Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

328. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Ambassador to Korea (McConaughy)⁰

Washington, August 12, 1960.

Dear Walter: Your letter of July 22¹ was most helpful in providing further background for your views on policy respecting current Korean political affairs. As I tried to indicate in our telegram 61,² we recognize the difficulties and dangers in exercising influence in Korean political affairs, and as the man on the spot, you are certainly most competent to judge what we can and cannot usefully do. I recognize also that political strategy, viewed from the remote precincts of Foggy Bottom, may not always take full account of the problems and complexities which face the man on the scene.

Perhaps a useful way to respond to your letter would be to follow your example and explain some of the considerations underlying our out-going messages, then to analyze the differences between our basic assumptions and yours as a means of bringing our respective positions closer together. I shall do so somewhat at length, and perhaps at the risk of laboring the obvious.

For both of us, of course, the point of departure is the basic U.S. objective of a free and stable Korean society and economy, which will at minimum compare favorably with what the Communists are able to do in providing for the basic material and spiritual needs of the Korean people, and at maximum will make of Korea a showcase of what Free World ideals can bring about in Asia by way of realizing economic well-being and social justice.

It would appear that the fundamental problems of Korea are social as much as economic and political. The rate of social change in Korea has been so great as to confuse both leaders and people as to the basic values and goals of their national existence. The material and sociological impact of the West–the principal agent of this change–has had much greater influence upon the leaders than upon the agrarian majority, and has therefore increased the leaders’ isolation, both material and social, from their own people. This isolation blocks the channels of communication through which the leaders might keep themselves attuned to popular needs and feelings. It also means that there are not adequate institutional restraints upon the leaders’ conduct such as more mature democracies have developed. The people therefore tend to feel, as they have traditionally felt, that they are impotent to control their government until they finally rise in revolt, and regard their leadership and government as something beyond their ken; the average man, who does not identify himself with the leadership group, finds them a handy target upon which to project the blame for his discontent and deprivations. By the same token, the leaders often do not identify themselves with the people, and tend to look upon them as witless rabble, to be coerced and exploited rather than served.

We believe, of course, that our basic concepts of representative democracy and social justice have universal human validity and offer the best means of bringing leaders and people together in a common effort for the national welfare, if these concepts can be firmly rooted in a Korean context. But, as your telegrams make clear, such ideas are not yet firmly integrated into the basic cultural framework, despite the considerable progress which has been made. So far there has not been a leader or group in Korea with the imagination, vision, and energy to give to the nation the definite and believable national ideals, goals, and programs which are essential to give meaning to this democratic framework, to end the Korean spiritual and social confusion, to ameliorate the deep discontent and even spiritual hunger which underlies so many of Korea’s problems, and to give the country a sense of unity, direction, and destiny. Social progress of this sort is, of course, a precondition of the economic and technical progress which is also essential to the national welfare. Until adequate native leadership emerges, it is incumbent upon us to do what we can to encourage the development of the Republic of Korea in the face of social inertia and ignorance until it can ultimately go it alone as a self-sustaining member of the Free World. We must offer the sort of guidance, inspiration, and support which will avert the ever-present danger of social disintegration, widespread revolution, or subversion, and will bring Korea to the stage labeled by Rostow the “take-off point”.³ If we cannot do this ourselves, our Communist competitors will be given an opportunity to try it their way.

It is obviously extremely difficult for us to fulfill this mission, and at the same time keep within the limits set by our own ideals of self-sufficiency, self-help, and the right of all peoples to self-determination. As you point out, there is also the danger that if the Koreans depend on us too much, they will not develop in self-government. Furthermore, ideals aside, deep Korean feelings of nationalism and ethnocentrism limit our freedom of action, as do the watchful eyes of the Communist propagandists and Free World opinion generally. I agree that the Constitutional amendment shows the ability of the Koreans to solve a political problem for themselves in their own way, and can be taken as an encouraging sign of progress. I am not sure that in more ordinary times we can yet be sure of similarly fortunate decisions upon the many problems which lie ahead; but to the extent we can expect it, I entirely agree that we can and should reduce our own role accordingly. Nevertheless, the Koreans themselves expect that we will provide guidance, and Americans have often been told throughout the history of our post-war relations with Korea that our correct stand of non-intervention can be misunderstood as lack of friendship and support. During their long period of opposition, leaders of the Democratic Party repeated to Embassy officers ad nauseam their feelings that the United States should somehow prevent the political and economic excesses of the Rhee regime and promote the cause of democracy and social justice, while the people themselves were impotent. (One example of this is Embassy despatch 218 of October 20, 1958.⁴)

My original analysis of the Korean political situation in telegram 1160⁵ was prepared with the thought that we could and should play a useful role of advice, guidance, and gentle restraint in the fluid Korean political and social situation of the moment, if we had a carefully-conceived and definite concept of how the political picture should evolve in the best interests of Korea and the Free World, and exerted whatever informal pressures we gracefully could to bring it about. I felt that the post-revolution politicians, insufficiently checked by still immature governmental institutions, might otherwise build the same old empire of political advantage, corruption, and disregard for the common welfare which was all too characteristic of the previous regime. In essence, what Koreans have been asking of us is that we are as yet nearly powerless to do so, and help insure that the blessings of our political philosophy and our economic assistance reach down to which the motivation and the sense of urgency can be conveyed to Korean leaders to formulate the necessary national goals, programs, and organizations. Only the Koreans themselves can be a believable source of these requirements; but if the leaders bicker and temporize and unabashedly seek short-run personal advantage at the expense of national welfare for another twelve years, the currents of history may wash over them and remove our brief democratic experiment in Korea without trace.

