Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

317. Message From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Paris, January 21, 1973, 1530Z.

1. Aldrich, Engel and I spent from 1030 to 1400 at Gif with Thach, Phuong and Thai January 21.

2. With minor modifications, they have accepted your revised language on statement and ICCS note. Texts being forwarded by separate message.

3. We wrote following understanding on “unanimity,” which they accepted ad referendum to Le Duc Tho:

Quote

It is understood between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the word “unanimity” in Articles 12 (a), 16 (b) and 18 (f) of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and in the protocols to the Agreement means “unanimous decision.”

Unquote

4. We had hour and one half discussion on police equipment, which was very testy, very sterile, and very discouraging. Thach claims DRV has intelligence that Thieu intends to convert police into paramilitary organization and bypass cease-fire. He is terribly suspicious of our motives.

5. In absence any background from Saigon or argumentation provided, I took position that most civil police were currently armed with carbines, and that Article 6 would disarm them, since they did not possess pistols. I made several other passes, from other angles, but to no apparent avail.

6. He finally agreed to discuss with Le Duc Tho following two sentences, which would be inserted between sentences one and two of existing Article 6.

Quote

They shall not be converted, either by arms or organization, into a force capable of combat operations. They shall be permitted to carry weapons for self-defense in the exercise of their functions.

Unquote

7. If these sentences accepted, it would be further understood that shortage of pistols constituted “unusual circumstances” which would permit continued use of carbines by GVN police until pistols available. He is very bearish about all of this, and stresses that his willingness to discuss with Le Duc Tho in no sense constitutes acquiescence.

8. Discussion of border posts opened up new hornet’s nest. He insists that there be an equal number at all possible PRG entry points and GVN entry points. Obviously, he does not accept Cambodian border post as realistic GVN control post. Net result of this whole discussion was Thach’s insistence that we shift team from Ap An Thuan to some point which GVN might really use as point of entry, such as Bien Hoa.

9. It is not clear whether this is set up as a tradeoff on Article 6 on general principle of “you make big change, we make big change,” or whether they really feel they were had on our frontier post exercise. In any event, I will explain in separate message why I think we are in good shape on whole point of entry exercise and why I recommend against further pursuit of this subject by our initiative.²

10. In addition to these subjects, our language experts turned up new issue in their work yesterday with respect to understanding on Article 8(c). One problem concerns our old friend “promote” which DRV wishes to translate “don doc” and which we are resisting. Do you want to substitute a new English word for “promote”? Second problem concerns word “envisaged” in last sentence of understanding. They translate as “provided,” claiming our word too vague. Thach agrees this problem could be eliminated by terminating the sentence at “ninety days.” Do you have views?

11. Apart from these subjects, Thach raised following points re establishment of four-party JMC in Saigon:

(A) Can U.S. send officer to Paris to meet bilaterally with DRV from 24 to 27 January, to be later joined by GVN and PRG MilReps January 27?

(B) While agreeing delay Saigon advance party until January 27, they will increase it from 7 to 9 members.

12. On these subjects, recommend you signal General Woodward to send Major Miles here tomorrow to be prepared rpt prepared meet with DRV beginning January 24. Actual decision will depend on GVN reaction, which I hope to have January 22.

13. Although those four hours of Alpine sun cleared my brain and helped dry up my cold, it was obviously prudent for me to return Paris.

14. I am not, however, totally clear in my mind what it is you need on Article 6 to make Thieu satisfied. The language you proposed in your message will never wash because it is broad enough to include tanks and cannon. Thach waved it away immediately. If you can give me some more precise guidance, I will go have another try.

15. As matters now stand Thach is standing by for another session with me either this evening or tomorrow morning. I am standing by at residence and have asked Scowcroft to call me when you wish to react.

16. Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. Secret; Operational Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Guay and Scowcroft.
2. See Document 316.