304. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State0
923. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 848.1 In course of 90 minute meeting with President Rhee this morning, also attended by Acting FonMin and DCM. I carried out instructions contained reftel and delivered aide-mémoire. Meeting was unsatisfactory.
Evidently anticipating nature of my mission, President Rhee launched immediately forth with expression of surprise and concern over Washington’s reaction to events of past three days, reactions which he termed “the opposite” of ROKG. When I interposed that our statements and all other actions were based upon deep friendship and regard for Korea, President commented that “sometimes good will is misused and creates a difficult situation.”
President’s principal theme was that disorders in Korea not a reflection of popular dissatisfaction but rather the handiwork of Vice President Chang Myon, supported by Catholic Bishop Ro, who was seeking to use Catholic Church influence for advancing Chang’s political ambitions. He was at pains not to say that this was a Catholic Church [Page 630] conspiracy, emphasizing that Catholics continually express friendship and support for government but rather Chang’s using his membership in Catholic Church for trying to stir up students and others in revolt against constituted authority. He further alleged that, with his term of office rapidly running out, Chang Myon had been driven to even more desperate political measures than he had been employing previously. He insisted that Catholic Church membership generally, including Apostolic Delegate Lambertini and Bishop Quinlan, is opposed to Vice President’s so-called political maneuvering. He regretted he said that he had not told me about all this before.
President Rhee continued that Washington’s version of Korean developments is entirely at odds with the facts. If Washington continues to base its policy on such a failure to understand true facts “it will all be a terrible mess” and Korean people will not know what to do. He continued: “Mr. Ambassador, you can save us if you realize these facts and help calm things down.” He also complained that US newspapers are agitating matters, making them worse, that guileless youth of Korea are being misled by Chang and others and that it would now take long, long time to establish peace and order. He said time would be required to get all the evidence together adequately to prove the “facts” about Chang’s conspiracy.
I told President Rhee that I was always receptive to hearing his side of the story and having his information and interpretation. However, I could not agree that Chang Myon is or has been conspiring against government. From all our many US sources of information, we know him to be loyal leader of loyal opposition; that we do not believe for one minute that he is the fomenter of this nation-wide movement which is spontaneous, deriving from the grass roots and based on justifiable grievances. Nor do we believe that Chang is kind of man who could fire up nation this way, any more than we believe him to be anything but a full respecter of law and order.
I continued that there have been some bad abuses in Korea which have created general popular anger and that demonstrations are a bona fide expression of people’s outrage. Because President Rhee was growing more and more agitated I hastened to interpose that these manifestations of anger were not, I believed, directed against him who was regarded as saviour of his country, but there is widespread feeling that he does not know all that is going on and that important facts are being withheld from him.
President Rhee retorted with vehemence that I seemed to place greater confidence in opponents of his government than in his government, that this would make it difficult for him to deal with me.
I interrupted to say that it was quite the contrary; I wished to talk things over with him, to have his views and confidence and to help him [Page 631] cope with situation. President Rhee, mollified, said that with US help the situation could be tranquilized. He said he would show US all the evidence when it was assembled of where the true cause lay, but that if I did not believe what he said, then “where do we go?”
I replied that we sought to be fair-minded and certainly thought we were; we wanted to hear whatever evidence of conspiracy President had and we did not seek to pressure him. However, we believe our assessment of situation to be correct and believe that steps could be taken and must be taken by ROKG to restore full support of populace for government.
I then referred to Secretary Herter’s recent meeting with Ambassador Yang and said that I was under instructions to deliver an aide-mémoire which had already been given Yang. I asked permission to read aide-mémoire.
President Rhee replied that he would like to see it except that “it is so far away from the truth.” President Rhee said that few people in the State Department had any real understanding of Far East situation, and that Secretary Herter is newcomer to this field and too pro-Japanese, that for many years State Department had opposed him when he warned US people of growing Japanese threat and, even though that threat had erupted into war, there was still tendency in State Department to trust Japanese more than Koreans.
(President Rhee repeated these charges against State Department in three subsequent parts of conversation.) I dismissed this latter charge as groundless. I then strongly emphasized to Rhee two points: (1) That all US Government agencies are agreed in their assessment of Korean problem and of remedial steps needed immediately to be taken, (2) that US and Korea have common understanding of Communist threat and basic steps to meet that threat. With Rhee’s permission, I then read full text of aide-mémoire slowly (but omitting last paragraphs spelling out specific measures which might be taken, merely referring to them in general. I felt that reference to specific measures would only lead to discussions obscuring main points and might leave him with impression that his government’s taking only certain limited steps would suffice).
