Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
Sir: I have to acknowledge the reception of despatches from the department, numbered from 640 to 644 inclusive, and of a telegram dated the 7th instant, giving the satisfactory intelligence of the fall of Vicksburg. I communicated this news at once, by telegraph, to Mr. Dayton, at Paris.
So completely has the public become convinced of the correctness of the representations continually made in the London press of the desperate condition of our affairs, and of the triumphal progress of General Lee, that the expectation was almost universal to hear of his taking possession of Washington. Much of panic had pervaded the minds even of many loyal Americans here, who found themselves unable to resist the pressure of the atmosphere around them. The astonishment created by the announcement of the actual facts on Sunday may well be imagined to have been in corresponding proportion. I need not [Page 367] add that the disappointment amongst the English was quite in the same measure. Many of the newspapers at first refused to believe in the surrender of Vicksburg.
The evidence thus obtained of this truth does not, however, appear to render any change necessary in the policy heretofore adopted by America towards Great Britain. That policy is the preservation of peace as the main instrument, not so much to alter these feelings as to guard against the evil effects of them. The chief hope being that the disruption of the Union might be the inevitable consequence of the present contest, our aim obviously can be no other than to persevere to the end of a complete restoration. The position of Great Britain should be set up as a beacon to warn us against the danger of domestic divisions for at least a century to come. We have a mission to fulfil. It is to show, by our example to the people of England in particular, and to all nations in general, the value of republican institutions. There is now a sanguine expectation that by reason of our incompetency to meet the immediate emergency, that mission may be shown to have failed, and those institutions correspondingly discredited. The greatest triumph of all would be to prove these calculations vain. In comparison with this, what would be the gain to be derived from any collision with the powers of Europe?
In the mean time the indications of uneasiness in the relations of the continental powers continue very marked. The Emperor of Russia is evidently preparing for difficulties in the spring. And although the ministry here have taken pains to announce their determination not to press matters about Poland to the point of war, there is some fear lest the French Emperor should be able to involve Great Britain in it, as he did in 1854, by the pressure of the popular sentiment. Parliament is on the eve of prorogation. The customary interval of repose in Europe is expected to take place, which will probably operate as a relief to us as well as to all other civilized nations. I trust that we may be enabled so far to improve it as to render the inducements to ultimate interference by no means commensurate with the danger of attempting it.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c.