideration between two departments, we did not think it necessary to tell the parties that it was determined.

The Marquis of Clanricarde thought it would be of great advantage if some means could be devised for exchanging parliamentary papers with foreign legislatures. This had been done with France in former times. He would suggest to the government to lay this American volume before Parliament, for, of course, Lord Lyons had communicated it to his government. He communicated last year’s volume, and it was laid in due course before Parliament.

Earl Granville thought it would hardly be advisable for the government to take upon themselves to lay before Parliament the blue-books, yellow-books, and other papers published by foreign governments.

The subject then dropped.

[Untitled]

HOUSE OF LORDS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN CLAIMS.

The Earl of Carnarvon, in moving for a return of claims made by British subjects upon the United States government, sustained either in person or property since the secession of the southern States, specifying how and the grounds on which such claims have been disposed of, and for any further information as to claims made by the United States government upon her Majesty’s government for damages alleged to be done to American ships by the Alabama and other confederate cruisers, said: The notice which I have given divides itself into two parts. The first part asks for a return of all the claims made on the American government by British subjects for injuries sustained either in person or property since the commencement of the civil war. I presume there can be no real objection to this part of the return. It is not open to the objection that it may prejudice negotiations in progress, because it is simply for a summarized statement of the particular claims which have been made, and the grounds on which they have been accepted, rejected, or disposed of by the American government. I can easily understand that it may not be quite practicable to make that return complete, but I shall be quite satisfied if it approximates to the truth, and puts the house and the country in general possession of the facts. I can easily believe that, under the circumstances, marry claims may have arisen to which many counter claims and objections may have been made, but I should be the last person to show any want of forbearance to the government of a country situate as the government of the United States is. Wherever we may assume a bona fide intention on the part of the federal government to do that which is right, we ought not to be very minute indeed in marking that which has been done amiss. With regard, too, to those British subjects—and the case is by no means an unfrequent one—who have gone out to the United States within the last few years with the intention of acquiring the rights of American citizens, and consequently of divesting themselves of their nationality and allegiance to the crown, which they have only been prevented from carrying out by recent events—though they may not have forfeited the protection which the British crown extends to all its subjects everywhere, still they do not come into court with a very satisfactory case, and do not possess a very strong claim on the consideration of Parliament. But in the case of persons who are clearly British subjects, and who on mere suspicion have been arrested, put into prison, subjected to indignities and hardships—sometimes even imperilling their lives—her Majesty’s government, I think, are bound to require the amplest compensation and redress. [Hear, hear.] Then, again, there is another class of British subjects who are in a position to make claims for redress. There are British subjects who have engaged in a legitimate trade, and who, while acting in conformity with international law, have seen their ships condemned in American prize courts on principles which, if correctly reported, are of a very questionable nature. I have always maintained that we, who in former wars have jealously maintained certain principles of international jurisprudence, ought not to depart from those principles now that our position is reversed, and we have become neutrals instead of belligerents. If the statements we have received of the judgments in the American prize courts be correct, there can be no doubt that neutral rights are on the verge of extinction. [Hear, hear.] There are two cases on which I must say one word. The first is that of the Saxon, which must be familiar to all your lordships. That ship was an English ship, and was taking in a cargo at an island at no short distance from one of our settlements on the coast of Western Africa. It is said that the island had been annexed by proclamation to the Cape Colony in 1861, by Sir G. Grey, but that that proclamation had never been confirmed. I believe that, looking to the practice of the colonial office, it will be found that proclamations of this sort have not been ratified sometimes for one, two, and three years are after. The ship was taking in her cargo, and on the point of sailing, when she was boarded by an armed boat’s crew from the federal vessel, the Vanderbilt. The captain was sent down below and the American lieutenant ordered the crew below. The mate of the Saxon was going down the ladder when the lieutenant pushed him on the shoulder, and, as the unfortunate man turned round to see who it was pushing him, pulled out a revolver and shot him dead. If this statement be true, there certainly never was a more wanton, atrocious, or barbarous murder committed on the high seas. [Hear, hear.] The captain of the Vanderbilt is said to have expressed his regret, but I hope that the government will require something more than a mere expression of regret. [Hear, hear.] The only compensation which can satisfy the honor of the country and the justice of the case is to bring the offender to speedy trial and to execution, if the case be proved against him. This transaction took place in the middle of September. It is not a case which can require much communication or negotiation; and I hope, therefore, that the noble earl will be able to lay the correspondence on the table, or name an early day for its production. There is also another case to which I wish to call the noble earl’s attention. I see it stated in the newspapers that a confederate vessel, the Tuscaloosa, has been seized, by order of the government, in Simon’s bay. That ship is referred to in the papers recently laid before Parliament, and she is stated to have been a federal ship originally, which had been captured by the Alabama, and turned into an armed tender to that vessel. She appeared at the Cape last year, when the United States consul demanded that she should be detained. The governor, however, did not consider himself at liberty at that time to take that course. The facts were brought under the consideration of the home government, and this is what the noble earl wrote on the subject:

“As regards the Tuscaloosa, although her Majesty’s government would have approved the British authorities at the Cape if they had adopted towards that vessel a course different from that which was adopted, yet the question as to the manner in which a vessel under such circumstances should, according to the tenor of her Majesty’s orders,” be dealt with, was not one altogether free from uncertainty. Nevertheless, instructions will be sent to the British authorities at the Cape for their guidance in the event of a similar case occurring hereafter, and her Majesty’s government hope that under those instructions nothing will for the future happen to admit of a question being raised as to her Majesty’s orders having been strictly carried out.”

