114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan0

1402. From the Secretary for MacArthur. I have thoroughly considered Japanese proposed minute on treaty review in light of strong case you have made for its acceptance. I readily recognize desirability of giving Kishi maximum assistance in securing treaty ratification and according Japan fully equal treatment to our other allies. I also am confident Kishi would not personally use treaty review provision. Nevertheless, it would in my judgment be a mistake to sign formal treaty review agreement with Japanese Government.

There is no exact precedent in our post-war security treaty system for Japanese proposal. NATO Article 12 was provision, coinciding with ten year review of UN Charter, designed to take into account need for flexibility and processes of peaceful change but only after treaty had ten years to become stable and source of confidence. While Senate recognized possibility of review prior to 10 years, review under these circumstances by “unanimous consent” rather than request of a party. Bohlen Serrano agreement also not precedent since it relates to 25 year base agreement rather than treaty and Japan Administrative Agreement already has comparable provision for review.

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Lack of precedent however is not impossible barrier to overcome were it not for political considerations arguing against Japanese proposal. Basically, we fear treaty review provision would create impression both here and in Japan that GOJ actually wishes reopen treaty even though we are confident this is not Kishi’s intention. It would confuse public opinion which would feel some special meaning behind provision and would invite continuing agitation from some elements now opposing treaty. I am most anxious, on contrary, to create impression in US as well as Japan of long-term durable ties between us. We had always considered this was major underlying objective of both Kishi and ourselves in new treaty and that Kishi was prepared to fight for treaty on issue of whether Japan should align itself with US. At best, treaty review provision will comfort those arguing for a less permanent commitment to us. I fear that in future years its intent as gesture to secure ratification could become increasingly clouded and provision will encourage opportunist elements to undercut our treaty ties whereas clear cut duration provision will discourage such future efforts.

Clearly, if new treaty should become no longer viable–although I trust this will not occur, GOJ not only has inherent right to request treaty review but can resort to provisions for consultation in Article IV as well as UN aspect of termination provisions in Article X.

I hope that Prime Minister Kishi could perhaps answer criticism of the treaty on this basis and recognize advantages in avoiding a specific agreement on treaty review which would confuse our public and could tempt mischievous elements in both countries to undermine the firm long-term friendship we both desire.

I would appreciate your speaking personally to Kishi of our objections to his proposal on treaty review on such grounds as you consider will be most convincing to him. You should affirm at same time our continued desire to strengthen his prospects for securing ratification wherever prudently feasible.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sneider on December 5; cleared with S/S, H, M, and L; and approved by Herter.