Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

279. Backchannel Message From the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Saigon, January 16, 1973, 1125Z.

Haigto 7. Ambassador Bunker and I just completed a two and three quarter hour meeting with Thieu and Nha.

I told Thieu that we were now at the final decision point in what had been a prolonged and difficult period for all parties. I noted that the results of our air actions in the North bore fruit at last week’s Paris sessions and that you had been able to resolve a sufficient number of the outstanding issues to convince the President that we had arrived at a point of no return. Recalling our earlier discussions, I stated that we were satisfied with the North Vietnamese concessions on the DMZ and the formula devised for signing the agreement as it pertains to the issue of the recognition of the PRG. I also emphasized that we had arrived at agreement on the principles of the associated protocols. For this reason, President Nixon, after careful consideration of all of the ramifications, had decided to proceed with initialing on the 23d and formal signing on the 27th. My purpose was to again serve as the President’s personal emissary in urging Thieu to join with us. I then handed the President’s letter to Thieu which he read very carefully.²

Thieu noted that he had received both the English and Vietnamese text of the final draft on Saturday³ but complained that the protocols were still far from complete and left many key issues unresolved. He also complained that he was having serious problems in attempting to coordinate the protocols with MACV which evidently was itself somewhat in the dark with the focus of information having shifted to the technical experts in Paris. (I discussed this problem later with Weyand and he assures me that the problem is with the GVN which refused to coordinate on protocols until the principal agreement had been arrived at.) He stated that he had originally believed that MACV would be the cornerstone for coordinating protocols but it was obvious to him that MACV was not being kept abreast from Paris. For this reason, he had decided to send his military team to Paris where they could be close to Sullivan and Lam and the U.S. technical committee. He stated that he had ordered General Vinh Loc to Paris yesterday. After the meeting, I checked on Vinh Loc’s departure time and I have been informed that he has not yet left Saigon.

Concerning the agreement itself, Thieu stated that he had noted some differences in the U.S. and Vietnamese text which might have been the result of typing errors. In substance, however, he stated that he could find no change in the new text on the issue of North Vietnamese troops. He noted some progress on the DMZ but the language was still short of what the GVN had insisted on and he was dissatisfied with the modalities for signature. Thieu stated that it was obvious that the primary agreement is the two-party version in which the PRG is recognized and that the four-party version is actually a secondary document.

He stated that all of the above had been discussed yesterday with his National Security Council and he and his advisers were of the opinion that while the document pretends to be an accord for ending the war and restoring the peace, it lacks balance and equilibrium. There are specific provisions for political obligations and concessions by Saigon which are not matched by balanced security provisions. The agreement provides for no more than a cease fire in place and leaves unanswered provisions for the withdrawal of 300,000 enemy troops in the South. As long as troops are in South Vietnam, it is impossible to implement the political formula. To Thieu, the agreement as it now stands is explicit and detailed on political obligations and vague and unsatisfactory on security provisions. He could accept a solution which provided merely for a ceasefire with the modalities for implementing it, but not one which provides only a ceasefire on the security side but is detailed and explicit on the political side. If a durable peace is the objective, then the agreement should be complete and “in balance.”

Thieu next turned to what he called his dilemma. He stated he recognized completely that he cannot fight without U.S. help. He affirmed that he recognized this as do the people of South Vietnam. His dilemma involves how he can take risks for peace with a persistent threat of a new war because of the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops. Thieu stated his central problem is not a question of honor or of equity but rather it is the reality of the North Vietnamese troops and the psychological impact they will have on the people of South Vietnam. The U.S. and President Nixon had placed him in a yes or no position. He had been hoping for some U.S. assistance in developing language in the agreement which would provide in some specific way for the withdrawal of enemy forces. Now he was faced with the simple formula of no discussion with a yes or no answer as the only alternatives. If the answer is no, U.S. aid is cut off; if yes, Saigon would take all the risks. He could find no middle path.