No doubt the instructions here mentioned are those on which the authorities of the Cape acted, and I trust that the noble earl will have no objection to lay them on the table. I come now to the second part of my notice, which refers to claims put forward by the United States government for damages alleged to have been done to American ships by confederate cruisers. Your lordships have doubtless seen the correspondence relating to the Alabama, which, though not long, contains matter of serious importance. It comprises five different kinds of applications from Mr. Adams on the part of the United States government. The first application was made on the 19th of February, and was presented in consequence of the destruction of the Brilliant and the Manchester, and repayment was demanded for the value of the cargo and ship, with interest thereon. On the 9th of March the noble earl replies to Mr. Adams and disclaims all connexion with the Alabama, and all responsibility for the mischief she may have done. On the 29th of April another claim was made by Mr. Adams on account of the destruction of the Golden Rule, which was simply acknowledged by the noble earl. Again a third application was made on the 7th of July, and on the 13th of July the noble earl returned an answer referring to his first despatch, and again disclaiming all responsibility for the acts of confederate cruisers. On the 24th of August there came another claim for the destruction of the ship Nora by the Alabama, and I should like to read to your lordships the description there given of the Alabama. The owners of the ship, in their memorial to Mr. Seward, say:

“The vessel calling herself the Confederate States man-of-war Alabama is an English vessel, and no other. * * * * The said steamer was allowed to leave port under the pretence of making a trial trip, and has never been in any port of the so-called Confederate States, so as to change her flag, or to be otherwise than a British vessel. * *

“Your memorialists would further represent that said steamer, after thus fraudulently leaving the ports of Great Britain against the Queen’s proclamation of neutrality, repeatedly visited or came within the jurisdiction of certain British islands in the Atlantic ocean, when and where it was well known and patent to the world that she had destroyed American vessels on the high seas; and instead of being seized and detained by the British government, as they were in duty bound to do, was allowed every facility for obtaining supplies and advice, and to resume her piratical cruise. * * * *

“In view of these matters, your memorialists do now and forever enter their solemn protests against the British government and people as willing parties, negligently culpable in the destruction of their property on the high seas, and thus in first violating the proclamation of the Queen by building and manning said steamer, and then allowing her to continue her depredations.”

These are the terms in which the Alabama is described, and the terms on which the claims of the American marine are urged upon the British government. A few days after the noble earl repeats his disclaimer, and winds up with the hope—very properly expressed, I think—that no such claim may ever be brought under the consideration of her Majesty’s government again. But the application to which I would call the especial attention of the house is that referred to in a letter from Mr. Adams, dated the 23d of October. In this letter Mr. Adams reviews all the charges he had previously made with regard to the depredations of the Alabama, and then proceeds:

“Upon these principles of law, and these assumptions of fact, resting upon the evidence in the case, I am instructed to say that my government must continue to insist that Great Britain has made itself responsible for the damages which the peaceful, law-abiding citizens of the United States sustain by the depredations of the vessel called the Alabama.”

I would ask your lordships to observe the similarity of that language with the language used in the despatch of the 11th of July, which has been so much spoken of. [Hear, hear.] There is, however, this difference—that in the letter from which I have just quoted Mr. Adams proceeds to qualify his language in these terms:

“In repeating this conclusion, however, it is not to be understood that the United States incline to act dogmatically, or in a spirit of litigation. They desire to maintain amity as well as peace. They fully comprehend how unavoidably reciprocal grievances must spring up from the divergence in the policy of the two countries in regard to the present insurrection. They cannot but appreciate the difficulties under which her Majesty’s government is laboring from the pressure of interests and combinations of British subjects, apparently bent upon compromising by their unlawful acts the neutrality which her Majesty has proclaimed and desires to preserve, even to the extent of involving the two nations in the horrors of a maritime war. For these reasons I am instructed to say that they frankly confess themselves unwilling to regard the present hour as the most favorable to a calm and candid examination by either party of the facts or the principles involved in cases like the one now in question. Though indulging a firm conviction of the correctness of their position in regard to this and other claims, they declare themselves disposed at all times, hereafter as well as now, to consider in the fullest manner all the evidence and the arguments which her Majesty’s government may incline to proffer in refutation of it; and, in case of an impossibility to arrive at any common conclusion, I am directed to say there is no fair and equitable form of conventional arbitrament or reference to which they will not be willing to submit.”

On the 26th of October, three days afterwards, the noble earl, in answering that despatch of Mr. Adams, uses these words:

“You add, farther on, that the United States frankly confess themselves unwilling to regard the present hour as the most favorable to a calm and candid examination by either party of the facts or the principles involved in cases like the one now in question.”

Up to that despatch I entirely assent to nearly every word used by the noble earl in this correspondence. I feel persuaded that it contains not merely the drift, but the plain view, of the intentions of her Majesty’s government. It appeared to me that from the first the noble earl had distinctly declined all responsibility connected with the building of the Alabama, and with the depredations which she was alleged to have committed. Nothing can be plainer and more complete in every way than the noble earl’s language; but after all this the noble earl ends by accepting the proposal for an arbitrament.

Earl Russell. No.

The Earl of Carnarvon. At a future period?

Earl Russell, (emphatically.) No.

The Earl of Carnarvon. The noble earl says “no;” but, on reading the despatch from which I have just quoted, can any one come to any other conclusion than that the noble earl did accede to the proposal for arbitration at a future period? Mr. Adams asks for arbitration, and the noble earl says:

“With this declaration, her Majesty’s government may well be content to await the time when a calm and candid examination of the facts and principles involved in the case of the Alabama may, in the opinion of the government of the United States, usefully be undertaken.”

