Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan⁰

Washington, May 9, 1959, 12:27 p.m.

1674. For MacArthur from Robertson. Re Secnog 4–Consultation Formula.¹

1. Japanese note for consultation formula should be revised as follows: Word “combat” should be inserted between “military” and “operations.” Alternative would be to substitute “combat” for “military.” Reason: Word “military” standing alone is much too broad and can be construed to involve all operations including logistics at the bases. If Japanese flatly reject above proposal, only other acceptable alternative to us is to retain GOJ text with clear understanding that it will in all probability be necessary to divulge in confidence to Philippines that GOJ consultation formula limited to military combat operations. Japanese formula will undoubtedly set precedent for Philippine negotiations and we must be able make clear to Philippines substance of formula in this regard so that we could reach arrangements with Philippines which would be no more limiting them that we have with Japan.

Latter part of formula should be reworded as follows: “will be the subject of prior consultation with the GOJ in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.” “Will be subject of” smooths out language of formula. Important that “in light of circumstances prevailing at the time” be retained. In explanation point out to GOJ that this phrase does not relieve us from need to consult with GOJ but makes clear we expect them take into consideration international situation at any time in which consultation would be required. FYI Phrase “in light of circumstances prevailing at the time” appears in public UK and confidential Italian IRBM agreements although both agreements refer to “joint determination.” End FYI.

2. Public formula should also include:

“Consultation will not be required concerning the deployment of US armed forces or their equipment out of Japan.” Comment:This is confirmation of standard US policy not to be bound in withdrawing forces from overseas areas. Congress bound to make inquiry of us on this point and issue also will arise with Philippines. Therefore far preferable make our position clear in public document rather than confidential agreement.

3. Understandings on formula (Embtel 2076)² should be set forth in exchange of classified letters between Ambassador MacArthur and Foreign Minister Fujiyama. In this regard, point three should be deleted and point four should be expanded to refer to “direct launching” of combat operations and to make clear logistic operations are not covered by formula. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

4. Separate message will follow on reaffirmation of present air defense arrangements.³

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/5–959. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sneider on May 8; cleared in draft with Robertson, L, SPA, S/P, and Defense (ISA); and approved by Bane. Repeated to Manila, CINCPAC, and COMUS/Japan.
1. Document 49.
2. Telegram 2076 from Tokyo, April 9, reiterated the U.S. understanding of the consultation formula (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/4–959), as contained in Document 38.
3. This statement reflected the DOD’s concern that air defense arrangements with Japan should not lapse under new treaty arrangements. (Telegram 1844 to Tokyo, May 29; (Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/5–2959) Subsequently discussions were conducted at the service level, and a new agreement for conduct of air defense of Japan was signed by Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns, USAF, and Lieutenant General Misoo Matsumae, JASDF, on September 2, 1959. The text of the Burns–Matsumae Agreement was transmitted to Washington in despatch 464 from Tokyo, October 15, 1959. (Ibid., 794.5/10–1559)