Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

289. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

January 17, 1973, 4:50 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry, anything new.

K: No, nothing new. We’ve got some more intelligence reports which indicate that things are still moving despite this operation towards an acceptance.² He told his corps commanders that he would have to accept the agreement and that he was going to try to get three or four days’ delay. Now we are setting that off.

P: You say we are setting that off.

K: Oh, yes.

P: Oh, God, yes. But that’s what I think his tactic is to push term. I’m afraid—what the hell would three or four days’ delay mean to him, Henry?

K: He just can’t face it. I’m afraid he can’t face it because he can’t face peace.

P: You think Ky is the top competitor?

K: No, I think the problem is that none of these military guys there can really face the problem of any free political process.

P: Right. The one thing I think that I—that has occurred to me that I think is very important to do, is to have our alternate contingency plan fully worked out. For example, if on Tuesday,³ and we trust this will not be the case, you have to negotiate with Le Duc Tho with regard to how we sign and what we have to do in the event that he balks, you are not going to be able to get back Tuesday and we may have to reconsider what I do, what I say.

K: I think you should announce the agreement in any event.

P: But I couldn’t do it Tuesday if you are still negotiating.

K: Well, you can do it even if I’m still there.

P: You had better give it some thought.

K: I’ll give it some thought.

P: You see what I mean. I can’t, while you’re still there, I can say we reached agreement and you are now negotiating to see what—whether or not we can get another device whereby—

K: No, I—

P: Unilaterally, you see my point.

K: I think what you should do, Mr. President, I think I should come back in any event, because I think what we should do then, you should go no further than call on Thieu publicly to accept. I should rather than go over to see how to adjust the situation rather than to admit immediately after initialling that we knew it wasn’t going to work.

P: Well, let’s call again then. In other words, you would initial, I would announce that basically we have initialed an agreement and then I would say you were going to return—

K: No, you’d say nothing. You’d call on Thieu to accept it.

P: Right. Of course. Then what—then he says no.

K: Then you send me back, then we announce reluctantly we have to make a separate peace and you are sending me back immediately to negotiate it.

P: And then we put off the Rogers signing until later, huh?⁴

K: We’ll sign it and attach the documents I’d leave by just taking out the word “concurrence” off. Just sign the two-party document.

P: Uh huh. Well you’d have to have an understanding with Le Duc Tho though on Tuesday that that’s what we intended to do. Don’t you think you’re going to have to—you see what I mean, I think—

K: It won’t come to that. I cannot believe it.

P: I can’t either, you understand.

K: I will work out a contingency—

P: I just don’t know. I personally feel that it can come, and yet what the other concern is, if he had any damn understanding of the situation, he would have come today. In other words, something is going to happen and he wants to develop some relationship. Haig, I assume, went through the drill that it was very important for him to win a few brownie points in my direction by the way he handled this. Did he talk about that sort of—

K: Oh yes. He followed really religiously what we proposed. I told him to say it.

P: Right. And it had no effect though. That’s the thing I’m concerned about a bit, aren’t you?

K: Yes. I have to say there is some reason for concern, but I would still think the overwhelming indications are in the opposite direction.

P: Yeah. Oh yes, well we had reasons for being concerned about the situation last week too.

K: We had more reason to be concerned with Le Duc Tho.

P: I would think so.

K: If I had sent you a verbatim report, Mr. President, of the first day’s conversation.⁵ You would have concluded that it was exactly like December, but—

P: The only difference there, Henry, is that the report of the first day was followed by a productive second day.⁶ Here we had a first day’s conversation followed by a stonewall of the second day as well.⁷ Correct?

K: That’s true. It wasn’t a complete stonewall, it was—he carefully refrained from turning it down.

P: Even in his letter.

K: Yeah. He’s just wailing about changes he wants. So if you tell him these changes are unobtainable—

P: When will my letter be delivered to him. It’s gone already has it?

K: No, it will go within the next hour. It will be delivered within four hours.

P: By Bunker.

K: By Bunker.

P: Is Bunker then to deliver it and wait, or deliver it and leave.

K: Deliver it and leave.

P: Yeah.

K: He won’t give him an answer. He won’t give an answer now until the 20th.

P: What will Haig do in the meantime.

K: He’s going to Phnom Penh, Vientiane and Bangkok.

P: Yeah, and what will he have them say or do?

K: He’s asking them, especially the Thais, to use their influence with Thieu.

P: Have they tried it before?

K: No.

P: I was just wondering if it would help. You don’t think they have.

K: Well I don’t think that what the Laotians and the Cambodians do will make a damn bit of difference. The Thais will make a difference.

P: Make a difference to Thieu?

K: Yep.

P: And Haig will ask them to put the arm on him damn hard.

K: Exactly.

P: And that there’s no choice. I think that talking absolutely fatalistically and in a way that is irrevocable is the only course we can get because that is the truth, now, there isn’t any fooling around at this point. He must not feel that. That’s why I think the announcement tomorrow—

K: That’s a terrific help.

P: Must indicate that you are going back for the purpose of concluding the agreement.

K: That’s what it says.

P: I’m going to talk to Ziegler in the morning to be sure that I still feel—but I mean—

K: Well, actually the text of the announcement is agreed to with the North Vietnamese, we can’t change it.

P: Does it say conclude?

K: In order to complete the text of the agreement.

