313. Editorial Note
In his summary of significant world developments affecting world security, presented at the 442d meeting of the National Security Council on April 28, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles outlined the situation in Korea as follows:
“Mr. Dulles thought there was little doubt that Syngman Rhee’s resignation would be accepted by the Korean National Assembly, which would become responsible for solving the crisis in the Republic of Korea. Huh Chung, who had recently been appointed Foreign Minister, was now acting as President of Korea in accordance with Korean constitutional processes providing for the succession to the Presidency of the Foreign Minister upon the death or resignation of the President and Vice President. Mr. Dulles reported that American observers had a high regard for Huh Chung, who was a former mayor of Seoul and a friend of President Rhee. Huh Chung had displayed a great deal of competence in recent negotiations with Japan. Mr. Henderson added that Huh Chung had shown a genuine desire to reach an agreement with the Japanese in the recent negotiations, contrary to the attitude displayed by President Rhee. Continuing, Mr. Dulles said the Korean populace might be aroused to take further mob action if it feels that reforms are proceeding too slowly. At present the attitude of the Korean population is very friendly toward the U.S. Mr. Dulles was of the opinion that the U.S. Ambassador to Korea handled the situation with great skill. Mr. Dulles then read an extract [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tending to show that the turning point in the Korean crisis came with the entry of the U.S. Ambassador into the palace to interview Rhee. Mr. Dulles reported that our Ambassador and General Magruder had been cheered in Korea. The President was not sure that the applause of the Korean crowd was an unmixed blessing. He said this applause could easily turn to condemnation as soon as we did something the crowds did not like. Mr. Henderson agreed that it was dangerous to allow mobs to have an influence on decisions. The Vice President asked whether our activities in Korea had made us, in the minds of the people, responsible for the new Korean government. The President said we had warned Rhee about the consequences of his course of action. However, he (the President) was not aware that we were about to be made responsible in the eyes of the Korean people for the change in the Korean government. Mr. Dulles did not believe that the Korean crowds did give us credit for the change in the Korean government.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)