Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, December 3, 1959, 8 p.m.

1736. Personal for Assistant Secretary Parsons from MacArthur. Embtel 1699 and Deptel 1318.¹ Before recommending that we accept minute on treaty review, we had of course carefully considered the background and all aspects of this problem including the points raised in your message. You will recall that when I discussed treaty duration with Secretary Dulles in September 1958 the original idea was that the treaty duration should be the same as in our other security treaties in the Pacific. That is, the treaty would remain in force indefinitely but any party might withdraw at any time after one year’s notice. Subsequently when I discussed this with members of the JCS and their representatives they strongly urged that we seek a minimum ten-year duration so that they could have a long-term plan and also be able to budget in an orderly manner for our important bases in Japan. Secretary Dulles concurred in this. However, in our discussions of this matter it was understood that if the Japanese should insist on the same duration provision as in all our other Pacific treaties and make an issue of it we would have no course but to agree to a one-year notification period. At no time was a 10-year duration considered essential quid pro quo for US commitment. I was able actually however to obtain an 11-year duration period in course our negotiations here. Furthermore as I discussed duration with Kishi, Fujiyama and other LDP leaders and explained to them the desirability from Japan’s viewpoint for a longer period than provided in our other Pacific treaties they came to agree that the 11-year period was appropriate.

In the absence of unpredictable developments our considered and best judgment is that once the treaty is ratified there is no conservative government in sight which would challenge the duration provision of the treaty. Furthermore and in the absence of unpredictable developments it seems doubtful that any conservative leader would be able to muster a majority of the conservative party behind such a proposal for Kishi, Fujiyama, Ikeda, Sato, Kaya, Yoshida, Funada and others with whom I have talked strongly favor the ten and one provision in the treaty. With respect to Kono we must recognize that whether or not there is a minute he is always capable of trying to reopen the duration question if he saw prospect of making a quick buck.

In our judgment points made reference telegram will not be persuasive to GOJ. The point that our other security treaties in the Far East have no comparable provision is not relevant because those treaties may be denounced at any time on one year’s notice. If we were willing to have a one-year duration period with the Japanese there would be no purpose in a treaty review at the request of either party. With respect to the NATO treaty Article XII provides a review in the last ten years of the treaty or at any time from 1959 on within next ten years. Since new treaty is for ten years it is the view of Kishi that a minute re review is appropriate in comparison with the provision in the NATO treaty. With respect to the comment that a minute providing for review represents an open invitation for reopening the treaty to every new Japanese Government in the event differences arise between US and Japan, it goes without saying that if serious major difficulties arise between us, or if kind of Japanese Government which will compromise with Communists gains office, our security relationship will indeed be in jeopardy. This would be true whether or not there is a minute providing for reviewing the treaty and its related arrangements, and it is equally true under Article IV of treaty with the wrong kind of Japanese Government. Panama is an example of what can happen despite texts or provisions of treaties.

I disagree that we will encounter serious Congressional objection to a minute providing for review of the treaty, for as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been the first to recognize, any party to an international treaty can ask for consultations for the purpose of reviewing any of its pertinent aspects whenever it so desires. In its June 6, 1949 report on NATO, Article 12, Senate Committee Foreign Relations noted, as you will recall, that even before ten years earlier review would be possible by unanimous consent of signatories, and observed that interest of US would be amply protected by requirement for Senatorial advice and consent on any proposed amendments.

I would like to emphasize that Kishi is going to have a major battle on his hands to get the treaty ratified and to rally support of all his factions and public opinion. He may or may not be obliged to fight an election on treaty issue. We can help him or make his task much more difficult. He has taken over the handling of our talks from Fujiyama and all proposals are now coming directly from Kishi. It is wholly in keeping with era of partnership and equality and greatly in our own interest to do what we can to make treaty ratification smoother because if the treaty fails of ratification we cannot simply go back to the status-quo ante for then our entire present security relationship with Japan will be in great jeopardy. We can of course tell Kishi we refuse to join in an agreed minute with him. In such event I believe he would feel he must make some unilateral statement in the Diet on the subject.

I again urge that we agree to a minute with Kishi. If the minute which he proposed to us does not seem satisfactory we could initially try out an alternative which would be based on so-called Bohlen–Serrano formula of October 13.²Kishi might not find such alternative acceptable in which event we could try combining it with Kishi’s original proposal.

Following is draft alternative.

“Japanese Plenipotentiary: While the treaty of mutual cooperation and security is of indefinite duration, no provision was made for reviewing the treaty and its related arrangements. Nothing in these agreements would prejudice the inherent right of either government to raise with the other in appropriate circumstances any questions of particular interest to it.

United States Plenipotentiary: The United States Government is of the same opinion.”

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/12–359. Confidential; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department.
1. Documents 110 and 111.
2. During U.S.-Philippine base negotiations, the formula agreed to Ambassador Bohlen and Philippine Foreign Minister Serrano was: “that nothing in the agreement prejudices the inherent right of either Government to raise with the other in appropriate circumstances any question of particular interest to it.” See the memorandum by Mein, January 27, 1960, in vol. XV, pp. 946–957.