I very much regret, whatever may be the intentions of the government, that the noble earl ever used such language as that; because, after all, arbitration applies to a question in which there is some doubt; but if there is a perfectly clear right—a perfectly unquestionable one—then men do not arbitrate. [Hear, hear.] If her Majesty’s government feel any doubt as to the propriety of the position which they had taken throughout the previous correspondence, let them say so. It is never too late to go back if one has committed an error; and here I must observe that the noble earl did use an ominous expression—namely, that the case of the Oreto and the Alabama was a scandal and a reproach to English law. [Hear.] If the noble earl is decided and clear in his opinion, he had better say so. If he believes that those claims are founded neither on reason nor on justice, then he should hold out no shadow of hope that they can by any possibility be admitted. It is unwise to endeavor to tide over a present difficulty by creating a much greater one for a future time. [Hear, hear.] I would urge upon her Majesty’s government, as far as my feeble voice can do so, to bring this matter to a conclusion. I entirely agree in the opinion expressed by the noble earl in his earlier despatches, that there is no ground for those claims; but it would be far better to admit and satisfy them, at whatever expense, than to allow the matter to go on, and at length to be compelled to undergo the humiliation of eating every word you have said. [Hear, hear.] My lords, I cannot see that there is any practical advantage in leaving a question of this sort unsettled. [Hear, hear] There are two classes of politicians, as this house must know, in America, who look at this matter from different points. One class—composed of, I believe, honest men, but men holding, as I think, very mistaken views—are convinced that the Alabama sailed from these shores through the fault and negligence of her Majesty’s government, and hold us accountable for the damage which she has done to the American marine. The American estimate of the amount of that damage is a very heavy one. According to that estimate, 148 American ships were destroyed or bonded from the time of the sailing of the Alabama to the 30th of June, 1863. The tonnage of those ships is stated to be 61,292 tons, which, at a valuation of £10 per ton, amounts in money to a loss of £612,920. To this is added a sum of £20 per ton, making a total of £1,100,000 as the value of the cargoes, and a sum of £700,000 for Chinese cargoes, which brings up the entire loss to £2,412,920. I do not know whether this is a correct estimate, but there can be no doubt that great injury has been done to American commerce. This is shown by the heavy rates for insurance. [Hear, hear.] Well, my lords, the class of American politicians to whom I have already alluded are smarting under a sense of personal injury, and they urge their claims against our government in no measured language. And I must say that the government of America, from whatever motive, have so lent themselves to their views that hereafter, when this sum grows up and becomes a very much larger one, it will be absolutely impossible for that government to restrain the machinery which they themselves put in motion. [Hear, hear.] I therefore think it is most important that her Majesty’s government should bring this matter to a settlement one way or the other. The second class of American politicians to whom I have alluded wish that these claims shall be withheld until the day of America’s opportunity, when she should offer us hostility or national humiliation. And, my lords, in our political intercourse with America, if there be any conclusion which we ought to have drawn, any lesson which we ought to have learnt, it is this—that the policy of English statesmanship ought to be to limit these debatable questions, and not allow them to be kept open. [Hear, hear.] You might number up a score of those questions, which by being kept open affected very considerably the good relations between the two countries, caused great agitation both here and in America, and at times threatened very disastrous consequences. Among these were the Oregon and fisheries questions. Lastly, not many years ago, a dispute arose with regard to the boundary line. The island of San Juan was taken possession of by a hot-headed American officer, and it was only owing to the exercise of great tact and forbearance on both sides that hostilities we’re averted. Now, it should be the object of good statesmanship to put an end as soon as possible to all these questions of debate and litigation. But in these despatches, whether intentionally or not I do not know, you hold out, in order to tide over the present difficulties, vague, shadowy hopes of some means by which differences may be reconciled. You thus deliberately create, in order to relieve yourselves from present embarrassment, a difficulty which may be ten times as formidable and ten times as dangerous as existed at first, inasmuch as it will then be backed by stronger material interests, will be founded on personal considerations, and in all probability will be supported by an unreasoning mob. [Cheers.]

Earl Russell. The noble earl seems to suppose that I shall have no difficulty in granting the first part of his motion, relating to the returns of vessels. Now, so far as her Majesty’s government are concerned, there will be very little difficulty in giving any information that is asked for as to representations which have taken place on the part of the government; but when I consider the public utility to be served by this motion, I cannot encourage the noble lord to press it. The fact is, that these despatches upon cases arising from time to time, and almost from day to day, become formidable in point of extent. I saw in the foreign office to-day a volume, not indeed a very thick one, but one of several folio volumes, many, of them exceedingly thick, which are said to contain about half of the returns which the noble earl moves for. Now, I ask, what would be the advantage of producing, what would be the advantage of printing, for this house, such a voluminous return of cases that have arisen between this country and the United States? I am quite sure that my noble friend would hardly think of pressing a motion of such a character. And if there is no advantage in it, there may be some disadvantage; because if hereafter there were to be any commission on these claims, the American government would probably take the evidence which had been laid before Parliament as complete with respect to them. They would say: “There is your case. It has been laid before the foreign office; it has been presented to Parliament and printed, and it is impossible to go beyond it.” If, therefore, these cases were printed, and a commission on claims were hereafter appointed, persons who had claims, and who were prepared to produce further evidence in support of them, might be precluded from the full benefit of that evidence. I cannot, therefore, think that there would be any advantage in producing this voluminous mass of papers. The noble earl seemed to think that our commerce was nearly extinct. [The Earl of Carnarvon dissented.] I took down the noble earl’s words, and he certainly said that our commerce on the southern coast of America was on the verge of extinction. Now to what do these words apply? It is known that this trade of blockade-running has been a most profitable trade, that great fortunes have been made by many persons in carrying it on, and that Nassau and some other places have swarmed with vessels which had never previously been seen in those ports. That a great number of vessels have been stopped by the American cruisers I readily admit. The noble earl says that the judges of the prize courts in the United States have given decisions some of which are not based upon principles of international law. Now I say here, what I have frequently had occasion to say before, that we are bound in the first instance to accept these decisions; and I think the complaints which have been made very often arise, and naturally arise, from ignorance of the principles of international law, as laid down by Lord Stowell and other great jurists in this country. It has been many times complained of that a vessel bound from this country to Nassau should be captured on her voyage while upon the high seas, and should be sent for adjudication before an American prize court. Evidently the persons who make that complaint think it quite sufficient if the nominal destination was Nassau, and do not take into consideration the circumstance that, if Nassau was not the ultimate destination, but it was merely meant that the vessel should touch at Nassau, and then, without transshipment, carry her cargo into the blockaded port, that vessel, according to the principles laid down by Lord Stowell, would be liable to capture. But it is natural that this should be forgotten when for so many years these belligerent rights have been in abeyance, and the result is that many of the persons who have employed their capital in this manner are severe sufferers. With regard to the Saxon, we were advised that that vessel was taken, not in British, but in foreign waters. The noble earl says that the law officers of the crown must have been completely wrong, because it was quite sufficient if the governor of the Cape had declared the island of Angra Pequena to be a British possession. Now I do not think that we should be guided by such a declaration in an analogous case. Suppose that on the coast of Africa a slaver was taken by one of our cruisers near an island; it would not be sufficient to prevent the capture by the statement that the governor of the neighboring French or Portuguese settlement had declared that island to belong to France or Portugal. We should say at once, “Have the French and Portuguese governments confirmed that declaration?” and if they had not, we should hesitate to acknowledge that the island belonged to either country. The argument which we should use ourselves we ought to accept from another nation; and acting, therefore, on the opinion of the law officers of the crown, I did not assert that this vessel had been wrongfully captured. What was affirmed by the American captors was, that the Saxon had received from the Alabama and the Tuscaloosa part of the spoil which they had taken from American vessels. The noble earl refers to what appears to us, if the information we have received be accurate, to be the wanton and barbarous murder of the mate of the Saxon. All that we could ask in such a case was that the person accused of that crime should be tried, and should be brought as soon as possible before a tribunal in which the charge could be fairly examined into. That, accordingly, is the demand which we made. The noble earl says it was no satisfaction that the captain of the Vanderbilt expressed his regret. But I do not know what more he could do. He did not order that the mate of the Saxon should be killed. He had no concern in the murder, but when he heard of the occurrence he expressed his regret. He could not immediately order a trial and have the man convicted and executed.

