Mr. Dayton to Mr.
Seward.
No. 44.]
Paris,
September 7, 1861.
Sir: Your despatches, 41, 42, and 43, are duly
received through Captain Schulz.
Your action, indicated in 41 and 42, has been anticipated by me In a
letter from Mr. Adams, dated London, August 1, 1861, he encloses me a
copy of Lord John Russell’s note of July 31, 1861, and in reference to
the vague paragraph to which your despatches refer he says: “I do not
quite comprehend the drift of the last paragraph, but I presume you will
find it out in the progress of your negotiation.” This I immediately
answered by a letter, of which I herewith send you a copy.
Their subsequent offer to make a written outside declaration
cotemporaneous with the execution of the treaty was a degree of
frankness which I did
[Page 248]
not
anticipate, and for which I had not given them credit. I shall wait with
great pleasure, according to your instructions, “the result of the
explanations which Mr. Adams is instructed to ask,” but I expect that
both he and I have already received all necessary explanations on that
point. My conversations, at least with Mr. Thouvenel, have covered the
whole ground, as stated to you in despatch No. 35. I add that I
communicated immediately to Mr. Adams the substance of that conversation
with Mr. Thouvenel.
The exequatur of James Lesley, appointed consul of the United States to
Lyons, was applied for immediately on the receipt of his commission.
With much respect, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
His Excellency William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, &c.
[Untitled]
Sir: I acknowledge with pleasure the
receipt of yours of the 1st instant, enclosing a copy of your note
to Lord John Russel and his reply. I feel that we have done a good
thing in getting the reply of the British government (declaring the
amendment to the treaty of Paris inadmissible) in writing. At least,
we can proceed now, under our instructions, with a consciousness
that we not only have not neglected this point, but that we have the
evidence of having pressed it affirmatively. You say you do not
comprehend the drift of the last paragraph in Lord John’s reply. I
think I do, at least, in part, and I shall not be surprised if the
meaning, which he has purposely wrapped up in that general language,
should in the end break off all negotiation. He may not refer to
this language again, but unless you ask its meaning before the
treaty is negotiated, it will be used by them afterwards as an
excuse for not carrying it in effect as respects the
insurrectionists of the south. The paragraph states, “the engagement
of Great Britain will be prospective, and will not invalidate
anything already done.” The comment after the treaty, predicated
upon this language, will be: “We had declared before the treaty that
the southern insurrectionists were a belligerent party, and entitled
to belligerent rights, (among which is the right to issue letters of
marque,) and the treaty was to be prospective only, and not to
invalidate anything already done. That, in other words, it does not
bind your disloyal citizens, recognized by us as a belligerent
party.” I long ago wrote Mr. Seward that these powers would, in my
judgment, either refuse to negotiate, or, if they did negotiate, it
would be with the understanding that it secured us no rights not
already conceded, and charged them with no duties not heretofore
acknowledged, It is advisable that we raise no question in advance
in reference to this matter, but it is necessary that we know what
they mean as we go along.
With much respect, I am yours truly,
His Excellency Chas. F. Adams,
United States Minister.
