Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Third Session Thirty-seventh Congress

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.

No. 166.]

Paris, June 28, 1862.

Sir: Enclosed you will find a printed translation of a speech by Mr. Jules Favre, on the 26th instant, in the Chamber of Deputies, in reference to the invasion of Mexico, and of Mr. Billault’s reply. The latter gentleman (minister without portfolio) is, as you know, the mouthpiece of the Emperor, and his speech is therefore the last and most authentic exposé of the purposes of France in regard to Mexico. You will, I presume, see it reprinted in the American papers, though perhaps not in full. I prefer, therefore, to send it, as it is in lieu of a despatch upon the subject.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. L. DAYTON.

His Excellency William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

Speech of Mr. Jules Favre.

The following is a full report of the important debate concerning Mexico on Thursday, Count de Morny in the chair:

M. Baroche, president of the council of state, MM. Billault and Magne, ministers without portfolio; and the other government commissioners were present, as usual.

Several local bills were adopted.

The order of the day was the discussion of the bill relating to the supplementary credits of 1862.

The president read Art. 1, demanding 178,371,382 fr. over and above the credits called for in the budget.

The sections relating to the ministries of state, finance, justice, foreign affairs, and the interior, were successively adopted. On the credits for the war department being brought forward, M. Jules Favre rose and said:

