It is in part the same matter suggested to him by me in the conference in
which he first notified me of his purpose. His written communication
subsequent to that conference required a like formal reply. I am happy
to learn from a communication received from Mr. Adams that he concurs
with me in the propriety of stopping the negotiation where it is, and
referring the matter to the government at home. I should have been most
reluctant, under the circumstances, to execute this convention, had Mr.
Adams insisted upon it, making only a counter declaration, such as was
referred to in despateh No. 35; but I was very desirous, after what had
passed, not to be considered an obstacle in the way of carrying out the
wishes of the administration. I doubt now, however, if England and
France would themselves have assented to proceed with the execution of
the convention in the face of such declaration.
His Excellency William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, &c., &c.
Mr. Dayton to
Mr. Thouvenel.
Legation of
the United States,
Paris,
August 26, 1861.
Monsieur le Ministre: I have the honor to
acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 20th instant,
in which (carrying out the purpose expressed by you in our prior
conversation of that day) you communicate to me the text of a
written declaration which you propose to make simultaneous with the
execution of the convention between the United States and France, in
reference to the principles upon maritime rights proclaimed by the
Congress of Paris in 1856. You further suggest in your note that if
I were ready to sign the convention contemplated, we might be able
to agree to do so the same day when Lord Russell should proceed, on
his side, to the signing of a like convention with Mr. Adams
The declaration which you propose to make in writing, simultaneous
with the execution of the convention, has for its object, you say,
“to prevent all misunderstanding as to the nature of the engagements
which the government of the Emperor is disposed to contract,” and
this declaration is, that “in the execution of the orders of the
Emperor the government of his Majesty does not intend to undertake,
by said convention, any engagements of a nature to implicate it
directly or indirectly in the internal conflict now existing in the
United States.”
My impressions, hastily thrown out when this proposition was verbally
suggested, have been strengthened by subsequent reflection. I do not
stop to inquire how such outside declaration as you propose may
affect the rights or obligations of parties under the treaty.
Indeed, it is so general that it may not be possible to anticipate
its entire scope or operation. It gives us notice that the
engagements of your government are not to be “of a
nature to implicate it directly or
indirectly in the internal conflict,”
&c. It may be that the conduct of the government of France,
under this declaration, would practically extend no further than
would be agreeable to the United States; yet I cannot act upon such
assumption. My instructions are to negotiate a particular
convention, the text of which has been examined and approved, as I
understand, by your excellency. If the declaration which you propose
to make does not alter the obligations or duties which would
otherwise devolve upon France, in virtue of that convention, it is
useless to make it. If it does alter such obligations or duties,
then I am not authorized to execute the convention subject to such
declaration. This, indeed, so far as my action at present is
concerned, is the whole case. But the subject justifies, and perhaps
requires some other remarks. You stated that you thought it more
frank and loyal to make your declaration in advance, and in this I
entirely concurred. If the treaty without such declaration would
impose any duty upon France which she would be unwilling to perform,
it was manifestly proper that she should declare her purpose in
advance. It was proper, not only for the purpose of preventing
misunderstanding as to the nature of her intended engagements, but
for the other purposes of leaving to the United States the option of
determining, with full knowledge, whether she would or would not
enter into the treaty subject to such declaration. The declaration,
it is true, is not strictly a part of the treaty, yet, for the
purpose intended, its effect and operation would be the same as if
it were incorporated into the treaty itself. It will prevent
misunderstandings as to the nature of the engagements, or, in other
words, it will prevent one party complaining of a non-performance of
supposed engagements by the other under the treaty, just as
effectively as if it were a condition added to the treaty itself.
But for the interposition of this declaration I should have
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assented to the execution
of the treaty at once; as it is, I have no power to do so.
From this it must not be inferred that there is now, or at any time
has been, the slightest wish upon the part of the United States to
involve France or any other foreign government in its domestic
controversy. The wish, nay, stronger than this, the right to be let alone by other nations, has
been claimed at all times, so far as I know, by our government and
its representatives abroad. They have never failed to deprecate, in
the most earnest manner, all interference in this question upon the
part of foreign powers. Yet the declaration which it is now proposed
to make would seem to imply that such interference might be claimed
by us at the hands of those powers with whom such treaty might be
made. I submit, with great respect, that there is nothing in the
present position of the United States, or in the past history of
this negotiation, which would justify such an inference. When the
present administration at Washington came into power it almost
immediately gave orders to its representatives abroad to open
negotiations upon this general subject; not, it is to be assumed,
for any small purpose or object growing out of what they then
believed to be a mere temporary insurrection, but with a view to the
settlement, so far as their assent could settle the same, of certain
great principles of maritime law.
The second and third of those principles, enunciated in the
declaration of Paris, has been already proposed and urged upon the
attention of other nations by the United States.
The fourth of those principles, which requires that blockades to be
respected shall be effective, had never been denied (at least by the
United States) as a principle of international or maritime law. It
was the first only of the points enunciated in that celebrated
declaration about which hesitation existed.
The abandonment of the right, by belligerents, to issue letters of
marque and reprisal, under proper restraints, was a serious matter
to a country having-the extended commerce and limited navy of the
United States; yet such abandonment by all nations would, we well
knew, tend much to lessen the afflictions incident to war; and so,
too, the exemption of property of non-combatants at sea, (except
contraband,) as it is on land, would, in a still greater degree,
tend to the same end.
Hence the disposition manifested on the part of the United States, on
every proper occasion, to connect in its negotiations the two; to
make the concession of the one the equivalent, if possible, of the
concession of the other. This was the condition of things when the
present administration at Washington came into power. Not trammelled
by certain considerations which had affected some of their
predecessors, they immediately took up the negotiation where it had
been left by a prior administration. Ascertaining definitely that
the exemption of private property afloat (except contraband) would
not be conceded by all the powers, they
assented at once to the execution of a convention, adopting the four
principles of the declaration of Paris as they are, without addition
and without limitation.
Then, for the first time, we were informed that the government of his
Majesty the Emperor (in connexion with that of her Britannic
Majesty) would only execute such convention subject to a certain
condition, which it declares for itself, and of the extent and
operation of which it is itself to judge.
I cannot, of course, anticipate with certainty what view the
government of the United States may take of this question, but I can
scarcely suppose it will assent to the execution of a convention
adopting the declaration of Paris, except upon terms of entire
reciprocity, and subject to no other condition than those existing
by and between the original parties; nor do I believe
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that it will, in its
negotiations with foreign governments, at all assent to exceptions
and reservations, verbal or written, predicated upon the existing
state of things in that country. It will, I apprehend, exact no more
and be content with no less than it would have been entitled to had
the convention been executed in advance of its present internal
controversy. If, therefore, the government of France shall consider
that an unconditional execution of that convention will demand of it
interference in our affairs, or will implicate it in any shape in
the civil war now raging in our country, then it is obvious this is
not a proper time for her or for us to enter into such
agreements.
But these suggestions are made, of course, subject to correction from
the government at Washington. To it I shall at once refer the
communication of your excellency, together with a copy of the
declaration which you have done me the honor to submit upon the part
of the French government.
I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to your excellency
assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honor to
be, sir, your very humble and obedient servant,
Monsieur Thouvenel,
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.