The Earl of Carnarvon. Did the captain order the man under arrest? [Hear, hear.]

Earl Russell. That is a point upon which we have no information. [Opposition cheers.] But certainly I do not think it an injury that the captain expressed his regret at the occurrence. I believe it is stated in the newspapers that the man was afterwards put under arrest; but that is only a newspaper report. With regard to the Tuscaloosa, that vessel was captured by and was a prize to the Alabama. The law officers gave it as their opinion that she should have been detained, and orders were sent out in conformity with that opinion. She has now been detained, and it will be for the noble earl to show that the law officers were wrong in that opinion, and that upon grounds of public law known to himself her Majesty’s government should have taken another course. I now come to the noble earl’s statement with regard to the Alabama, and I cannot say how much I feel indebted to him for enabling me to clear up a misconception which, as it has affected his mind, may also have affected others in the same way. My lords, her Majesty’s government have always maintained that they were in no way responsible for the hostilities against the merchant ships of the United States committed by the Alabama. [Hear, hear.] We have maintained that position from the beginning; we shall maintain it to the end. The noble earl seems to suppose that in a letter of mine of the 26th of October I admitted that these questions would afterwards be referred to a commission. My lords, I admitted nothing of the kind. [Hear, hear.] I stated then, as I have always stated, that her Majesty’s government was not responsible for the acts of the Alabama. The United States minister may have in view some kind of commission or arbitration; but her Majesty’s government have never consented, and never would consent, to a commission or arbitration. [Hear, hear.] According to all the principles of international law, her Majesty’s government are in no way responsible for the doings of the vessel referred to. There has been a question of a commission, but we have always thought that a commission would be of no use, because the United States government would be sure to propose that the case of the Alabama should be referred to the commission, and it is quite impossible that we could consent to that. Therefore we have never proposed what under ordinary circumstances would be a proper course; we have never proposed a commission to consider the respective claims of the subjects of each country, and which the United States government intimated they were ready to agree to, because we knew that it would be proposed to include the case of the Alabama, which we were determined not to consent to. [Hear, hear.] I say, therefore, the government may well await the time when a calm consideration of the principles involved in the case of the Alabama can be given. Every one is aware that for a long time there has been great excitement in America upon the subject of the Alabama; that she has been called a British pirate, and the American nation has been roused to anger against this country for the doings of the Alabama. I say that when the United States government say they do not wish to press that question further now, it is fair to believe that a time may come when the United States government, considering all the precedents laid down by their own judges as well as by British judges, will be satisfied that they have no claim against this country on account of the Alabama. My expression was not intended to convey the notion that the British government would change their minds, but that the United States government would change theirs when the excitement of the moment had passed away. Therefore I go on to say:

“The British government must decline to be responsible for the acts of parties who fit out a seeming merchant ship, send her to a port or to waters far from the jurisdiction of British courts, and there commission, equip, and man her as a vessel-of-war.”