Gentlemen: When the government lately came to demand from this chamber the means of sending assistance to a corps d’armée, arrested by unexpected obstacles, it met with unanimous support; for to succour one’s fellow-citizens in danger, and assure the honor of the flag, is the duty of all men, without distinction of party; and in such circumstances the government has no opposition to fear. But a vote of that kind is not a vote of confidence, and we should fail in our duty as the representatives of the country if we did not endeavor to hold back the government from a course which we think fatal. I have no wish to commence an irritating debate, and I think nothing more is now requisite than to obtain explanations from the government as to the resolutions it intends to adopt. Official documents have made known to the country the reasons which determined the government to send an expedition to Mexico last November. If, at a moment when everything combined to make strict economy a bounden duty, a distant and expensive war were untertaken, it was, he considered, undoubtedly indispensable to protect our countrymen threatened by a faithless government, in contempt of all treaties. England and Spain had the same grievances to avenge, and their co-operation, while lightening our expenses, seemed likely to render success more easy and rapid. The treaty of 31st October, concluded between the three powers, clearly defined the object of the combined expedition. Art. 1 stipulated that sufficient forces should be sent to seize and occupy the ports and military positions on the coast. Art. 2 declared that the three powers should not seek any separate advantage, nor exercise any influence on the internal affairs of Mexico affecting the independence of the country, or its right to freely choose its own government. The instructions given to the French plenipotentiaries were in conformity with the spirit of this treaty. They represent the object of the expedition to be the occupation of the Mexican ports, explain the nature of the coercion to be used in case of resistance, and repeat the declaration that the powers will not interfere with the internal affairs of the country. They add, however, somewhat vaguely, that if the sound part of the population, weary of anarchy, should make efforts to constitute a government presenting guarantees of stability, such efforts should not be discouraged. I propose to examine whether our army has been received with sympathy by the sounder portion of the Mexicans, and is supported by men of character and influence. It is impossible to doubt what is meant by the expression “sound part of the population.” It can only mean those who would welcome the invaders of their country, and I assert that such persons must be the most contemptible part of the population. What would have been thought of those who, under the convention, should have welcomed the stranger invading France? I do not wish to institute comparisons, but I am justified in pointing out the dangers to which the vague instructions given to our plenipotentiary exposed our flag. Well, the expedition was decided, and France was to send only 2,500 or 3,000 men. Well-founded alarm was soon manifested. It was said that the protection of French interests was merely a programme concealing other projects; that we were going to Mexico to overthrow the established government and erect a monarchy in its place, and the name of an adventurous, though Austrian, prince was mentioned as having accepted such a candidateship. It was in the midst of these doubts that our session began, and you cannot have forgotten the interpellations addressed to the government. You have heard the observations of M. Jubinal, who puts the question plainly: “If you go to Mexico,” said he, “to avenge your wrongs, you have justice on your side; but not so if you mean to impose upon a people a form of government which it does not wish for. If you abuse your power, you commit an act so much the more criminal that it concerns a weak nation that cannot resist—a nation which is perhaps a prey to regrettable divisions, but which has a right to prefer them to slavery.” To these just and pointed remarks I shall add a vew others, to demonstrate that the expedition was both impolitic and unjust. It was impolitic, because the greatness of the effort and of the cost was not in proportion to the result aimed at, and because it might lead to serious diplomatic complications, and alter the equilibrium of our alliances. It was unjust, because Mexico, once informed of the claims of France, had offered to negotiate, and had presented substantial securities. By exacting more than the reparation of damages, an attack was made on the national sovereignty of a people. You remember, gentlemen, the reply of M. Billault to those interpellations. He said that we only went to Mexico to protect our citizens, menaced by an anarchical government; that we desired only a reparation of wrongs; and that we could not be eternally the dupes of a government that deceived us. He added that the expedition was made in common with Spain and England, and he asked us where, in the face of such open facts, we saw anything of a direct convention for the advantage of some foreign power? Where were the proofs of such suppositions? The proofs, gentlemen, will be supplied by the events brought about by the policy of the government. I am well aware that M. Billault admitted that our presence on the Mexican coast might give rise to circumstances wherein we could not remain inactive. He thought that the whole Mexican population would rally to our flag and proclaim us its liberators; and in presence of that spectacle, could we refuse to give military protection to the founding of a new government? [Noise.] Such were the explanations given by the government, and the minister, availing himself of an oratorical expedient, added “Our troops are on their way—are perhaps now at Mexico: why discuss the matter?” Whatever were the sentiments of the chamber respecting that language, it is certain that the expression of them was less open than usual. My own opinion has undergone no change, but I hardly expected to find it so speedily justified by events. Allow me to recapitulate what has occurred. The expedition left in November, 1861, and arrived in the month of December. Just then Vera Cruz fell into the hands of the Spaniards, who had been the first to arrive. The combined army had no ammunition wagons or horses, nor any war material. It was thought that everything of that sort might be found on the spot. There were many faults at the outset of the affair: First, the season was not well chosen. The terrible month of yellow fever, auxiliary to the Mexicans, was already looming in the horizon. It was necessary to use despatch, and that was still possible. But as political action should precede the military one, a proclamation was issued, addressed to the Mexican nation, and thus worded: “Mexicans, the arms of France are open to you! Leave those who oppress you under their yoke: that yoke we are come here to break.” Nobody responded to the call, and the proclamation found no echo. The Mexican minister of foreign affairs gave it to be understood that he would only reply to diplomatic reclamations. He added that the combined army might be menaced with yellow fever on the sea-coast, and that he would open the gates of Mexico to the allies on two conditions: 1st, that the claims made should leave the existing government intact; and, 2d, that if the treaty under discussion should not be signed, the troops should retrograde to the coast. All this took place in February, 1862. The plenipotentiaries made a note of their claims, and Count de Reus was authorized to submit them to the Mexican minister. An understanding was soon come to: Mexico agreed to negotiate, and offered for her debt the guarantee of the United States. Thus falls to the ground the objection of M. Billault respecting the perpetual deceit practiced in Europe by the Mexican nation. Under these circumstances the convention of Soledad was signed by the plenipotentiaries, stipulating for the opening of negotiations, and for the removal of the allied troops to quarters on high ground, out of the reach of the yellow fever; and such was to be the state of things up to the 15th of April, when the acceptance or refusal of the European powers would have arrived. On that