If I interpret correctly our telegrams and your letter, you would have no basic fault to find with the majority of the assumptions and lines of reasoning I have set forth. You suggest, however, that we run the risk of throwing our influence behind a dubious political course of action which would subsequently prove inappropriate, and that we would then bear the onus of having forced undesirable political developments. On this point, I think the difference in our respective points of view is a matter of degree rather than kind. If our advice and influence were to be in terms too specific, or too energetic, or too obviously out of phase with prevailing currents of Korean thought, then we would indeed run unacceptable risks. On the other hand, if our suggestions are soundly conceived, tactfully conveyed, and are obviously directed at the best interests of Korea, then I think on balance our actions will be justified in most Korean eyes and, not being intended as intervention, will not be taken as such except by extremists and the lunatic fringe. As you suggest, we should not expend our ammunition unnecessarily, nor should we be too specific in our suggestions. (In this connection, I hold no strong brief for the proposal of pushing Chang for President, and agree with your analysis that it is too risky.) If we maintain our channels of communication with all segments of Korean opinion, it will be difficult for any one group to charge us with undue influence or intervention. To some extent we will have to bear such charges anyway–as witness the numerous charges that we supported the Rhee regime.

You speak of the necessity of playing the situation by ear. I wholeheartedly agree that inflexibility in politics is indefensible, and that we, like the Korean politicians, must be prepared to shift our ground. The apparent overwhelming Democratic victory, for instance, may well call for a review of our strategy. However, although a ship riding at anchor shifts its position with the tidal currents, it does not drift like a hulk. I think there are certain basic positions which both we and the Koreans should decide upon and take up; our flexibility should take due cognizance of these basic positions, which should be changed only after careful thought has demonstrated the necessity of doing so, and if possible only after new positions have been prepared.

In specific reference to the problem of political parties, I agree with you that it may well prove impossible to prevent the split of the Democratic Party either now or later. I believe, however, that too much shifting and splitting of political alignments might well result in the complete breakdown of the new system of government, and if not that, then an atmosphere of disillusioned and cynical political self-seeking which would utterly destroy the splendid spirit engendered by the events of last April. The Koreans have already been through such a cycle of disillusionment; there was a certain enthusiastic fervor in the air in the days immediately following the establishment of the Republic in 1948 (notwithstanding fairly widespread admiration at that time for the north Korean regime), but somehow all that enthusiasm had been lost by the time of the Armistice, and some of the excesses of the Rhee administration resulted from the general air of cynicism and hopelessness which followed. If the same revulsion of feeling should occur a second time, the anti-Communist ardor of the Koreans may not be strong enough to withstand the temptation to try something new in the hope of finding better social answers to national problems.

In summary, it seems to me that there are certain basic principles, the validity of which both we and the Koreans can be sure of, and with which responsible Koreans will agree, in guiding our course of action in the months to come: (1) that basic planning by the national leadership in terms of national goals, programs, and organizations is mandatory; (2) that the new leadership will face a challenge even greater than the previous administration, and must respond to it if democracy is to survive in Korea; (3) that it is essential to the leadership’s success that there be inter-communication with the common people and a sense of participation by both leaders and people in national progress; (4) that in the absence of general prosperity, the only possible substitute must be a general feeling of participation in the common struggle and equitable disposition of deprivations–particularly in respect to tendencies of the leadership toward conspicuous consumption; (5) that the leadership group must be aware of its responsibilities to the nation in order to maintain itself in power (its consciousness of this fact, I suspect, can disappear surprisingly fast despite the April revolution); (6) that the development of Western democratic institutions, including political parties, is far enough advanced in Korea so that a stable, national organization of a small number of parties offers the best hope at the moment of realizing the necessary participation and inter-communication mentioned above; (7) that a resumption of earlier factionalism, bickering, and self-seeking among politicians in a parliamentary government is unquestionably the greatest danger which faces the Korean body politic at the present time and it must at all costs be held to a minimum. So long as our influence is directed toward Korean developments in accordance with these principles, and is exerted within the limits you have pointed out, it can be of benefit to both the Koreans’ and our own national interests and is, I believe, well worth the risks involved. Our role, as I see it, is one of restraint and inspiration, and as you correctly emphasize, should be carried out in such a way as to promote and encourage the already far-developed capacity of the Koreans to manage for themselves, a self-sustaining society and economy with liberty and justice for all.

As you have no doubt surmised, this letter was drafted for me in NA but I have studied it carefully against the file and hope that it provides an evocative contribution to our mutual consideration of the problem. In the meantime we are grateful for your luncheon effort with the Democratic leaders which seems to have gone well and, so far as we know, not to have provoked any unfavorable overtones of intervention. The circumstance that the leaders were so unmindful, except in a superficial way, of the magnitude of the problems to be faced emboldens me to think we should continue to explore for discreet means to inspire them to rise above their factional maneuvers.⁶

Sincerely,

J. Graham Parsons⁷

0. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 62 D 26, McConaughy. Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by Macdonald on August 10 and cleared by Bacon and Peterson.
1. See footnote 1, Document 326.
2. Document 326.
3. See W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
4. Despatch 218 summarized a conversation between an Embassy officer and three members of the Democratic Party in North Cholla province in August 1958. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/10–2058)
5. Document 321.
6. On September 6 Marshall Green replied to this letter for McConaughy, who departed for home leave before he had a chance to respond. Green observed that he and McConaughy had discussed Parson’s letter extensively and were in agreement that the letter represented a definitive expression of “our common views.” He assured Parsons that Embassy officers were doing everything they could to broaden and deepen their contacts with the new Korean leadership, including old faction members, and that “these relationships are being appropriately utilized to achieve better ROK observance of the basic principles enumerated at the conclusion of your letter.” (Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 63 D 168, K1-C.2 Official–Informal Correspondence) See Supplement.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.