Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

312. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, April 28, 1960, 9 p.m.

1013. CINCPAC for POLAD. State pass DA, CNO, DAF. I met today for 45 minutes with FonMin Ho Jung (who is also the senior member of the ROKG) at his request. His principal purpose in requesting this meeting evidently was to spell out his intention to cooperate closely and fully with US and to solicit our support and assistance in every way appropriate.

FonMin Ho opened conversation by expressing his appreciation our efforts vis-à-vis President Rhee which, he said, had enabled him and those working with him to prevent further deterioration situation and move toward restoration order. Referring to that portion President Eisenhower’s recent statement re question US “interference”,¹ (which also raised with Ho by American correspondent here) Ho stated in most positive terms that in his view our actions had not constituted interference in domestic affairs but “proper advice concerning situation.” He volunteered make official statement this effect if I thought useful. I expressed appreciation Ho’s suggestion but replied I did not think needed now, although I might accept his offer should this become matter serious controversy.

FonMin remarked that situation now seems be “settling down.” Since further difficulties might arise and much to be done, however, he earnestly hoped he could continue count on advice and assistance US. In this connection, Ho at one point remarked he fully aware US in past has given advice on many things which not favorably acted upon due to “certain stubborness on part our old President.” On such matters, Ho assured me, he intends “accept fully” our advice. He further emphasized that, in general, he willing consider any advice or opinions we may have offer, that he will not hesitate solicit such advice, and that a principal objective his part is to promote closest possible relations our two countries and most effective utilization our aid with full respect for our views.

Ho then discussed briefly following three matters on which he believes US can be of immediate assistance:

1) Formation his cabinet: Ho stated he expects be able announce cabinet soon (see Embtel 1011).² Emphasized however that in view pressure time and other limitations, not all his selections as good as might be wished but that he had done best under circumstances. Ho expressed hope that in our consideration his cabinet we would bear in mind difficulties he faced. He was willing to listen if we had any serious reservations about any of them. If, however, we found his selections “relatively satisfactory,” he urged that it would be helpful in “calming down situation” if US could make statement indicating favorable view.

2) Police reform: Ho stated that he plans reform National Police on completely different basis and also plans reorganization ROKA/CIC. He emphasized immediate US assistance these efforts especially important, noting that he wishes draw as much as feasible in relation Korean situation upon US experience these fields.

3) ROK-Japanese relations: Ho stated that he particularly desirous normalize ROK-Japanese relations. Referring his experience as chief delegate Tokyo talks last fall, Ho stated he fully aware US position this matter and appreciates desire US for settlement; further stated that in light his experience he has definite views on how reach this goal, adding that he still of view that if Rhee had followed his advice last year situation would not have deteriorated as did. Ho assured me that he understands importance compromise on outstanding issues, but emphatic in expression view that compromise cannot be worked out so long as “deportation” North Korea continues. Said no other free country had arranged mass shipments of residents to a Communist country. Ho stated ROKG policies and activities its admission Tokyo largely responsible for accumulation of Japanese “antagonism” toward Korea which in turn had needlessly created support among Japanese for repatriation scheme; and he indicated he determined do whatever possible correct these faults on part ROKG. He urged however that US now use its influence halt movement to North Korea. If this can be done, he stated, “I am confident I can reach settlement our relations in no time.” Ho expressed view this favorable time for exertion US influence this direction since most those who wish return North Korea probably have been repatriated.

In replying Ho’s remarks, I emphasized that I particularly heartened by his evident desire to maintain intimate and cooperative relations with US and that I wished reciprocate his determination maintain closest association and contact between our governments, which was vital necessity in this hour. I added that although I would of course do all that I could to meet his requests for advice and assistance, I necessarily would be guided by a recognition that US must not appear to be meddling in his responsibility to conduct affairs his country. As Korea’s closest friend and ally, and in view direct manner in which essential national interests of ours were engaged here, however, it only natural US would wish assist his government every possible way.