first convention the agreement was broken— the Madrid and London cabinets approving, but that of the Tuilleries disapproving, of the same. And here I must ask why was this? A government ought to give precise instructions to its agents; why, then, was our plenipotentiary disavowed? However it may be, the convention not being ratified, formal promises were still made to execute it. Unfortunately—and this is painful to relate to a French chamber—the chief of the French expeditionary corps thought himself obliged not to keep his promise. He had promised to withdraw his troops to the coast side of the defile in case of the non-ratification of the treaty. He, however, remained on the other side. That officer has given his reason, which I am authorized in calling vague and evasive, by reason of the language of our plenipotentiary at the conferences of Orizaba. To the questions of Sir Charles Wyke, M. Dubois de Saligny replied that he had refused the ratification because he had no confidence; and when asked why he had signed the convention in the first instance, he said that he had no account to render to any one as to his motives, but that, having once signed it, he should have thought himself personally bound to adhere to the treaty, had not the Mexican government endeavored to annul it by every means in its power. Such language is to be regretted; the plenipotentiary should have been more precise and less disdainful in a question where the signature of France was involved. It is, however, certain that our soldiers remained in Mexico in virtue of a non-ratified treaty, and that this non-ratification was the cause of the rupture, and of our own isolation. That is not all. France, after having eliminated Spain and England, has opened her routes to emigrants, to factious citizens, expelled both by armed force and by the national will. Here is a second episode which will give rise to a second and more flagrant rupture. This episode has been the object of a regular discussion among the three powers—a discussion drawn up in a procès-verbal, and published all over Europe. You are aware that when the report was spread about that the old partisans of the defunct government, and notably General Miramon, would join the expedition, the representative of England declared that he would have him arrested and tried for robbing the English legation. Miramon became alarmed, and beat a retreat to Havana: but we took on board our ships General Almonte and Father Miranda, partisans of a clerical and military government, which had been overthrown and replaced by the constitutional government of Juarez. Almonte could not touch Mexican ground without exposing himself to the rigor of the law, so he came in the midst of French troops. Did he come without being sent for? I cannot admit that it was so. Almonte appeared to know the powers with which he was invested, and he declared that he came to support the candidateship of Prince Maximilian. The minutes of the conference say, “General Almonte has declared that he relied on the three powers to change the government into a monarchy, and to name an archduke; that he believed that project would be well received, and might be realized before two months.” Almonte was thus the agent of the prince—the broker, as it were, of a monarchical candidate, presenting himself behind foreign bayonets. Was not his pretension calculated to excite much emotion? The representatives of England and Spain said that the convention of London was violated by his presence. Were they wrong? Certainly not. That convention set forth that the powers interdicted themselves from exercising any pressure on the Mexican government. A proscribed and a condemned man—an emigrant—united himself to France. That was evidently to tear up the convention of London. The fact must be also examined as regards the violation of the law of nations and of morality. War is always a cruel extremity; but it is permitted in order to repel force, to avenge an insult, and to assist an ally. If, however, it be undertaken to impose a government which the nation will not have, and to assist the ambitious views of a citizen who has been expelled from his country, it is then a crime. What is to be thought of the morality of a man who lets loose on his country the scourge of a foreign war? For my own part, I cannot restrain the feelings with which my heart is fraught. History has recorded more than one act of that kind, but all who have turned their arms against their country have been branded with the strongest reprobation. There is no principle more sacred than love of one’s country and horror of foreign intervention. I do not know what future may be reserved for France. [Loud interruptions.] But I am sure that she will achieve her complete liberty. If she could be called on to support the yoke of a power which would destroy eminent citizens, she would bear it with indignation, and would endeavor to throw it off. But if a liberator presented himself, escorted by Austrian and Prussian troops, it is he whom I should regard as an enemy—[interruption]— and I think I should fulfil my duty in shedding my blood to prevent that in solent auxiliary from defiling the soil of my country. [Movement.] Juarez said, “If the French are with Almonte, I consider it as a declaration of war.” It was then that a conference took place, and it was declared that the presence of Almonte was an absolute bar to the further co-operation of Spain and England, and his re-embarkation was demanded. Admiral Jurien de la Gravière refused, and, in consequence, a division between the allies took place. Another cause of discord exists on which I am desirous of obtaining some explanation from the government. Each power had reserved to itself the right of bringing forward its individual claims, and those of France appear to be insignificant; the amount reaching, perhaps, about four millions. At the conferences, the sum first mentioned was twelve millions, and afterwards seventy-five millions. That enormous sum was connected with a transaction known by the name of the Jecker loan, and which it was thought would be recognized by the new government. Juarez was called on to pay that sum, and he refused. He consented to pay the seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars, as stated in former treaties, but not the other fifteen millions of dollars. The house of Jecker was a Swiss establishment, which afterwards became bankrupt, and that is the creditor which France takes under her patronage! The affair of Jecker, which was a scandalous piece of usury, was laid before the French government as a legitimate debt. That affair ought to be cleared up, and the government should declare that it will only exact the payment of sums really due, and not those which are only disgraceful speculations. In my opinion, the only course compatible with the interests and honor of the country is to treat with Mexico and then withdraw. [Murmurs.] France must either do that or make war. If France is not the partisan of Almonte, she has no enemies in Mexico. She has only debtors, unless the words which have been spoken in this chamber have been used only to deceive the public, [murmurs,] for it has been declared that French troops only went to Mexico to protect the interests of their fellow-countrymen. To make war, therefore, is to engage in an enterprise not only difficult, but unjust. What would be the object of such a war? Would it be to avenge a check? We have met with none. The French soldiers have, in the midst of almost insurmountable natural obstacles, heroically supported the name and honor of France, and they might return to their country with the greatest glory. France is doubtless powerful enough to proceed on to Mexico, but is the object to be attained worth the sacrifice? After victory will come responsibility. The stable government that would be established would cause an expense of thirty millions to be inscribed on the Budget; for it would be necessary to keep a force of three thousand to four thousand men in the capital, and perhaps twelve or fifteen thousand in the interior. Such are the sacrifices necessary if the government perseveres in a fatal resolution, and refuses to acknowledge that it has taken a false step. The French government had done so on other occasions; for it stopped short at Villafranca before it had attained the end it had in view. [Murmurs.]