I told Thieu I could not accept his assessment of the agreement, especially with respect to its lack of balance. I pointed out that his concessions on the political side were really meaningless. It was Hanoi that had made the major concessions by not insisting on his resignation and by substituting powerless advisory committee for their earlier demand for a coalition government. More importantly, I stated that there were few political obligations in the agreement and that in any event Thieu was in the controlling position with respect to the political process. I stated it was precisely this fact which gave us confidence that the troop issue was manageable. The political process, Thieu’s control of the release of political prisoners and the formally established principle of demobilization all provided the necessary levers to manage the troop problem.

I then recapped the history of the past three months’ negotiating pointing out that while there had been substantial advantages accrued during this period, President Nixon had also consumed all of his remaining flexibility. Therefore, the President is painfully but irrevocably committed to no further changes in the agreement, to a firm decision to initial and sign and to a schedule which I outlined for Thieu. I then covered in detail the improvements which we had obtained since October, reiterating all of the arguments on the issues of manageability of the troops in the South and the firm provision for South Vietnam’s sovereignty provided in the agreement.⁴

I told Thieu that he had completely misread the arrangements which had been worked out for the signing of the agreement. I pointed out that he had forced these arrangements upon us but that we were satisfied that they were completely workable from Saigon’s perspective and, above all, preserved the principle that Thieu himself had insisted on. I then covered in detail the four-party–two-party signature arrangement, noting that it was not the two-party but the four-party document which was the central operative agreement. Thieu strongly questioned how we could manage including in the preamble the fact that he concurred in the two-party document, noting that he might challenge this publicly. I pointed out that this would be a grave mistake and that all he had to do was ignore the two-party document and insist that he recognizes only the four-party document as the operative instrument. I then explained carefully how the four-party document stood on its own and the two-party referred to the four-party and was therefore subsidiary to it. I noted that he could claim with credibility that he recognized only the four-party document which did not mention in its preamble or text the PRG and which, in fact, was the only document which the GVN would sign. Thieu finally seemed to understand and to accept this point. I also carefully walked him through the fact that a title alone does not legally imply recognition. I then covered the other changes in the agreement which we had obtained since October.

Thieu repeated that the psychology of the problem is what gave him his greatest difficulty. The crux of the problem was how Hanoi would view and interpret the agreement and how, in turn, the people of South Vietnam would view it. I took this argument on strenuously, listing the achievements and pointing out that this was a subjective, self-inflicted attitude which Thieu could easily remedy with a positive approach which up until now he had demurred on. I noted that any objective observer who analyzed the agreement would concede that Hanoi, not Saigon, had made the major concessions.

After a lengthy exchange, Thieu acknowledged that he could easily handle the security problem and the North Vietnamese troops in the South but remained primarily concerned about the psychology of the situation. I replied that despite Thieu’s concerns we could no longer indulge in theoretical arguments for we had, in fact, arrived at a point where a hard decision would have to be made in Saigon. I carefully outlined how Thieu could shift his stance by claiming credit for all of the changes. The simple fact with which he is now faced was that without an agreement there would no longer be U.S. aid. What was now essential was not further debate or nit-picking of the agreement but a return to U.S.–GVN unity which would enable the President to continue crucial U.S. support to the GVN, to react violently in case of violations and to provide those elements in the U.S. who had long supported Thieu with a basis for continuing this support.

I listed the specific assurances which President Nixon was prepared to provide and mentioned our hope that Foreign Minister Lam would visit Washington on the 24th, prior to the formal signing in Paris on the 27th. I noted that on January 18th we would announce your return to Paris on the 23d to complete the agreement and the fact that the President had decided to initial on that date with or without President Thieu. I also noted that the President would report to the American people via television on the night of the 23d. If Thieu refused to join with us, the President was determined to proceed anyway and to bring to the attention of the American people and world at large that we had arrived at what we considered a fair settlement with Hanoi but that Thieu and the GVN had refused to go along. I noted that the outcome of this action was obvious. I stated that the President had been in constant and continuous touch with his key Congressional leaders and that they were of the unanimous conclusion that if the agreement were not concluded that the President would experience a serious setback in the U.S. legislature which would in any event cut off U.S. aid. For this reason, the President could not risk defeat on an issue which he himself believed to be justly resolved and on an issue on which he had been so persistently challenged during his first term in office. Therefore not only would the President acquiesce in the legislative action which would follow but he would painfully feel compelled to take the lead in this action.