P: Complete the text of the agreement. Yes, that’s all right. Without indicating how long?

K: That’s right.

P: Do you think that will have some effect on Thieu, or is he likely to blow it then.

K: Oh no, he won’t blow. At no stage is it in his interest to blow with us, to blow publicly.

P: No, I guess not.

K: I mean, that’s the worst thing that can happen to him and that he will do the furtherest down the line.

P: Yeah. And Haig—Henry, well my letter left no doubt, but Haig also left no doubt whatever that there was no delay possible and no—

K: Absolutely, Mr. President.

P: How did you get the word back to him that three or four days’ delay was impossible. We are not supposed to have known that.

K: Well, no, we are putting it in the form of your schedule, and no deviation from that schedule is possible.

P: No deviation is possible. Okay.

K: You are not referring to anything he might have—

P: And just say no—there is no deviation whatever is possible. Put it as strongly that under any [no] circumstances is possible.

K: Exactly.

P: All right. Okay. Well I hope, as I say, we don’t want to borrow trouble but I do think the contingency plan should be well thought out so that we can put it into effect if necessary.

K: Absolutely, we’ll—

P: It would be a great tragedy if we had to put it into effect. You understand that we—the reason is—you see the problem we have here, Henry, which we’ve got to face, is that not only the events of this week but the way I—I’m not mentioning Vietnam—but I will talk about the whole peace and so forth. I’ll be very strong on that. And then when I go on on the 23rd, the problem is that we then will have raised the expectations beyond belief; and then to have it shattered is going to be one hell of a thing.

K: Well, that’s why he cannot do it.

P: I know. My point is, even though he cannot do it, if he does do it we’ve got to know—have a plan and affect [in effect] to cut our losses but God damned fast.

K: Mr. President, the fact is that we are now doomed to settle.

P: We’re going to settle I know, the point is, when I describe it, Henry, is that peace with honor and all that jazz, then the next day he says, no, I won’t go, see? Is that the time he would do it in your opinion?

K: If he does it, that’s the time he’ll do it. He won’t do it.

P: If he doesn’t do it, however, what if he decides to go along. Is he going to wait until I speak.

K: No. What the bastard may do is to put the agreement before his national assembly before you speak.

P: And get it turned down? Get it rejected?

K: Well, he may do that. That’s how he would do it.

P: Yeah, but he won’t do that before the 20th in your opinion?

K: Oh, certainly not, no. There’s no chance of that.

P: But you see, he might do it on Monday?

K: He might do it on Monday.

P: All right, suppose he does that, do I still speak? That’s another contingency we’ve got to think about, isn’t it.

K: We’ve got to think about that. If we know he’s already turned it down, then we may have to go to another agreement.

P: That’s the point, that’s the point. Also if we know he’s already turned it down, I don’t think that it makes—that’s the part that I’m thinking, I just can’t see myself going on and saying, look—

K: Well, you see, you’re compelled to do nothing because all I am hoping is to complete the text of the agreement.

P: Right. In that case, it seems to me, my feeling on that contingency is that if you know he’s turned it down, you go right on over there, you complete the text of the agreement, you initial it, you come back and then we meet with the leaders and say that you’ve initialed it and he’s turned it down. Right?

K: Well, if we know he’s turned it down—if we don’t know he’s turned it down, that’s what we should do. If it’s still open, I initial, go—come back, tell it to the leaders and you go on television with a unanimous leadership behind you.

P: Right.

K: If he has, in fact, turned it down then I think I should go to the—should go over and negotiate another agreement.

P: Right. Then you come back and I announce that that’s the agreement.

K: That’s right.

P: And that we are going to make it on that basis and that—separate from him.

K: That’s right.

P: Well, having thought through the contingency, and he’s damned well got to think through it as well, I agree with you he can’t allow that to happen, can he?

K: Whatever he thinks may happen under this agreement is certain to happen under any of the other courses.

P: Oh, instantly too. Let’s face it, the moment he—his people know and his army knows and all the rest knows, that the support of the United States is gone, for Christ sakes, Henry, they’re down the tube.

K: Absolutely.

P: That’s the point. They’re down the tube. I mean the psychological effect of that would be absolutely cataclysmic.

K: That is absolutely correct.

P: I think that’s what he’s looking at at the present time. Well, okay, as I—

K: From our intelligence reports, one would have to say the chances are nine out of ten—

P: We won’t worry about it, but we will prepare for it in case he does do some insane thing.

K: Exactly.

P: But your thought is that Haig will see him now on the 20th, and we hope to get an affirmative answer at that point, but he may not.

K: Exactly.

P: Does my letter that we are sending to him ask for a response, or what?

K: Oh, yes, it says we must have the answer by the 20th.

P: Then Haig comes back. Well, all right, fine. I guess that otherwise reactions of the Congressmen and jackasses in the press is about as we expect, right?

K: Overwhelmingly favorable.

P: Yeah. (laughter) Well, we’ve got them worried anyway. Okay, Henry.

K: Right Mr. President.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 17, Chronological File. No classification marking. Nixon was in Key Biscayne, Florida; Kissinger was in Washington.
2. The two reports are in Document 286.
3. January 23. Kissinger was to return to Paris on January 22.
4. The formal signing had been tentatively scheduled for January 27.
5. See Document 255.
6. See Document 256.
7. Haig’s meetings with Thieu on January 16 and 17; see Documents 279 and 285.