A Voice. We had victories behind us then.

M. J. Favre. I cannot accept any share of responsibility in this affair. I protest against the policy which should compel me to do so, and I demand a prompt solution to extricate France from this predicament. The result of the expedition will be found to have cooled our relations with two neighboring powers; to have excited the mistrust of the United States, and alarmed all the republics of South America. A wise policy consists in retrieving faults, and not aggravating them by obstinacy. Out of evil, however, good may sometimes come. France will, perhaps, be made sensible of the danger of allowing herself to be engaged in great questions of external policy without the consent of her representatives. Has not the chief of the state himself, to whom all authority was given for the protection of order, felt the necessity of having the nation to share his responsibility? Has he not given the representatives of the country pre-eminence in matters affecting the public fortune? Well, all this would be illusory, if it were possible, without consulting us, to engage France in compromising undertakings. I hope this lesson may not be renewed, and that this assembly may not be reduced to vain regrets and powerless wishes. [Applause and dissent.]

M. Billault. Gentlemen, in the patriotic vote which you gave some days ago, M. Jules Favre sees only a vote of necessity, not of confidence. He is mistaken in that view, and I trust the confidence of the chamber will be still greater when complete explanations shall have been given by the government. The government was most anxious to thoroughly explain to the chamber and the country an affair in which the misconception of some and the ill-will of others have strangely disturbed the public opinion of this country, if not of Europe. It is, therefore, its interest, as well as its duty, to make known its motives and intentions. I shall have to trespass for some time on the patience of the chamber, but I am aware that your attention never flags when the interests of France are concerned. [Marks of assent.] In the first place, we have to examine whether things have reached such a pass in Mexico that war is inevitable. It has been said that insufficient and even blamable motives have determined the government. For thirty years past Mexico has inflicted all kinds of injury and annoyance on Frenchmen settled in that country, where trade and industry are the victims of anarchy and the exactions of all succeeding governments, whether reactionist or liberal. I will not dwell upon the anarchy prevailing there, but limit my remarks to the wrongs France has suffered. How many conventions have been successively made since the capture of San Juan d’Ulloa, and all violated the moment the French flag withdrew? What is more, the funds proceeding from the customs, intended to serve as a security, were seized, or rather stolen, by the Mexican government. England, too, suffered in the same way. All was anarchy in Mexico. In six and twenty years there had been above sixty presidents. When the government of Juarez was formed, which claimed to be liberal and constitutional, some faint hope of justice was entertained. M. de Saligny was accordingly sent to Mexico, and a fourth convention was signed, with no better result than the others. For thirty years all treaties have been violated with impunity, and our countrymen plundered and murdered. Under these circumstances, M. de Saligny, in accord with the English minister, had just sent in an energetic protest, when Juarez issued a decree annulling all treaties with foreign governments, and declaring that the produce of the customs assigned to them should be taken by the Mexican administration. The two ministers then made another protest, and M. de Saligny informed us that he had been compelled to cease all relations with the Mexican government. He added that it was impossible longer to tolerate such conduct, and also that the Mexican government attributed our longanimity to helplessness. In September, 1861, the minister of foreign affairs sanctioned the conduct of our representative, instructed him to send in an ultimatum, and withdraw it if it were not executed. This ultimatum demanded the repeal of the decree abolishing all treaties. The Mexican government made fair promises, but as usual did nothing. The English and French ministers, therefore, left Mexico. The question then arose whether England and France should abandon the interests of their subjects. Would any one within these walls have advised the government to submit to such treatment? No, for the dignity of France was engaged; and there are positions in which honor and duty are paramount to all other considerations, [Loud approbation.] The respect due to our flag must never be compromised. Two Americans of the southern States, travelling under the English flag, had well nigh set Europe on fire, and shall not we, after thirty years of insults and wrongs, insist on reparation? The government will not suffer the French flag to be insulted with impunity, either in the Old World or in the New. [Loud approbation.] England thought, as we did, that forcible means were necessary. She had suffered the same wrongs, and latterly a sum of money had been taken from the English legation at Mexico. The man who stole it was tried and acquitted, on the ground that he had not stolen, but merely taken possession of the money. [General laughter.] Spain also had similar wrongs to avenge, and was also determined to obtain redress. Lastly, to cite an authority which will no doubt have more weight with the honorable member who spoke last than any monarchical government, the government of the United States declared that the wrongs it had received from Mexico would justify the occupation of the towns on the coast, and added that such a measure would be favorably received by the population. Thus, the republic of the United States certifies to the fact that the Mexicans must be disposed to receive the protection of a foreign flag. As all conciliatory means have been tried in vain, it was indispensable to obtain a remedy by other measures. But how was it to be done with a country in such a state of anarchy? The occupation of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico seemed the simplest course, but that had proved useless, for the Mexicans would not allow imports to go into the interior without paying duty again, and when foreigners complained the only reply was, an increase of duty. [A laugh.] To occupy Vera Cruz and Tampico, and to seize on the customs, was, on the one hand, to seize on nothingness, and on the other to expose the occupants to the disastrous effects of the yellow fever. That plan was, therefore, impossible. There was a precedent for a more energetic course of action. In 1846, under similar circumstances, the United States forces marched on Mexico. There was then in that unfortunate country an appearance of governmental organization, which has since disappeared. After a stay of twelve months the claims were satisfied, and the American army was able to leave. We might think that by similar means the same results might be attained, and that the example of the United States might be followed. But at Mexico we should have found ourselves in presence of a government unable to keep its promises, even if it had the will to do so—of a country plunged in anarchy, and of fifty men who were disputing for power. A long delay might also have been given to Mexico to satisfy the claims made on her, on condition that the people would give themselves a serious government which would respect citizens and laws. It could never enter into the minds of the three powers to impose a government on the people by force. The policy adopted by France is said to have given umbrage to Spain and England. If that were true, it would not be the fault of the French government; but, thank God, that is not the case. Those powers, however they may differ in opinion, never felt more friendly towards France. I have official proofs of that fact. (The minister then read two despatches addressed by the French minister at Madrid to the French minister of foreign affairs, and then continued.) There are two combinations in presence, that of England and of Spain. England would go to Mexico solely to exact the reparations due to her, would remain on the coast, and not interfere with the form of government. Spain, on the contrary, said that nothing would be effected if a government capable of fulfilling its engagements were not established. France proposed a middle course. It would not be sufficient to remain on the coast as England wished, neither was the plan of Spain to impose a form of government considered advisable. If a return to a monarchy in Mexico were possible, and the country expressed its wishes to that effect, France would support them with disinterestedness, but with regard to any particular form of government she had come to no decision. Negotiations were entered into on the subject with the two powers, and the convention of the 31st October was signed. It was admitted that an expedition into the interior might be made for the very purpose of not discouraging the oppressed populations. It was desirable that a firm and liberal government should be founded in Mexico, and in that hypothesis it was necessary to seek what the form of it should be. Certain Mexicans were in favor of a monarchy, and the idea was that a foreign prince would be best suited. France only said one thing: “I declare that I have neither for my country nor for the imperial family any ambition; I wish for no conquest; I will have the reparation which is my due, and I ask the other governments whether they