Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

42. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, December 24, 1958, 9 p.m.

1302. CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral Felt and POLAD; COMUS Japan exclusive for General Burns. Exclusive for Deming and General Booth. Re final paragraph Embassy telegram 1184.¹

Following is comment on Department telegram 802:²

As we have made clear in earlier messages (Embassy telegrams 1115³ and 1189⁴), agree it is best to await Japanese views on all major aspects of treaty and related proposals before attempting reach agreement with them on treaty area. We should not however, delay reaching agreement within USG on what is essential for us in mutual security treaty with Japan. It is still possible that GOJ may prefer to have Article III, Peace Treaty Islands in Treaty Area, but it would be very unfortunate if we were unable to respond promptly and favorably when other parts of treaty fall into place and if they then still feel that inclusion of territory outside Japan is impossible under present interpretation of their constitution following comments should prove helpful in arriving at agreed position within USG, which I hope can be reached within next two weeks.

1. In view of present interpretation of Japanese constitution there is absolutely no possibility of inclusion of “US sovereign territory” in treaty area. Japanese argument against inclusion of Article III Islands, would apply with far more force to inclusion of US territory. GOJ statements to effect that inclusion of US territory would not oblige Japanese forces to act outside of home islands would be unconvincing to Japanese public. Critics would ask why in such case such territory was included and would accuse GOJ of having given secret commitment to violate constitution, or of having given secret commitment to railroad revision of constitution through Diet. There would be uproar in Japanese Diet which could bring fall of government, withdrawal of ratification bill, or both.

2. As to possibility that failure to include US territory might be interpreted as a move toward noninvolvement of Japan, this does not seem problem in view of consultations we have had with Senate leaders in September. At that time, as explained in Embassy telegram 1049,⁵ all these possible alternatives of treaty area (US and Japanese-administered islands in Pacific, Japan and Article III Peace Treaty Islands, or Japan main islands only) were explained and none of Senate leaders raised any objection with respect to any one of these alternatives. A good case can be made that Japan would be making much more important contribution to US security, even if treaty area is limited to main islands, than any of our other security partners in Pacific, simply because Japan has great deal more to contribute. But Japanese contribution consists primarily in providing bases and logistical facilities rather than in its military forces, which are relatively small. Provision of Japanese forces to help defend US territory is not necessary in our national interest. On other hand, it would be highly unfortunate if there were any tendency to belittle the great political and psychological importance, not only with respect to Japan but also in terms of free-Asian opinion, of obtaining voluntary, long-term alignment of Japan in vital field of collective military security, which would result from the conclusion of mutual security treaty. For it seems quite clear Japan can only be dependably aligned with the free would in the vitally important field of security through a collective security treaty with us voluntarily entered into.

3. As to “possible nonavailability” of bases and forces in Japan for conduct for military operations and hostilities in which Japan is not engaged, US position, which we have presented to Japanese, already takes into account such possible non-availability by our having proposed formula for consultation in event of hostilities in which Japan is not involved. As to our obtaining “indication of Japanese concern” over defense of US territorial interest by their agreeing to use of bases and forces to assist in defending those areas, we have already done this implicitly, subject to consultation formula. However, any notion that Japanese would “agree” in advance is quite unrealistic. None of our other allies will give us blank check to use their territory to conduct military operations in which they are not themselves involved. As to Japanese taking military action within Japan area in event US territories are attacked, they might well do this in defense of Japanese national interests and security, but it would depend upon circumstances and conditions and there is no possibility of obtaining advance commitment. For instance, in case of Soviet overflight of Japanese territory in connection with attack on US territory it is reasonable to expect that Japanese would fully cooperate with us in defense of their own territorial sovereignty.

4. It is still possible that GOJ may find it feasible to include Ryukyus and Bonins, over which Japan has residual sovereignty, in treaty area. In our opinion, while their inclusion would add another element of mutuality, it is not essential because the really valuable Japanese contribution to mutuality rests in provision of US bases and logistical facilities in Japan and in common action in defense of Japan. (There is precedent in SEATO protocol for US commitment to come to defense of countries which do not agree to defend US territory.) New mutual security treaty will give us:

(A) Assured use of logistic base in Japan which saves us hundreds of millions of dollars a year;

(B) Possible use or our bases in Japan, subject to consultation formula, for operational use outside of treaty area even in case of hostilities in which Japan is not involved; and

(C) Assured use of bases in Japan for operations in defense of Japan. These are highly important.

5. We envisage no difficulty with respect to withdrawal of forces from Japan for active defense of other areas. Negotiations so far do not suggest that this will be a problem. We have made perfectly clear, and will continue to do so, that our freedom to withdraw forces cannot be restricted in any way. At same time, we assume that we can assure GOJ that we will continue to give maximum private advance information on troop withdrawals from Japan, as we did in recent Taiwan crisis.

6. Re last FYI paragraph Department telegram 802, while our willingness to undertake commitment to help in the defense of Japan (we can never commit ourselves in an absolute sense to defend Japan) must continue to be presented as major bargaining counter in our negotiations with the Japanese, we should not magnify significance of such commitment since in effect it already exists. This policy has long been recognized within US Government and also in relations with Japan. The very presence of our forces has been and will continue to be strongest possible commitment to that effect, stronger than treaty engagement itself as Secretary pointed out to Philippines in his talk with Magsaysay and other leaders in 1954 when nature of our commitment to defend Philippines was discussed.

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–2458. Secret; Limited Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Naha, CINCPAC, and COMUS/Japan.
1. Document 39.
2. Document 37.
3. Document 35.
4. See footnote 2, Document 40.
5. Telegram 1049 from Tokyo, November 16, discussed the treaty area and reiterated MacArthur’s conviction that the mutuality of the proposed security treaty with Japan lay mainly in the use of bases in Japan. In a conversation with Senate leaders last September, MacArthur informed them that there were three possibilities regarding the treaty area: “A. U.S.- and Japanese-administered islands in Pacific; B. Japan and Article 3 Peace Treaty islands; C. Japan main islands,” None of the Senators expressed any concern over any of these possibilities as long as the major objective of aligning Japan with the United States was achieved. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/11–1658) See Supplement.