And I further say, that if “an admitted principle was thus made elastic to meet a particular case, the trade of ship-building in this country would be seriously embarrassed.” The noble earl, in a manner unaccountable to me—for it never from the time I wrote that letter until now occurred to me that such a meaning could be applied to it, and that it could be understood as admitting a future examination of this case—the noble earl says it is desirable that these cases should not be kept open, but that they should be settled at once. I quite agree with him, if there is any amicable way in which they can be settled. The American government says, “We have a clear and undoubted case for reparation on account of the Alabama.” We say, “We have a clear and undoubted case for refusing reparation in the case of the Alabama.” Who is to be the arbitrator, unless we resort to that method of arbitration which the noble earl thinks I agree to? In no way can this question be settled, unless the United States should push us to the verge of war for the purpose of getting this question settled. The United States government must say, ‘We have a good case, but we are ready to keep it in abeyance, and to continue on terms of amity and friendly relations with great Britain, if Great Britain will consent to do so.” Am I to say, “We will not agree to anything of the sort. Why do you not make war upon us? Why not push your claims to the utmost extremity?” That is the case of the noble earl. He says it is desirable to have these questions settled, and not to have them hanging over us. It is desirable indeed; but how is it to be done while the positions of the two countries are so entirely opposed? I have had the good fortune, in some cases, to put an end to matters which had long been causes of dispute between this country and the United States. For many years there was a dispute pending upon the question of the Mosquito Shore and of the Bay Island. The President of the United States said at the time, “If this be the only question of difference,” as I believe it was until the secession occurred; “if this be the only question of difference we have with the government of Great Britain, let us endeavor to settle it.” I for my part was quite ready to make concessions of what might be considered fair claims on the part of the British government in order to settle the dispute, and happily I was enabled to make a treaty which put an end to that dispute. There was another question which arose since the Ashburton treaty, and which went on for some years, respecting the Hudson’s Bay Company, and that dispute it was agreed to refer to arbitration, and a convention has been made for that purpose. So I am by no means indisposed to settle these questions, which, as the noble earl truly says, ought to be settled if they can be settled. There is also the question of the island of San Juan, adjoining Vancouver’s island, and in that question also I proposed an arbitration, which proposal has been for some time under the consideration of the United States government. That government thought the Senate could not agree to arbitration, but I trust there will be an agreement upon that question also. I think it would be much better that the question relating to the island of San Juan should be decided by an arbitrator than that it should remain a cause of dispute between the two countries. Referring again to the Alabama, the noble, earl seems to be much shocked because I said that that case was a scandal and in some degree a reproach upon British law. I say that here, as I said it in that despatch. [Hear, hear.] I do consider that, having passed a law to prevent the enlistment of her Majesty’s subjects in the service of a foreign power, to prevent the fitting out or equipping, within her Majesty’s dominions, of vessels for warlike purposes without her Majesty’s sanction; I say that, having passed such a law in the year 1819, it is a scandal and a reproach that one of the belligerents in this American contest has been enabled, at the order of the confederate government, to fit out a vessel at Liverpool in such a way that she was capable of being made a vessel-of-war; that, after going to another port in her Majesty’s dominions to ship a portion of her crew, she proceeded to a port in neutral territory, and there completed her crew and equipment as a vessel-of-war, so that she has since been able to capture and destroy innocent merchant vessels belonging to the other belligerent. [Hear.] Having been thus equipped by an evasion of the law, I say it is a scandal to our law that we should not be able to prevent such belligerent operations. [Hear, hear.] I venture to say so much, because at the foreign office I feel this to be very inconvenient. If you choose to say, as you might have said in former times, “Let vessels be fitted out and sold; let a vessel go to Charleston, and there be sold to any agent of the confederate government,” I could understand such a state of things. But if we have a law to prevent the fitting out of warlike vessels, without the license of her Majesty, I do say this case of the Alabama is a scandal and a reproach. A very learned judge has said that we might drive, not a coach and six, but a whole fleet of ships through that act of Parliament. If that be a correct description of our law, then I say we ought to have the law made more clear and intelligible. This law was said to be passed to secure the peace and welfare of this nation, and I trust it may be found in the end sufficient for that purpose. I say, however, that while the law remains in its present state its purpose is obviously defeated, and its enactments made of no effect by British subjects who defy the Queen’s proclamation of neutrality. To these observations I will only add, that, if the noble earl wishes for any other paper relating to the Alabama—I believe there is only one—I should be willing to give it, but as to the folio volume of papers to which I have before referred, I hope the noble earl will not press for their production.

The Earl of Carnarvon did not wish for the correspondence in extenso, but would be satisfied with short summaries of each case, containing such details as names, dates, and amounts of claim. There would surely be no difficulty in producing such information. He thought their lordships would feel that he had been naturally misled, and was justified in asking further explanation. He accepted the explanation the noble earl had given him; he rejoiced to receive it, and was quite satisfied with it. He hoped there would be no objection on the part of the noble earl to produce the papers in the case of the Saxon. [Hear, hear.] That transaction had occurred between five and six months ago, and the negotiations in that case were surely complete. It was most important that Parliament should know precisely the position in which it stood in reference to such matters; [hear, hear;] and when the noble earl challenged him to prove his case, although he was quite ready to take up his challenge, he could not do so unless the noble earl supplied him with the materials. He should only press for a copy of the instructions which were sent out to the colonial authorities at the Cape of Good Hope, and on which they had acted in the case of the Tuscaloosa. He hoped there would be no objection to give a copy of these instructions.

Earl Russell would have no objection to the motion of the noble earl, on the understanding that names, dates, and other details of that kind only were to be given. With regard to the papers connected with the case of the Saxon, he was quite ready to produce them, if the noble earl would move for them.

The Earl of Carnarvon then moved for the papers connected with the case of the Saxon, and the instructions to the authorities at the Cape of Good Hope with reference to the Tuscaloosa.

Earl Russell said it would be necessary to communicate with the colonial office in regard to the instructions to the authorities at the Cape.

The motion with respect to the Saxon was then agreed to.

Their lordships adjourned at 20 minutes after 6 o’clock.

The case of the Alabama.

To the Editor of the Times:

Sir: It is greatly to be regretted that there should be found politicians on both sides of the Atlantic who seem for party objects to desire nothing better than to inflame and exasperate national animosities by demands and recriminations which are neither justified by the doctrines of law nor founded in the principles of justice. It is some consolation, however, to think that, while in America this course has been resorted to by the responsible government of the country, in England it has only found favor with an irresponsible opposition. Some recent orators in both houses of Parliament have been laboring to stimulate public indignation by endeavoring to persuade us that we have been the tame and spiritless victims of unmerited ill-usage. This view of the subject is founded on peculiar notions of law which they have thought fit to assume, and in accordance with which they have undertaken to criticise the action of the English government, and to denounce the conduct of the American prize courts. It is, however, satisfactory to observe that the vehement sallies of these unprofessional partisans have received no countenance from the eminent lawyers of whom the conservative party are justly proud. While these attacks rest on the unsupported authority of party politicians, they are not likely to make much impression on the public mind, or to work any considerable national mischief.

I am glad to observe that the attorney general—than whom on such a subject no higher authority is to be found—has fully confirmed the opinion which I have ventured on former occasions to express as to the general rectitude and fairness of the American prize courts. The grounds on which the decision in the case of the Springbok have been attacked show that the critics of the American judges are very little conversant with the elements of the subject they have undertaken to discuss. It is assumed that a shipment whose immediate and ostensible destination is to a neutral port is necessarily and absolutely in all cases innocent. This is, no doubt, as a general rule, true, but it is equally certain that, if this destination be only a section of a voyage whose real and ultimate intention is to a belligerent port, the mere interposition of a neutral resting-place will not alter the real character of the transaction. The whole voyage will be regarded according to the reality, and not according to the appearance, and will be dealt with according to its real and ultimate, not according to its apparent and immediate, destination. This principle rests on the foundation of that which is known to jurists as the doctrine of continuous voyages. Those of your readers who may care to pursue this interesting and somewhat complicated question any further will find the authorities collected and discussed in two letters I printed on this subject in the summer as a supplement to my collected letters. The weight of the opinion of the attorney general may now be added to the authorities which are there cited.