entertain the same opinion.” A prince occupying a disinterested situation, who was friendly to France, and who was entitled to general esteem, was mentioned, but only in conversation, and as an indication, and it was so taken by the two other powers. The instructions given by the English government state, that if the Mexican people, by a spontaneous movement, placed an archduke on the throne, there is nothing in the convention of London to oppose it; no pressure was to be exercised on the Mexicans, who were to consult their own interests. The object of the convention is the reparation of injuries suffered; the means is constraint by war. Declaration is made that it will not be limited to the coast, but, if necessary, carried into the interior; the desire of the powers is that there should be a counter-blow on the part of the nation itself. In the supposition that Mexico would manifest a wish to have a stronger and more regular form of government, declaration is made that no power will endeavor to derive any personal advantage. In case of a tendency towards a monarchy, indication is made that a sovereign which would not give umbrage to at least two of the powers might be named. The last indication was only subsidiary. Such is the clear and candid statement of the situation of affairs. There are some persons who find the hypothesis of the substitution of a monarchy for a republic to be shameful. The French government deeply respects the independence of nations and the principle of national sovereignty. The independence of nations is a principle which France has written on her flag, and with her sword on Europe. [Movement.] If we foresee any organization whatever which might take place in a country, it would not be to prepare obstacles to liberty, of which we know the resources and the future. [Hear, hear.] But there is a country which cannot be suspected of any ideas in favor of monarchy—a country which has a great respect for the sovereignty of the people. I allude to the United States. What is the desire of that country? A despatch of its President, of the 12th January, says: “Mexico ought to be a prosperous republic. Is it possible that such a nation should be abandoned to anarchy and ruin without our making some effort to save her? Shall the United States allow that country to destroy itself? A government like that of Mexico which cannot repress such attacks deserts all its duties. It is to Mexico that it is necessary to go and penetrate into the interior of the country to seek for the guilty parties.” It is necessary to go to Mexico to seek reparation for the past and guarantees for the future Mexico is a nation adrift. As a good neighbor the United States government must hold out its hand to pilot her. [Noise.] If it does not do so, there is reason to believe that others will do it. [Renewed agitation.] Gentlemen, I dwell perhaps too much on these facts, [No, no;] but I wish to demonstrate that for all governments there was but one method of obtaining a redress of grievances, that of striking a blow at the heart of the Mexican government by an occupation of Mexico; and but one hope, that of seeing the people rise and manifest its intentions. We have, then, here the first point in the debate clearly established. There is nothing here in common with the rash hypotheses invented by men of imperfect information, who think a great government capable of compromising the treasure and blood of France in pure gaiety of heart. Such ideas will not find favor in this assembly. [Great applause.] Gentlemen, the use of force was decided on, and the three powers sent a combined expedition; Spain sending about 7,000 men, France 2,500, and England a fleet and some marines to be employed for the time ashore. The retreat of the English has been likened to that of the Spaniards. But I cannot admit the resemblance; I do not explain facts, but only point out a difference. Spain, convinced that it was necessary to penetrate to the interior, sent an army. England felt more hesitation, and left the affair in our hands, not wishing to meddle with it. [Noise.] Some English troops had been momentarily disembarked; they were re-embarked long before the disagreements that subsequently occurred. We must do justice to all. I do not blame or condemn any foreign power, but merely state facts; Europe will judge them. The expedition started. Its object was not to resume fruitless negotiations, but to overthrow the phantom of a government, to erect the standard of justice, and to give the country an opportunity of fixing, if it so wished, its own destinies. Instead of that, what took place? The three, or rather four or five, plenipotentiaries met with ideas essentially different. The French agents had clear and formal instructions; England hesitated, not wishing to meddle with the interior of Mexico. The Spanish plenipotentiary, gentlemen, appears still to have very special ideas about Mexico. He believed in the power of Juarez; he put trust in his ministers, and had relations with them; he had not the feeling that dictated the treaty respecting Spanish and French grievances. [Movement] The result of all this was a mitigation of tone. The expedition had arrived to impose its will; it made a pause, and sent to Juarez a sort of ultimatum, which appeared to charge the very government that it was expected to fall with the task of reforming itself. When, in my former reply to M. Jules Favre, I said that we were en route, and perhaps even then in Mexico, I was in error; negotiations were then going on with Juarez, and there were hopes of an arrangement. Those hopes were never entertained by France. We knew that the word, the signature of men who had employed their ephemeral existence in deceiving foreign nations and oppressing their own, was valueless. [True, true.] France, however, had not the preponderance due to the greatest number of soldiers; Spain had the strongest force; England kept nearly aloof, but had her policy. Under those circumstances, the French plenipotentiaries submitted to—or, more correctly, he should say agreed to—the experiment. It was, indeed, useless; but it was also dangerous. Juarez found that time was precious, and resolved not to lose it. On December 18 he promulgated a decree closing the port of Vera Cruz, and declaring as traitors all who had favored the cause of the invaders. Pardon was granted to all Mexicans, (except those whom the government thought unworthy of it,)—[laughter]—and the government reserved to itself the right of judging individual cases. What Juarez feared was, not being obliged to give a promise to pay, but lest his compatriots should return and put themselves at the head of a movement. Gentlemen, when all this was known in France, the French government did not hesitate to blame a proceeding that could only lead to further deception. It knew well that Juarez was counting on the rainy season and the yellow fever as his allies. The expeditionary corps arrived in January, and there was to be no action before April; thus, much time would be lost, and the situation became extremely difficult. Immediately that the government became aware of the false route on which it had entered, it hastened to pronounce its opinion. Gentlemen, I state facts, not for yourselves only, but for the general public. A government like that of the Emperor must clear itself of the charge of compromising the name of France; with ten years of glory behind us, we must not have a cloud before us. [Great applause.] M. Thouvenel wrote to his plenipotentiaries that since conciliation did not succeed, it became necessary to act with energy. Our minister at Madrid found the sentiments of the Spanish government on this subject in exact conformity with our own. M. Calderon Collantes also declared that energetic measures were required, and that Spain, for her part, was quite decided on the point. [Noise; interruption.] An analogous conversation also took place in London between our ambassador and Earl Russell. Lord Russell admitted that a more rapid action would have been desirable; but I must repeat that the English cabinet never abandoned its reserve about the interior of Mexico. Its circumspection on that point has never been caught tripping. [Movement.] Energetic action was then resolved. But whilst this, long correspondence with Europe and the internal negotiations were being carried on, Juarez was adopting, with a reckless tyranny, the most violent measures for stifling within the country any opinions hostile to his interests. With this view he issued a decree which was a monument of sanguinary tyranny—the penalty of death inscribed sixteen or seventeen times: Any foreigner found with arms to be sent to the galleys for ten years; any armed Mexican to be put to death! Such was the reply made by the Mexican government to the appeal made by the three powers to the populations. In presence of those facts the convention of Soledad was signed, a convention negotiated by General Prim alone, and afterwards accepted by the plenipotentiaries. But whilst the object of the expedition was to provoke the establishment in another government in Mexico, the first thing done by General Prim was to give a sort of moral recognition to the power of Juarez. He stipulates that negotiations should be negotiated in April; he asks permission for the allied troops to occupy healthy quarters; he promises to retrograde to the pestilential regions if the negotiations fail. Our sick are confided to the proved loyalty of the Mexican government, and the Mexican flag is to float on the forts of Vera Cruz by the side of those of France, England, and Spain. Such conditions were contrary to the policy of the French government; they were very deplorable.

