Office of the Historian

316. Message From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Paris, January 21, 1973, 1519Z.
1.
You have asked several questions about our agreement on points of entry. I have said it is best we can get and wish to explain why.
2.
First, we should recall that agreement says nothing whatever about points of entry. If they disagree on any article and fall back on agreement, they can accept replacement supplies anywhere, so long as they ask for supervision and control. This whole concept, therefore, is one we have introduced into protocol, in considerable extension of agreement provisions.
3.
Second, we must realize that DRV/PRG controls extensive coastal areas, not only in U Minh, Ca Mau, and Kien Hoa, but also in Phu Yen and Binh Dinh. There is not a question of “seizing a coastal town and building it into an enclave.” They already hold a number of “enclaves.”
4.
Next, any place we are likely to name for PRG, other than land route at Gio Linh, will produce screams from GVN. If our current concern is to grease this package through Saigon, we had better avoid any point of entry designations.
5.
The system of leaving it to the two South Vietnamese has much to merit it. First, Saigon needs fewer points than the PRG and can therefore limit the points chosen. Second, Saigon will have to make the hard decision on seaports, not the U.S. Third, since the U.S., as supplier, will not cheat, choice of some points is inevitable.
6.

The list of border teams for GVN deliberately omits Saigon, Cam Ranh, and Danang, much to Thach’s loud complaints. They are the ones most likely to be picked by GVN as points of entry; and they are all rpt all Saigon really needs.

The three omitted from the DRV list are obviously going to be seaports. However, DRV needs Gio Linh land route for its forces in MR I. Therefore, if GVN picks only three entry points for itself, PRG will have Gio Linh, plus two seaports. Whether Saigon considers that formulation pleasant or not, it is nevertheless realistic.

7.
I argued this around with Thach this morning and I sense, from his temper, that he has been criticized for making a bad deal. In fact, he said so, in the course of arguing against Ap An Thuan. I have reserved on that point (which is not important) and will be willing to trade it off for Bien Hoa in furtherance of a deal on Article 6 re police equipment.
8.
Perhaps what is confusing in the language is the assumption that points on the list of frontier posts will actually be designated as points of entry. Except for Gio Linh, which DRV needs to supply Quang Tri front, I would expect none rpt none of points on that list to be actually agreed by the GVN.
9.
For foregoing reasons, I believe we should let this one lie as being better than we seriously deserve.
10.
Warm regards.
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. Secret; Operational Immediate; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Guay and Scowcroft.↩