But, while it is to be deplored that inconsiderate speakers in this country should disturb the public mind by unfounded complaints, it is still more a subject of regret and censure that the government of Washington, who can hardly plead the excuse of ignorance in these matters, should pervert the judgment or their own countrymen by persistent assertions of claims which they must know to be wholly unjustifiable. I have already in former letters, and especially in one which I had the honor to address to you on November 7, 1863, examined in detail the pretensions which the American government have advanced against England in respect of the captures of the Alabama. I do not propose to repeat the arguments, for I have never seen any attempt to dispute their conclusions. With every disposition to look at the matter in an impartial spirit, I do not believe that it is possible to find any basis, either of authority or of reason, to give color to such a claim. Upon this point the law and practice of nations alike are clear and settled. It is the right of every neutral state to prevent the violation of its sovereignty by the equipment within its territory of belligerent armaments. In a certain but more imperfect and restricted sense it is its duty to do so. But the injury arising from the violation of this right is an injury primarily and essentially to the neutral and not to the belligerent. The neutral is in no sense an insurer to one belligerent against the wrongful acts of the other belligerent. Nor can any claim in the nature of damages arise against the neutral in respect of an injury which the neutral has involuntarily sustained. These are principles founded in reason, and established by authority, and they are decisive against the American claim.

But the former American practice is equally conclusive against their present pretensions. During the course of the war between Spain and her revolted colonies in South America the ports of the United States became the grand officina of the rebellious privateers. The South American seas were covered with cruisers fitted out in the American ports in violation of their foreign enlistment act. The instances of adjudication on suits for the restitution of prizes taken by these privateers in the American law books are numerous, but we may be quite sure that the recorded cases indicate a very small percentage of the captures thus effected. That being the state of things, the course adopted by the American courts and the government was this: When a prize captured by a cruiser thus unlawfully equipped was brought within the jurisdiction of the United States the prize was duly restored by legal process to its original owner. The government of the United States did not pretend to deal with the cruiser herself, (vide the facts and the judgment in the case of the Santissima Trinidad:) they distinctly repudiated all authority and liability in respect of captures by such vessels not brought within their jurisdiction, (vide “La Amistad de Rues,” 5 Wheaton’s Reports.) And I venture to challenge the American government to produce a single example in which they acknowledged any claim to compensation for prizes taken by cruisers equipped within their ports to “prey upon the commerce” of Spain, or attempted any other redress than that of the restitution in specie of prizes brought infra prœsidia. The terms of the Jay and Grenville treaty between Great Britain and the United States in 1795 (which was discussed at length in my letter of November 7) are, when properly understood, equally conclusive against the present pretensions of America. That being the case, it is lamentable, indeed, to see a responsible government, for the temporary political purposes of the moment, inflaming the passions and perverting the judgment of the nation with whose destinies it is charged, by preferring claims which it cannot sustain in right, and which it is notorious it is without the means of enforcing by might.

Before I quit this topic I must ask leave to offer a few remarks on some circumstances disclosed by the last papers on the subject of the Alabama laid upon the table of Parliament, (North America, No. 1, 1864,) which are likely to give rise to new questions of considerable delicacy and difficulty. The circumstances to which I refer will be found narrated at pp. 19-25 of the Parliamentary Paper, and have reference to certain transactions which took place at the Cape of Good Hope in the course of last summer. The material facts, if correctly stated, seem to be these: On July 28, 1863, the Alabama entered the bay of Saldanha for the purpose of repainting, and remained there till August 4; on August 5 she sailed for Table Bay, and within sight of the persons on shore, though apparently at a distance of more than three miles, captured the federal bark Sea Bride. The captain and the crew of the Sea Bride were taken on board the Alabama and put in irons, and seem afterwards to have been landed at Cape Town. After the capture was effected it is asserted that the prize was brought within a mile and a half of the English shore in charge of a prize crew, and it appears that attempts were made to sell the prize to some speculators at Cape Town. What ultimately became of the Sea Bride does not appear upon the papers. Now, assuming the facts thus stated to be correct, and there is no intimation on the face of the papers that they are disputed, some important questions arise.

And, first, ought the Alabama ever to have been allowed to enter the bay of Saldanha at all? I confess I am very strongly of opinion that she ought not. As soon as the war between the federal and confederate states broke out the English government defined the exact terms and conditions on which the ships-of-war of both nations should be admitted into our ports. In our character as a neutral nation we extend impartially to both such a limited hospitality as shall keep us clear from any participation in their hostile pursuits. To this hospitality so defined the duly commissioned vessels-of-war of both belligerents are clearly entitled so long as our regulations remain unaltered. It is equally certain, however, that we are at perfect liberty to make precisely what rules upon the subject we think fit. The principles of the rights and duties in this respect of neutral states are laid down with admirable clearness in the case of the Exchange, (7 Cranch Rep.,) one of the greatest judgments, perhaps, ever delivered in a court of law. If the Alabama is admitted into our ports it is undeniable that while she is there she is entitled, as a properly commissioned vessel-of-war, to enjoy the immunity of her flag. The legality of her origin cannot be inquired into, so as to authorize the neutral state, or any one else, to exercise jurisdiction over her. Still the question remains, ought the Alabama to be admitted into our ports at all? Now, it is a sound and salutary rule of international practice, established by the Americans themselves in 1794, that vessels which have been equipped in violation of the laws of a neutral state shall be excluded from that hospitality which is extended to other belligerent cruisers, on whose origin there is no such taint. Accordingly, the cabinet of Washington compelled all the French privateers which had been illegally fitted out in America against England to leave the ports of the United States, and orders were issued to the custom-house officers to prevent their return. This course of proceeding appears equally consonant to the principles of law and the dictates of policy. The question, then, remains, Was the Alabama unlawfully equipped and manned within the jurisdiction of Great Britain? Now, setting aside the vexed question of equipment, I think there can be very little doubt on that of enlistment. The question is one which from its very nature is not and cannot become the subject of judicial determination, because a neutral government cannot exercise jurisdiction over such a vessel. It is a matter on which the executive of the neutral government must, according to the best information it can obtain, form its own judgment, and that judgment is final and conclusive on all parties. Now, I observe that in a despatch dated March 27, 1863, (Parliamentary Paper, p. 2,) Lord Russell writes: “The British government has done everything in its power to execute the law; but I admitted that the cases of the Alabama and the Oreto were a scandal and in some degree a reproach to our law.” Now, with the greatest deference to those persons who may be of an opposite opinion, I submit that vessels of which such a statement can be properly made, and that it was properly made no one acquainted with the circumstances of their outfit and manning can honestly doubt, are not entitled to the hospitality of the country whose laws they have eluded and abused. I think that to deny to the Florida and the Alabama access to our ports would be the legitimate and dignified manner of expressing our disapproval of the fraud which has been practiced upon our neutrality. If we abstain from taking such a course, I fear we may justly lie under the imputation of having done less to vindicate our good faith than the American government consented at our instance on former occasions to do.