A Voice. Humiliating.

M. Billault. The journals have said that the Emperor’s government has demanded of Spain the recall of General Prim; but the Emperor’s government is studious only of its own dignity, and leaves to other nations the care of their own. [Great applause.] It has confined itself to disavowing the convention of Soledad as contrary to the honor of France.

A Voice. So it was.

M. Billault. It was necessary to ascertain whether our allies shared this sentiment. M. Barrot wrote that the Spanish government also blamed the convention of Soledad; that the president of the council acknowledged the fault committed, and was ready, if any conservative party made an effort in Mexico, to support it with the moral authority of Spain, M. Barrot declared that the Emperor’s government would never allow French soldiers to leave Mexico humiliated. [Hear, hear.] The Duke de Tetuan said that Spain would do as much for her flag, and would shrink from no sacrifice. [Sensation.] Thus Spain seemed to coincide with us as to the convention of Soledad. New instructions were sent off to Mexico. The command of the troops was given to General de Lorencez, the diplomatic direction to M. de Saligny, who was told to make the reparation of French grievances the principal point, and to give moral aid to the establishment of a government offering some security, but not to impose it. We have no wish to impose any particular form of government; all we want is a real government of some kind. In the meantime circumstances occurred which rendered the convention impossible. The French residents were worse treated than ever, and Juarez’s sanguinary decree of 25th January was enforced. All Mexicans were threatened with death if they took part in the municipal government of Vera Cruz while the French occupied it. Could such a state of things be endured? (The honorable minister here read letters from General Prim to Admiral Jurien, to the effect that negotiations were useless, and that energetic action was the only course.) These letters were dated 20th and 21st March, but on the 23d, the general again wrote to inform the admiral that he was prepared to take his departure. What was the cause of this sudden change? Why, the presence of General Almonte with the French troops. In his letters of the 20th and 21st General Prim was in favor of vigorous means; but did not the state of things call for some other measures? And was not the French commissioner right in endeavoring to obtain from Juarez a serious amnesty, and in demanding that the Mexicans should have an opportunity of manifesting their sentiments freely? But the resistance of the Spanish commissioner was absolute on this last point. As to the presence of Almonte in the French camp, the French admiral informed General Prim that the Mexican emigrants had not left Vera Cruz under the protection of the French troops with his (the admiral’s) consent; in his opinion they ought to have waited for the armistice. It thus appears that both policies were agreed on the necessity of putting down Juarez, but differed on the point of giving the Mexicans an opportunity of making known their wishes. Yet other populations have been consulted in the same way. [Hear, hear.] Were they not aided by the French flag, which, the Hon. M. Jules Favre will acknowledge, was not regarded by them as a foreign flag? Were they not by that flag delivered from tyrannical governments? [Hear.] What you like beyond the mountains you do not approve of beyond the seas! [Loud approbation.] The allied commissioners held their last conference at Orizaba, on the 11th April. From the procès-verbal of that sitting, M. Jules Favre quoted only the words of the foreign commissioners opposed to the right of France, but not a word of the two plenipotentiaries who upheld the interests of our country. [Hear.] Surely, in a French assembly, discussing French interests, the opinions of our representatives ought to be held in more honor. [Hear, hear.] When the last conference met, the allied commissioners were no longer agreed. Sir Charles Wyke had always been disposed to treat with Juarez. England seemed then to have forgotten all the conventions violated for twenty-five years past; but I have not to discuss that point. One of our representatives at that conference was Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, and I may here be permitted to render well-merited homage to his straightforward and generous character. Admiral Jurien acquitted himself of the task with the utmost composure, but with a feeling of our numerical inferiority as compared with the Spaniards—they were 6,000, we only 1,200. Well, what said Admiral Jurien, in whose words I am sure you have the utmost confidence? [Yes, yes.] He declared that nowhere had he ever seen such terror, more arbitrary spoliation, or more crushing oppression. And when he thus judged the situation he entirely set aside all projects relative to the Archduke Maximilian. “Monarchy is not the question,” said he; “a moral and respected government is the thing wanted; the majority of the population wishes to see an end of anarchy, but dare not speak out, and awaits our arrival at Mexico.” And he adds, “It is impossible to treat with a government which allows sanguinary executions, and issues edicts of death: our troops must go to Mexico.” I now return to the letters of 20th, 21st, and 23d March. All must have been struck by seeing General Prim, who in the first two letters considered that the vexatious conduct of the Mexican government ought to decide the allies to act, announces in the third his intention of quitting Mexico with his troops. It has been said that the motives of such a determination was that a conference had taken place between him, Sir Charles Wyke, and two Mexican ministers, one of whom was M. Etcheverin, an uncle of the general. [Ah, ah!] No suspicions must, however, be entertained, and General Prim is a man who, setting aside his dissent with France, and whatever may be the feelings entertained of his conduct, must not be suspected. [Noise.] It is my desire, as well as the will of the Emperor, whatever may be our temporary disaccord with two great powers, to observe every courtesy in my remarks. [Hear, hear.] I shall, therefore, refrain from making any insinuations, but let facts speak for themselves. France demanded an energetic reparation, and would not have been sorry to place Mexico in a position to declare herself on the form of government she wished. The allies were all agreed on that point, and everyone co-operated more or less for that accepted object. When we arrived at the practical means, England drew back; and when France persevered in the plan concerted in common, Spain in her turn withdrew. General Almonte is said to be the motive of that retirement. I am astonished at such preoccupation on the part of General Prim, particularly after a previous fact. A general who had performed a much more decided part than General Almonte—Miramon—presented himself on the coast of Mexico. England arrested him, and, without consulting the other powers, sent him back to the Antilles. General Prim complained of such conduct, and his government approved of his having done so, and recommended him to use his efforts to prevent anything of the kind taking place in future. How was it that General Almonte did not meet with similar feelings on the part of General Prim? Why did the latter forget the principle proclaimed by his government? The French troops arrived in Mexico in January; the Spaniards had preceded them, and every one in Europe expected that in the following month the affair would be settled, and that the French flag would float at Mexico. No one ever calculated on diplomatic negotiations of three months’ duration. General Almonte arrived at Vera Cruz on the 1st March, with the conviction that he should find his country opened to him, and the Mexican nation restored to liberty. Let it not be said, therefore, that he had been sent from France for the purpose of exciting civil war. There was no occasion for such a war. What France desired was that every Mexican citizen might express his sentiments freely as to the government wished for by the country. So long as General Almonte was under the shelter of the French flag he only issued one proclamation, and that was after the rupture of the negotiations. France only protected him against the decree of the 25th January, which entailed the penalty of death on those who returned to their country. General Almonte was not a proscribed man; he had quitted the country of his own free will Not considering himself safe at Vera Cruz, he followed one of the French battalions into the interior. At Cordova, the commander of that force was called on to give him up, but that officer indignantly refused. General Robli, whose character is entitled to general respect, having been suspected of having had a conversation with the French general during the kind of armistice which followed the convention of La Soledad, was taken with a lasso like a wild beast, and immediately shot. Who after that will say that France ought to deliver up General Almonte? [Numerous marks of assent.]