On specific points which he raised, I stated we prepared do all possible assist in reform National Police and reorganization ROK/CIC and took opportunity suggest, in this connection, that we meet soon together with Dr. Moyer and Gen. Magruder to discuss this and other aspects general problem security, as well as other basic elements of defense and economic assistance programs for which they responsible. Re ROK-Japanese relations, I careful not encourage Ho to think it possible halt repatriation, and although I indicated we deeply desirous remove any fundamental barrier to settlement, and stated his views this point would be communicated to GOJ. I suggested special effort might be made to avoid any extension Calcutta Agreement. More generally, I strongly welcomed his views on importance reaching prompt settlement outstanding issues and indicated my belief GOJ also prepared work in this direction constructively and in spirit of compromise.

I also urged on Ho advisability he make public statement in near future outlining fundamental basis on which he intends proceed in settlement current crisis and confirming his stand in support continued cooperation free world and firm determination maintain Korea’s anti-Communist position. I also suggested that such statement indicate his determination promptly restore law and order and promote internal stability. Referring President Eisenhower’s latest press conference statement re Korea, copy of which I left with Ho, I mentioned that he might also wish reiterate that he looking forward President’s visit. He seemed quite receptive to my suggestion statement along these lines.

In connection my remarks re prompt restoration law and order, I urged that Ho make every effort prevent personal reprisals against individuals who had played leading role Rhee administration and now being held responsible by many for many wrongful acts committed by government. I emphasized that such acts mob retribution could only have adverse impact on his efforts maintain law and order and on world opinion toward Korea, and I urged that, if necessary, individuals likely be targets such action be placed under protective custody by government with assurance to public that their cases would be given thorough investigation and that any punishment must be strictly according legal processes. Ho expressed himself in complete agreement these views.

Our conversation then brought quickly to close by urgent call from DCM that Rhee reported actually about to set out on foot from Kyungmudae to his private residence, a distance of about 3 miles, and that large crowds already had gathered in vicinity KMD and capital. (Embtel 1011) I hurried to Kyungmudae with Ho to seek dissuade him.

Comment: I impressed by evident sincerity Ho’s expressions his desire work in close harmony with US, not only in taking steps surmount current crisis but in longer-range measures lay foundations for more stable political order Korea. His entire demeanor, moreover, one of selfless determination serve best interests his country, seeking advice and assistance from every side. I detect, however, some lack self-confidence and probable inclination look to public indications US support in efforts strengthen his position. This not likely become serious problem, but I believe we must be careful avoid being drawn into position where our relationships with him could be misconstrued. His manner conveys impression of integrity, deliberation, objectivity, balance, probably somewhat lacking in decisiveness, initiative, and dynamic leadership and organizational talents.

I was particularly encouraged by his remarks re settlement outstanding problems ROK-Japanese relations and willingness let US set course for best application our assistance contribution. Believe that real opportunity now presented for making substantial progress these directions. I shall defer my comments former point for more complete elaboration in connection Toyko’s 3470³ to Dept.

Unfortunately time did not permit discussion any details Ho’s thinking re such immediate political problems as presidential elections, constitutional amendment, and legislative action which might be taken as part over-all effort resolve present crisis. I plan, however, meet again with Ho in very near future at which time I shall take up these matters in light Deptel 897⁴ just received.

McConaughy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B/4–2860. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.
1. In response to a question at his press conference on April 27 concerning U.S. involvement in the political crisis in Korea, President Eisenhower said that “as a friendly gesture” for a man he knew and admired, he had expressed to President Rhee his concern about the implications of irregularities in the recent elections. He added, however, that “no interference of any kind was ever undertaken by the United States; we had no part in inciting, or know anything about the inciting of, this difficulty.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, p. 361)
2. Telegram 1011 from Seoul, April 28, reported that Huh Chung had announced the following cabinet appointments: Yun Ho-pyong as Minister of Finance, Yi Pyong-do as Minister of Education, Chun Taek-po as Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Suk Sang-ok as Minister of Transportation. The Defense, Communications, and Agriculture posts were still vacant. The Embassy also reported that the capital was in shock at the news that morning of the mass suicide of former Vice President Yi Ki-pung and his entire family, and that crowds had begun to fill the streets as word spread that former President Rhee intended to leave the Presidential palace on foot and walk to his new residence in the northeast section of the city. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.11/4–2860)
3. In telegram 3470 from Tokyo, April 27, Ambassador MacArthur recommended that the United States should take advantage of the new government in Korea to try to promote better relations between South Korea and Japan. (Ibid., 795B.00/4–2760)
4. Document 311.