But, assuming this position not to be well founded, and that the Alabama was rightly admitted into Saldanha bay, it remains to consider whether the capture of the Sea Bride can be justified as it affects the neutrality of Great Britain. This, I confess, appears to me somewhat more than doubtful. Supposing the Alabama were to anchor at Spithead for a week to repaint; suppose thence she were to sail along the coast and capture a federal vessel four miles off Deal, and afterwards were to proceed with her prize to the mouth of the Thames: the circumstances would be precisely similar to those which took place last August at the Cape. Is this permissible? I venture to say clearly not. Assume that the capture was actually effected—of which there seems little doubt—beyond the limits of the neutral jurisdiction, still within the principles of well-known English judgment this act of hostility is far too proximate to be permitted. The law on the subject is laid down with great distinctness by Lord Stowell in the case of the Twee Gebroeders, (3 Rob. Rep., p. 165.)

“Direct hostility appears not to be necessary, for whatever has immediate connexion with it is forbidden. An act of hostility is not to take its commencement on neutral ground. It is not sufficient to say it is not completed there—you are not to take any measure there that shall lead to immediate violence; you are not to avail yourself of a station on neutral territory, making as it, were a vantage ground of the neutral country, a country which is to carry itself with perfect equality between both belligerents. Many instances have occurred in which such an irregular use of a neutral country has been warmly resented, and some during the present war; the practice which has been tolerated in the northern stages of Europe of permitting French privateers to make stations of their ports, and to sally out to capture British vessels, is of that number.”

Vide also the Anna (5 Rob., p. 385.) It is true that in the case of the Vrow Anna Catharina (5 Rob. Rep., p. 18) a distinction is taken between the “making a harbor an habitual station for captures,” and the case of a privateer “accidentally lying in the port” which goes out to capture an enemy whom she sees approaching. But, as far as I can understand the occurrences at the Cape, they range themselves rather under the former than the latter rule. If this be so, the capture of the Sea Bride comes within the same category as captures made actually within the limits of the neutral jurisdiction, and in such cases it is the duty of the neutral government to effect restitution.

But, again, assuming this not to be so, and the capture is to be regarded as clear from all objection on the score of violation of neutral territory, there still arises another question from the fact that the prize was subsequently brought within the limits of our jurisdiction. Now, this having been done, the consul of the federal government had a clear right, according to the doctrine of the Santissima Trinidad and similar cases, to litigate the question of restitution on the ground that the vessel was captured by a cruiser unlawfully equipped within the English dominions. This he was entitled to do, on a claim for restoration brought either at his suit or that of the English government, and upon such a suit the character and origin of the Alabama would have been judicially investigated. It is difficult to understand why this course was not adopted, except that both the English colonial authorities and the American consulate appear, from their reciprocal arguments, to have been imperfectly versed in the legal principles applicable to the occurrence. The American consul seems to have omitted to demand that to which he was justly entitled, while he put forward all sorts of claims which were wholly untenable. On the other hand, the colonial authorities do not appear either to have received very explicit instructions or to have exercised any great caution or sagacity on the occasion.