M. Jules Favre. We demand that he should not follow our army, and that he should be sent back to Europe.

M. Billault. The men with whom you sympathize asked to have him given up to them, and that was consigning him to death. This sympathy seems to me very strange. Is, then, the name of republican powerful enough to excuse all that is wrong as well as all that is right; and is it enough for a man to have republican printed in his hat to enable him to oppress his country?

M. Jules Favre. We abhor all tyrannies, even those that disguise themselves. [Exclamations.]

M. Billault. Tyrannies that disguise themselves are those which recognize the national sovereignty, but only respect it when it obeys them [Lively applause.] There is no French soldier that would not have thought himself dishonored if Almonte had been given up. [Hear, hear.] No statesman could have recommended it. We were importing into Mexico ideas of civilization and public rights, and could not act in contradiction to them. When the French flag shall float on the walls of Mexico, the generosity of the government will not be in default. An appeal will be made to all opinions, and liberty will be made to triumph. Liberty loves such operations; so does France, and she has protected them with her arms in Italy. [Great applause.] Do not, therefore, give undue prominence to what has been done relative to Prince Maximilian. The main object is to obtain just reparation; the main object is to bring every Mexican citizen to the poll to give his opinion on the tyranny of Juarez. [Applause.] Let the Mexicans pronounce, and if Juarez suits them, so let it be. [Laughter and applause.] To sum up, gentlemen, we have broken the convention of Soledad because it was contrary to instructions; because the government of Juarez, during two months, far from preventing vexations and affronts, has itself authorized them; because, in demanding the delivery of Almonte, it has sought to dishonor our flag. When the convention was broken, the Spaniards retired. But I forgot to say a few words on another motive assigned to the rupture, namely: the pecuniary claims and the ultimatum of our representative. I shall not dwell on these points, gentlemen; but there is a subject that is profoundly painful for the ministers of a loyal government. Calumny is fertile in resources, and employs strange weapons. You say that we have stopped the Times newspaper; it has not been stopped.

A voice. But other papers have been stopped.

