I herewith enclose to you a copy and translation of a communication
recently received by me from Mr. Thouvenel on the subject of the
execution of the convention as to maritime rights. It contains nothing
that I have not referred to before, but it is evident he wanted to put
the specific grounds of exception to an unconditional exception of the
treaty on record.
His Excellency William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, &c., &c.,
&c.
Mr. Thouvenel
to Mr. Dayton.
[Translation.]
Paris,
September 9, 1861.
Sir: I have received the letter which you
did me the honor to write me, the 26th of the month of August, in
order to explain to me the reasons which induced you to await
further instructions from your government before proceeding to the
signing of the convention relative to maritime rights.
In this state of affairs, I could but await the arrival of the
instructions which you have requested, and, consequently, I do not
wish to enter into the discussion of the motives which have
prevented you from signing the contemplated convention, and which
you were pleased to bring to my knowledge. I desire, however, to set
forth clearly, by some further explanations, what is the train of
thought followed by the government of the Emperor, in judging, like
the government of her Britannic Majesty, that it is expedient to
accompany the proposed treaty with a special declaration.
If the United States, before the actual crisis, had adhered to the
declaration of the congress of Paris, as this adhesion would have
bound the whole confederation from that moment, the cabinet of
Washington might, at the present time, have availed itself of it to
contest the right of the southern States to arm privateers. Now, if
this supposition be correct, (fondée,) one could not be astonished
that the government of Mr. President Lincoln, according to the
principles which it has set forth in its manner of viewing the
present conflict, should wish to consider the contemplated
convention as much obligatory upon seceded States, in the present
circumstances, as if it had preceded the hostilities. But if this
opinion be quite explicable on the part of the cabinet of Washington
in the situation in which events have placed it, it could not be
thus with governments which have proposed to themselves to preserve
the strictest neutrality in a struggle, the gravity of which it has
no longer been possible for them to disregard. In accepting, then, a
proposition presented (formulée) by the federal government, when the
war had already unhappily broken out between the northern and
southern States of the Union, it was natural that the government of
the Emperor,
[Page 253]
having
decided not to turn itself aside from the attitude of reserve which
it had imposed upon itself, should consider beforehand what
extension the cabinet of Washington might be induced, on account of
its position, to give to an arrangement, by which it declared that
the United States renounced privateering. The hostilities, in which
the federal government is actually engaged, offering to it the
opportunity of putting immediately into practice the abandonment of
this mode of warfare; and its intention, officially announced, being
to treat the privateers of the south as pirates, it was manifestly
of importance to caution the cabinet of Washington against the
conviction, where it might exist, that the contemplated treaty
obliged us thus to consider the privateers of the south as pirates.
I will not dwell upon the matter (n’ insisterai pas) in order to
show how much we would deviate from the neutrality we have declared
ourselves desirous of observing towards the two factions of the
Union, if, after having announced that they would constitute for us
two ordinary belligerents, we should contest the primitive rights of
a belligerent to one of them, because the other should consent
voluntarily to the abandonment of it in a treaty concluded with us.
There is no need to point out, further, how we would forcibly break
through our neutrality as soon as we should be constrained, in
virtue of the contemplated convention, to treat as pirates the
privateers which the south will persist in arming. The cabinet of
Washington might, then, I repeat, be led, by the particular point of
view in which it is placed, to draw from the act which we are ready
to conclude such consequences as we should now absolutely reject. It
has seemed to us that it is equally important to the two governments
to anticipate (prevénir à l’avance) all difference of interpretation
as regards the application to the actual circumstances of the
principles which were to become common to them both. Otherwise, it
would have been to be feared, if the same explanations had had to be
exchanged later, that there would have been attributed to them a
character altogether different from that which they really possess.
We would regret, too, sincerely that the least misunderstanding
should be produced in our relations with the United States, not to
be anxious, from this moment henceforth, to enlighten them upon a
reserve, which, being officially stated to the cabinet of Washington
before the signing of the convention, maintains strictly one line of
neutrality, without taking away from the value of the agreement,
which, in this case, we will be happy to establish with the United
States.
Accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the
honor to be, sir, your very humble and very obedient servant,
Mr. Dayton,
Minister of the United States at Paris.