It remains to notice the case of the Tuscaloosa, which arose just about the same time in the same waters, and which, from what I perceive by your paper of this morning has more recently occurred, is likely to became a matter of some interest. This vessel, it appears from the Parliamentary Paper, was originally the federal bark Conrad captured by the Alabama; she had some guns put on board her, and was named the Tuscaloosa. Whether she was ever legitimately commissioned as a vessel-of-war does not distinctly appear; and if she was so, the authority and the manner in which the commission was conferred are not stated. However this may be, on the 8th of August, 1863, she entered Simon’s bay, where she remained seven days with her original cargo of skins and wool on board, and it is stated that her cargo was sold to merchants at Cape Town. Under these circumstances the American consul demanded her detention by the English colonial authorities on the ground that she was a prize, and that the English government “having excluded prizes from all the ports of the British empire, the captures necessarily revert to their real owners as soon as they enter a British port.” It is hardly necessary to say that as a general proposition this is wholly untenable. The rule is, that questions of prize are cognizable only in the courts of the captor; and the mere fact that a prize is brought into our ports, in breach of these orders, does not give to the neutral any jurisdiction over the prize of a legitimate cruiser, whether the prize has or has not been condemned. The only remedy in such a case is to order its instant departure. But to the general rule that questions of prize are cognizable only by the courts of the captors, there are two important exceptions—one, where the prize has been taken in violation of the neutral territory; the other, where the prize has been taken on the high seas by a cruiser equipped within the neutral territory in breach of its laws. In both these cases the neutral government lawfully assumes authority over the prize in vindication of its violated neutrality. Neither the American consul nor the colonial authorities seem to have adverted to this important distinction between the rule and the exceptions. The matter was further complicated by the pretension of the Tuscaloosa to be a commissioned vessel-of-war. The colonial authorities decided that she was entitled to be so regarded, and declined in any way to interfere with the vessel. It appears from a letter of Lord Russell to Mr. Adams, dated October 29, 1863, (Parliamentary paper, p. 43,) that the foreign office was not altogether satisfied with the view taken of the matter by the authorities at the Cape, and it would seem that fresh instructions were issued, under which, in December last, the vessel was seized on her return to the Cape. The grounds of this seizure and the circumstances attending it are not stated with any precision. and the facts of the case are too little known to admit of any one venturing an opinion on the subject. Those who desire to acquaint themselves with the principles of law involved will do well to study the case of the Nereyda, (8 Wheat. Rep.,) which appears, as far as the facts are known, to be re markably similar to that of the Tuscaloosa. The profound and masterly arguments at the bar in that case seem to exhaust every aspect of the question, and are a good deal more instructive than the somewhat timid and inconclusive judgment of the court. The question there was whether a prize which assumed to have been duly condemned and to have received a legitimate belligerent commission could, when brought into a neutral port, be seized by a neutral government and restored to her original owners on the ground that she was originally captured by a vessel unlawfully equipped within the territory of the neutral government. It is not very easy to discover from the judgment of the court whether they held the satisfactory proof of a lawful condemnation would have absolutely defeated the neutral jurisdiction; nor is it clear what view they took of the operation of the alleged commission. I confess I am disposed to think that in such a case the question of condemnation is not the most material, and that, whatever may be the case of a bona fide purchaser under the sentence of a prize court, at all events as against the original captors the mere sentence of condemnation would not defeat the right or dispense with the duty of the neutral government to effect restitution in such a case. The question of the commission of the Tuscaloosa is a much more serious matter. It is certainly a strong thing to attempt to exercise jurisdiction of any kind, upon any pretext, over a commissioned vessel-of-war; and in this respect it must be confessed that it is not very easy to reconcile the course taken in the case of the Nereyda with the doctrine laid down with so much precision in that of the Exchange. It is probable, however, that the legitimacy of the commission of the Tuscaloosa is not admitted by the English authorities. In that case the matter will resolve itself simply into a suit for the restitution of a prize brought within our jurisdiction, on the allegation that she was captured by a cruiser unlawfully fitted out and manned within our dominions. Such a suit would be strictly in accordance with well-established precedents, and in its discussion the whole question of the origin and character of the Alabama and her outfit will be adjudicated upon.

Before quitting these topics I should wish to say one word on the tone and temper in which it becomes us to enter on these discussions. Some people seem to consider that we do ourselves injustice if, when the Americans swagger, we do not bluster in return. I confess that it appears to me that dignity and self-respect prescribe an exactly opposite course. The American government may find some excuse for irritation and ill temper in their ill success and disappointment. We have no pretence for regarding these questions in any other spirit than that of a calm and self-possessed impartiality. I have no fear lest we should be timid enough to do more than is right because we are threatened, and I hope we shall not be petty enough to do less than is right because we are abused. The maxim of chivalry, noblesse oblige, applies not less, to great nations than to exalted persons. England is too powerful to be afraid, and too great to fear to be thought so. What we have to do is to determine, according to the best of our judgment, the precise limits of right, and to tread with an unswerving step the path of justice and of law, alike heedless of menace and disdainful of reproach. What we have most to fear is lest we should ever find ourselves committed to defend that which is not justly defensible.

HISTORICUS.

Temple, February 16.

Mr. Graham to Mr. Adams.

United States Consulate, Cape Town, Cape of Good Hope, January 4, 1864.

Sir: The Conrad, alias Tuscaloosa, arrived in Simon’s bay, in this colony, on the 27th of December, 1863, having been on a cruise between this place and Brazil, since she discharged her cargo of wool at Angia Pequina. She reported having seen over one hundred vessels on her cruise, only two of which were American. One of these two outsailed her after a chase of two days; the other, named the Golden Age, she captured, and afterwards released upon the master giving a bond to the amount of $180,000. On the 28th, the next day after the Tuscaloosa arrived here, I received the following letter:

“Colonial Office, December 28, 1863,

“Sir: I am directed by the governor to acquaint you that the Tuscaloosa, having again arrived in Simon’s bay, will, under instructions lately received from her Majesty’s government, be retained under her Majesty’s control and jurisdiction, until properly reclaimed by her original owners.

“I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

“RAWSON W. RAWSON, “Colonial Secretary.

“Walter Graham, Esq., United States Consul.”

To this I briefly replied, that I was content to have the vessel remain in the present custody until I received special instructions from her owners in regard to her; because, though I could institute a proceeding in rem without special authority from them, I could not receive actual restitution of the res in controversy without such authority. But I added, that if, at any time hereafter, it should be determined to give the vessel up to any party other than the owners, I desired to be apprized of the fact in due season, to commence a proceeding in rem in the vice-admiralty court here. I also said, I hoped his excellency would see that the decision of the British imperial government covered as well the goods belonging to the Sea Bride, which were seized at the custom-house here, and that he would be pleased to announce that they also were held subject to the order of the original owners.

I have not yet received any reply; but as the suit I have brought against the colonial government was to establish a principle which the home government has already conceded in the case of the Tuscaloosa, there is now little necessity for prosecuting the suit, especially as the value of the goods claimed is of small account.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

WALTER GRAHAM, Consul

Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Envoy Extraordinary, &c., &c., &c., London.

P. S.—January 5. Last evening I received the following letter.

W. G.

“Colonial Office, January 4, 1864.

“Sir: I am directed by the governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, and to state that, in compliance with your application, the Tuscaloosa will for the present be retained in charge of officers of her Majesty’s government. His excellency is quite prepared to comply with your request respecting the forfeited goods, said to have been part of the cargo of the Sea Bride.

“I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

“RAWSON W. RAWSON, “Colonial Secretary,

“The U. S. Consul.”