I told Thieu that it was important that I have his answer by tomorrow evening since I was leaving for stops in Cambodia, Laos and Bangkok on the following morning but, more importantly, because if I had no reply by then the President would assume the answer to be negative and would proceed accordingly both in further contacts with Hanoi and in completing his legislative arrangements for Tuesday’s initialing and the address to the American people Tuesday night.

Thieu stated that he completely understood the gravity of the present situation and that he would meet with me again tomorrow to give me his response. He stated that for the first time in his position of leadership he was in a genuine dilemma. All other challenges had been transitory and relatively easy to cope with. For that reason, he could take a forthcoming position. On this occasion, however, he felt his decision would be decisive and one that would have the gravest consequences for the people of South Vietnam and one which would be judged harshly by the court of history. He emphasized that he and he alone would decide and pointed out that he would be influenced by no one. He stated that in light of the situation it was obvious that he could be a popular hero for a brief period if he rejected the agreement. On the other hand, as a realist he had to think in terms of the long range outcome for South Vietnam and its people. Thus, his decision would not be a simple one.

I had not received your instructions on the Vice President’s trip although I had in fact intended to offer it during the second session after hearing Thieu’s decision, using it in conjunction with my return visit on Saturday.⁵ Throughout the meeting, Thieu was more friendly, forthcoming and intimate than he has been since October. He referred to Bunker as an old friend who had shared many travails with him and Nha was silent and dejected.

As in the past, if I were making an assessment it would be that Thieu will reluctantly join us. Each time he attempted to raise objections, I answered them substantively and then pointed out in crisp fashion that the issues were moot at this point. However Thieu ultimately decides, I am confident that he is completely cognizant of the outcomes with which he is faced and the gravity of the situation. He is completely resigned to the fact that a negative response will result in what he termed his prompt removal or even his death. I told him that while he seemed unwilling to appreciate this fact, the situation was just as grave for President Nixon, while Thieu liked to refer to the U.S. as a giant which could accept blows and South Vietnam as a weak dwarf that could not, the implications for both our governments were equally grave. For this reason, we had absolutely no choice but to close ranks and to do what was necessary in the short term to preserve our long range objectives. Bunker and I left with the impression that Thieu will come along but we have been fooled before.

[3½ lines not declassified]

Reference your Tohaig 19, we will of course proceed to Seoul as the last stop in our itinerary.⁶ I will work out the precise timing with Habib but would prefer to await the outcome of today’s meeting before fixing the schedule.

The foregoing merely touches upon the highlights of what was an extensive, frank and I believe constructive exchange with Thieu.

[4½ lines not declassified] Despite this report, however, I think we should wait for his formal reply before popping corks.

Warm regards.

Attachment

Attachment to Haigto 07

16 January 1973

Subject: Summary of President Thieu’s remarks before the National Security Council on his conversations with General Haig.

1. At the meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) convened by President Nguyen Van Thieu during the early afternoon of 16 January 1973, Thieu jokingly noted in his opening remarks that when a person is about to become angry, he should drink a glass of cold water; he noted that he always has a glass of cold water handy when Dr. Kissinger or General Haig visit Saigon.