M. Billault. That is true, and requires explanation. There exists in Paris, gentlemen, about a score of men, chiefly French, whose business it is to transmit to foreign journals the most odious calumnies against the Emperor’s ministers. What can we do? We do not know either the calumniators or the sources of their information. Such matter could not be published in France; it would be speedily and severely repressed; but it is sent abroad, and thence returns to France. And thus does calumny make the tour of Europe. This organization of calumny is odious and abominable, [True, true!] and renders the situation of an honest man well nigh intolerable. Gentlemen, the memorandum of M. de Saligny was in two parts. There was, first, an estimate of twelve millions of piastres to repair wrongs done to our countrymen. Those were very numerous; at Vera Cruz alone there were 300 applications. But you have called this sum excessive. Admitting it for the moment, I may observe that all the claims are to be verified by a committee, that is to say, by a French committee. There is also something else, the Jecker contract. This last has been the object of all sorts of insinuations, based on the despatches of Sir C. Wyke. I do not speak of these despatches, because I do not wish to discuss the English claims. Spain in this matter has been clear and precise. England less so, but she has made no opposition. Let us see what this Jecker affair is. Miramon was still in power. He was at Mexico at the beginning of 1860, whilst Juarez called himself president at Vera Cruz. Miramon, who is not better than Juarez, coined money, laid his hands on all he could, and made a loan with the house of Jecker. He said to Jecker: I will give you fifteen million piastres (75 millions of francs) in bills, chargeable by fifth parts on the customs. Every trader who shall have 100 francs to pay in customs duties shall pay 20 francs in these bills, and you will negotiate them as well as you can. Jecker accepts the 75 millions of francs in bills, and he says that he has paid back three millions of piastres. [Interruption on the bench where M. Jules Favre was sitting.] I shall be glad to reply to the interption. Jecker issued the bills; traders, some of them French, took them; it was possible to get them at a discount, and to pay 20 francs with what had been bought for five francs or six francs. You will see, gentlemen, that we had an interest in this situation. A negotiation with the minister of Juarez had been opened before the rupture, and that minister had shown some complaisance. He said he would adhere to the negotiation, begging only that it might be conducted with caution, as not likely to put the congress in good humor.

M. Jules Favre. Read the document which proves it.

Numerous voices. No, no. Do not read it.

M. Billault. I affirm it, and that is sufficient. [Hear, hear.] I affirm that the Mexican minister has admitted the principle of the debt, and said that it should be settled. The honorable minister then read a despatch from M. Thouvenel to M. de Saligny on the subject of the indemnities claimed. Everything, continued the honorable minister, has been clear and precise. It is not the financial affair which has led to a rupture, and cannot furnish any grounds for the calumnies which have been propagated. The financial question will be settled according to justice. A complete difference of opinion existed between the plenipotentiaries as to the policy to be followed. Hopes were entertained between Juarez and Spain of a treaty, which have not been realized As to Sir Charles Wyke, he made a treaty. He obtained all the pecuniary reparations he desired. Knowing, however, the value of such promises, he required guarantees, and there were given to him those of a loan of money promised to Mexico by the United States in exchange for certain Mexican provinces; but will the treaty entered into between the United States and Mexico be confirmed at Washington? We have reason to hope that it will not. The English government refused its sanction to the treaty signed by its representative—[approbation]—as it would be sanctioning the sale of the Mexican territory to the United States. [Hear, hear.] Of the three powers which arrived in Mexico two have left, the English in the first place without any violation of their engagements, and next the Spaniards. We have nothing to say as to the conduct of Spain; you are now able to judge of it. France remains alone with a handful of men, because the flag of France does not willingly draw back, notwithstanding the advice given to do so. In the instructions sent to the representatives of France in Mexico as to their conduct in this new situation, it is declared that is not from the French camp but from the country itself that the political regeneration of Mexico must proceed. A last instruction has been sent to Mexico; the character of which deeply affects the chamber, the country, and Europe. It was given directly by the Emperor when, in accepting that isolated situation, he wished to give confidence and resolution to the soldiers engaged. The Emperor wrote to General de Lorencez: “It is against my interest, my origin, and my principles to impose any kind of government on Mexico; let the Mexican nation give itself any form of government that will suit it. We only ask for sincerity in its relations, and only desire the happiness of that fine country under a regular and stable government.” [General marks of approbation.] It is not without astonishment that I heard an honorable gentleman propose his programme—treat, and then retire. What treaty can be obtained from Mexico. Promises might be had, but what reliance can be placed on them? When the honor of France is engaged, every French heart would recoil from such cowardice. [Movement.] What a shame! [Yes, yes.] What! shall the flag of France, which has triumphed over the illustrious, retire without honor from Mexico! I am sure that the patriotism of the learned gentleman did not suggest the advice he gave in the heat of his speech, [A laugh.] You say that we have no enemies, only debtors, in Mexico; but when nations are debtors, and refuse to satisfy their creditors, there are no other judges but God and force. You forget that our patience has been tried for five and twenty years, that all the people of America have their eyes upon us, and that if we withdraw without attaining our object, every Frenchman in the New World must also abandon his interests, and follow in the train of our flag. [Hear, hear.] No! Our honor is engaged, and justice we must have. Let this Mexican government disappear before the face of France, or let it take a more serious form, which may offer some security for the future. We do not wish to establish there one of those governments which only live by foreign breath; we want pecuniary satisfaction for our plundered countrymen—military satisfaction for the honor of our soldiers—diplomatic satisfaction for the dignity of France. If we do not obtain them, if the nation is so worn out that it cannot revive to honesty and order, then we will do ourselves justice, and leave it to its evil fate. But let us have no doubts as to the justness of this war. Let us say that it is just, necessary, legitimate, and let our soldiers be assured that you, as well as the Emperor, give them all your sympathies; that the whole country is at their backs, and that the flag of France will never cease to be the flag of right, justice, civilization, and liberty. [Loud cheers.]

(The honorable minister resumed his seat in the midst of a double salvo of applause.)

The five sections of the war department were then successive agreed to; and the ensemble of the bill relative to the supplementary credits of 1862 was adopted unanimously by 256 votes. The sitting then terminated.