306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea0
878. Embtel 9231 rptd CINCPAC 158. Dept cannot accept President Rhee’s reaction, as set forth reftel, to this Government’s recent moves. Dept is moreover both highly disappointed and concerned that Rhee apparently has not slightest conception of basic reasons for demonstrations and that abuses perpetrated have created general popular anger, disillusionment and frustration reflecting itself in bona fide expression of Korean people’s dissatisfaction with their Government. Rather than [Page 635] face up to situation and take constructive measures in an effort restore public confidence in himself and his Government, it would appear from Rhee’s reaction and his recent public statements that he intends to ferret out those whom he considers responsible for demonstrations and persecute them. His allegations that Chang Myon and Bishop Ro in essence are seeking use Catholic Church influence for advancing Chang’s political ambitions and that Chang is using his Catholic Church membership for trying stir up students and others in revolt against constituted authority are of course preposterous and this and Rhee’s general attitude would seem indicate quite clearly unfortunately that he will follow policy of further repression. It is tragic farce and mockery for Rhee proceed, on basis stamping out these elements responsible for recent demonstrations and then sitting down to redress grievances “if any.”
Dept satisfied it must continue its firm line with Rhee and his Government, despite Rhee’s inquiry as to what he could now do to make it “easier for the State Department.” As indicated Deptel 7842 rptd CINCPAC unn, Dept beginning January this year adopted firm policy designed 1) to bring about constructive change ROK attitudes where US interests involved and 2) to cause ROKG to conduct its affairs as mature and responsible member free world community. In pursuance this policy Dept has no intention backing down in view Rhee’s position and his obvious belief that if he stands firm this Government will adopt softer line. Although Rhee and Acting FonMin Choe undoubtedly nettled as result our statement re recent aide-mémoire,3 it is our firm intention to make appropriate references publicly to our actions whenever we consider it desirable do so, particularly since all evidence would seem indicate that this is most effective pressure upon Rhee. We of course do appreciate that too many public statements could be counterproductive and that timing must be carefully considered.
Decision to continue follow firmest policy vis-à-vis Rhee in continuing insist he not follow repressive policy but move without delay to regain confidence of people in ROKG reached in light what Dept considers to have been effective results new policy adopted last January and that only by facing issues squarely with ROKG including Rhee in order endeavor bring ROK to pursue constructive programs both domestically and internationally can US have solid basis for long-term support and cooperation and thus avoid risking inability maintain adequate support and gradual deterioration even disintegration long-term US-ROK relationships. Despite sporadic press statements here taking exception [Page 636] Dept’s firm policy, there every reason believe Congress and general public solidly behind Dept.
Dept not considering further démarche vis-à-vis Rhee and his Government until clearer picture presented as to how Rhee plans response to specific courses of action suggested in recent aide-mémoire designed restore public confidence. Dept initially views with skepticism reports carried press media this morning and Army attaché’s msg DTG 230500Z4 that Yi Ki-pung considering establishment parliamentary Cabinet system to which Rhee has agreed and that he also weighing own resignation. If in fact Yi resigns and Rhee appoints Prime Minister with approval simple majority National Assembly as formerly the case (LP presently has two-thirds majority in Assembly), we recognize this could pave way for Rhee save face while handing over effective administration Government to able executive more acceptable to people. However, we presently inclined believe this more likely prove device used by Rhee and hardcore elements LP to permit present Korean Administration to continue dictatorial tactics under different guise. By this means Rhee and LP could avoid new confrontation electorate such as in new election for vice president or election Upper House. As consequence seriously doubt such move by Rhee and LP, if made, will satisfy or placate any appreciable degree widespread popular demand for new elections. We are looking forward your assessment this development. In this connection, we are considering how influential views Admiral Stump can best be used.
As suggested Deptel 848,5Dept believes Embassy should in interim make every effort make clearly known to variety responsible and influential personalities 1) strong US concern over situation as it has developed, 2) our position as set forth April 19 aide-mémoire and 3) our firm determination not to accept anything less than solution which in fact does restore public confidence in ROKG.
We must reckon with fact that Rhee in effort divert public attention from current situation may at some stage consider taking such drastic action as march north or moving on Japan, e.g. Tsushima Island, both of which Rhee has advocated in past. In event Rhee should take some such drastic action, Dept doubts most seriously he would have support general populace and we would of course trust that our military would be able continue exercise restraining influence on ROK military establishment.
If, as Dept anticipates, Rhee pursues repressive policies and fails meet popular demand hold new elections, Dept believes that we must [Page 637] then consider without delay means by which Rhee and hard core or extremist elements in Government and LP may be isolated and moderate and responsible elements in DP, LP and non-political groups (such as students) who would be responsive but need encouragement may be brought together in broad grouping in order develop a broadly based Korean administration dedicated to Free World principles and security objectives and to effective operation genuinely democratic political system capable of maintaining popular support. We intend review our aid program to see in what manner it could be utilized in this process. We have of course no intention identifying ourselves with any particular party or group but rather to press for restoration government responsive to will of electorate.
Furthermore, urgency of situation underscored by 1) Rhee’s advanced age, 2) Yi Ki-pung’s physical condition, 3) charged political situation in Korea, and we therefore believe we must begin without delay give active consideration on continuing operating basis as to what this Government should do in event Rhee’s death, incapacitation or overthrow his Government, and to endeavor assess what courses of action might be pursued in Korea if any of these eventualities transpires, for example, 1) observation constitutional processes (such possibilities as following present themselves: after Aug 15 and on assumption Yi Ki-pung does not resign, if Rhee were to die we would be in odd position of insisting man who physically unable assume duties and who was elected by fraudulent means be pushed into Presidency); 2) coup of one type or another (e.g. by palace guard or some element such as Yi Bomsok); 3) military takeover as caretaker government (possibly under aegis MinDef or ROK Army C/S).
Your 9396 just received and only underscores our concern over way situation developing ROK and necessity our maintaining firm US policy.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–2160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Lane and cleared by Bane, Steeves, Parsons, and Merchant. Repeated to Tokyo and to CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- Document 304.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 294.↩
- See Document 302.↩
- Dated April 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–2360)↩
- Document 302.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 304.↩