2. Thieu then briefed the NSC on his talks to date with Haig. (Comment: The briefing appeared to be a straight presentation of the facts as we know them.) Thieu next had Presidential Private and Press Secretary Hoang Duc Nha read without commentary the latest letter from President Nixon.⁷ Nha then summarized Haig’s statements on the progress of the cease-fire negotiations in Paris, including Haig’s arguments as to why the GVN should sign the new accord. (Comment: This was also a straight presentation of the case as we know it.) Thieu next had Nha review the procedures for signing and go over the schedule in this regard; Nha also went over the schedule with regard to what the US would do if the GVN refused to sign. At this juncture, Thieu wondered out loud why this schedule was being followed, and specifically why an announcement of the cease-fire agreement was not being made by the US prior to Nixon’s inauguration; Nha replied that it was “just tactics”.

3. Thieu then reviewed what Haig had said about the meaning of “with the consent of the GVN” and mentioned that he had raised the question with Haig of what position the US would be in if the GVN failed to give its consent. Thieu quoted Haig as replying that the GVN could always say that it was only bound by what it had actually signed. Thieu inserted a comment at this point to the effect that all the US solutions and proposals were “lame”.

4. Thieu went on to speak of the vagueness in the agreement with regard to the presence of the North Vietnamese (NVA) in South Vietnam, saying that a “correct balance” was not being maintained in the accord insofar as the GVN was concerned. He said that Haig had told him that this same vagueness in the parts dealing with a political solution could be manipulated to serve as leverage in obtaining NVA withdrawal. Thieu then noted what Haig thinks about the accord personally, most notably that Hanoi does not have the capability to mount a serious attack and that the US will use prospective aid to Hanoi as a ploy to reduce the likelihood of Hanoi resorting to renewed military action. Thieu next reviewed Haig’s remarks with regard to US retaliation in the event there were serious violations of the agreement. In this context, Thieu agreed with the American position that it would be better for Nixon to come out with a statement to the effect that the NVA are “foreign troops”, as it would represent more of a commitment on the part of the U.S. than to have some allusion to it in an agreement signed “only by the Secretary of State”.

5. Thieu then told the members of the NSC that General Haig had asked for a decision by the evening of 17 January 1973 and added that it was his intention to give him one by that deadline. Thieu said that one of the two choices open to him was to act as a “political amateur” and become a “temporary hero” by not agreeing to sign the accord. If he followed this path, he would be able to go before the people proclaiming that he had upheld the rights and honor of Vietnam by not signing an unacceptable agreement; he would then step down from the Presidency as the “hero of the people”. Thieu went on to say, however, that this was a serious matter, not just some business venture, and if he wanted to approach it seriously, he could not simply accept the idea of becoming a temporary hero. Thieu then said that the decision he must render on 17 January is thus a choice between being an “amateur” and “hero for the hour” on the one hand, and being a responsible leader on the other.

6. Next, after some digressive rambling by Thieu about a “lack of logic” in some parts of the accord and mention of what General Haig had said about Laos and Cambodia, one of the members of the NSC present asked Thieu if he was going to meet with President Nixon before an accord was signed. Thieu promptly replied in the negative, adding that he would not, for that matter, meet with Nixon even after an accord had been signed until he had “some guarantees”. He explained that there could be violations of the accord once it had been signed, and the question then would be whether or not the US would take appropriate retaliatory action and give the GVN the necessary support. If it did not, it would embarrass him in front of his people to have a meeting with Nixon. However, if it became evident that the US really was backing up the GVN after the accord was signed, Thieu could then meet with Nixon and thank him for his determination and for keeping his promise.

End of message.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. Document 278.
3. January 13. See Document 275.
4. The improvements are listed and the issues of the troops and South Vietnamese sovereignty are discussed in Haig’s “Talking Points for President Thieu,” dated January 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 859, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIII)
5. January 20.
6. In message Tohaig 19/WHS 3023, January 16, 0250Z, Kissinger wrote: “We have a cable from Habib strongly recommending that you stop by on the way home to brief Park on the state of play. I think you should do this as you did on last trip as last stop.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV)
7. Document 278.