President Rhee listened impassively, though acting FonMin Choi snorted occasionally, and I quickly followed up with another expression of our friendship and desire to cooperate with President Rhee. I said I continued to be disturbed that he might not be adequately informed by his advisors. I said I hoped he would accept aide-mémoire in friendly cooperative spirit in which it was given, that we were not dictating but rather counseling a close ally and fellow democracy.
President Rhee inquired what he could now do to make it “easier for the State Department.” I rejoined that this was not an expression of [Page 632] State Department thinking but rather of US Government thinking. Question was what could be done expeditiously by ROKG to relieve dangerous pressures which are building up without resort to repressive measures. Basic causes were way these last elections conducted and way that police involved in politics and in their employment harsh repressive measures to point where they now hated by people. I said that if ROKG failed to understand these to be basic causes and grievances and to act accordingly then situation would explode; otherwise it could be calmed down and people’s confidence restored in government.
President Rhee stated that, given time, he would be able to prove to US the whole story behind Chang’s conspiracy and we will see through the measures to be taken by his government that all will be cleared up.
Rhee enjoined that I inform President Eisenhower how sorry he was about this “unexpected disturbance” and that everything would be done to settle it long before President came here on visit so warmly anticipated by ROK people. He was sorry that some school boys seemed to be doing everything they could to spoil President Eisenhower’s visit.
I replied that I was sure he would do everything necessary to permit visit to take place and that this would necessarily include taking steps to remove basic causes of ROK instability. I said l had right along recommended President Eisenhower’s visit and I sincerely trusted there would be no reason for President having to change his plans. That would be most unfortunate.
President Rhee said that he would see to it that there were no “untoward incidents” which might mar visit. I responded that it wasn’t an incident that might occur during visit which presented problem but whether or not basic grievances in this nation had been redressed in way which would permit visit.
We agreed that it would be helpful if aide-mémoire could be kept strictly confidential. Minister Choi then criticized State Department statement2 issued after Ambassador Yang’s visit to receive aide-mémoire. Choi claimed that US had in effect released “gist” of aide-mémoire to which I took decided exception. Choi also complained that State Department statement was issued even before ROKG had received report of Yang’s conversation with Secretary. Choi went on to deliver what appeared to be carefully planned reprimand to Embassy regarding the press release issued while the demonstration was at its height.3
President Rhee was silent during exchange between Choi and me regarding proprieties of statement, but my concluding statement that [Page 633] our release had not interfered with restoration of law and order and might have assisted it went without effective challenge even from Choi. I emphasized that our statement was intended to be helpful to ROKG, that it deplored resort to violence, that it seemed to have had a stabilizing effect, that I had carefully read statement to senior minister (Defense Minister) who was with President in beleaguered Presidential palace at time of issuance and that this senior minister had signified our statement would be useful. Choi weakly replied, without being specific, that translation of phrase into Korean of “justifiable grievances” twisted press statement in way “which was surprising and embarrassing” to ROKG.
Since Choi also indicated his view that our aide-mémoire had been delivered to Yang precipitately in moment of stress, I replied that this aide-mémoire had been long in preparation and would have been delivered anyway regardless of April 19 events. Latter merely underscored tenability of points made in aide-mémoire. President Rhee returned to his allegation of State Department naiveté and concluded with request that we re-examine the “facts” and that for his part he would present “true facts” as soon as they could be assembled.
He indicated he wished to see me again. We left on ostensibly amicable note though I have no doubt but that my visit has placed some strain, which may be temporary, on our personal relations.
Analysis of above meeting will follow.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–2160. Secret; Priority. Also sent to CINCPAC.↩
- Document 302.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 303.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 300.↩
- In telegram 939 from Seoul, April 23, McConaughy concluded that his conversation with Rhee on April 21 demonstrated beyond a doubt that Rhee was “dangerously uninformed and misinformed.” McConaughy felt that this was only partly due to the withholding of information from Rhee by his entourage. “The octogenarian President has been entering into an eighth age of man where no new ideas or intellectual grasp of new forces at work can penetrate his mind. He is receptive to flattery and to statements which play upon his well-known prejudices but critical statements only prompt him to suspect the motives of the speaker rather than to ponder the content of the criticism.” (Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/4–2360) See Supplement.↩