Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

64. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, January 2, 1960, 3 p.m.

1779. Eyes only Secretary and Chiefs of Mission. I note that Department circular telegram 853 December 26¹ states in paragraph 5 that we consider summit meeting will be essentially probing operation in which Soviet attitude toward German reunification will be pretty much acid test of Soviet intentions. In my view Soviet attitude toward German reunification already crystal clear. There is however some doubt as to Soviet intentions regarding Berlin and I assume it is this that Department had in mind. I suggest we should keep in mind that this will also be probing operation on part of Soviets and Western policy much less clear than Soviet. I believe Khrushchev seeks a détente of long duration and a real measure of disarmament if this can be had without jeopardizing Communist empire in Eastern Europe. If our policy at Paris summit meeting is to be as preparation so far would indicate, it seems probable Khrushchev will conclude that we are determined to break up Communist bloc and that a real relaxation of tension is not possible. Moreover if our position is that at most we will renew our Geneva offer, which was known to be unacceptable to Soviets at time of Camp David, or that we can only solve Berlin problem in connection with German reunification, it seems to me Khrushchev would have sound grounds for accusing us of bad faith since at Camp David we undertook in effect to secure agreement of our allies to further effort solve specific problem of Berlin. As Department aware, even before my New Year’s conversation with Khrushchev² I was convinced that in absence of new major proposals on our part Khrushchev would carry out his threat to conclude separate peace treaty and proceed on basis that our rights in Berlin had been extinguished. It is of course true that Khrushchev has reason to want to give us this impression. It is also true that he has a large vested interest in maintaining a détente as well as economic and other reasons for wanting a long period of relaxation. My best judgment is that as things are now shaping up Khrushchev will, after summit meeting, start the process of negotiating a separate peace treaty with East Germany. It is probable, particularly as there is an indication of hope of progress in field of disarmament, that process of negotiation and ratification will be drawn out for some time in order for him to gauge developments in this and other fields. I believe that Khrushchev is under strong pressure from East Germans to do something about Berlin problem. (German Ambassador tells me he has specific evidence of this.) There is probably also some support for an aggressive policy within Soviet regime and I think it can be assumed that Chinese would strongly support such action. I had the impression on New Year’s Eve that Khrushchev was to some extent talking for benefit his colleagues and this impression was even stronger at luncheon which he gave the Vice President during latter’s visit here.³

Khrushchev must be conscious of the relationship between his handling of this problem and his leadership of Communist bloc. Khrushchev has shown strong interest in American elections. Foreign policy declarations of Democratic Party leaders and his own views on VP Nixon could lead him to conclude that he has little to hope from next administration and that best time for bold action would be in period following national conventions and before election.

On balance I am so convinced that in absence of agreement on Berlin Khrushchev will carry out his threat to conclude a separate peace treaty and allow our rights in Berlin to be challenged that I believe we should reappraise with our Allies the advantages and disadvantages of various courses open to us. These would seem to me to be as follows:

1. A firm stand of refusing to make any further attempt to solve Berlin problem. This is the course on which we appear to be embarked and if it is to be followed I suggest that serious effort should be made to enable Khrushchev to accept it without too great loss of face. I find it difficult to suggest a formula but we might, for example, argue that Berlin problem would be easier to solve after further progress had been made in field of disarmament in which we have great hopes; and we might urge that consideration of Berlin problem be postponed on this basis. We might also consider threatening to break off disarmament talks if Khrushchev nevertheless proceeds to challenge our rights in Berlin.

As indicated above, I believe this course will sooner or later lead to such a challenge. Khrushchev will probably try to ensure that East Germans not interfere with British, French and American access other than exercise of nominal control by East Germans. He would probably, however, allow East Germans to harass population of West Berlin and gradually strangle West German access. It is my view that if in such a situation we should use force to maintain West German access or to carry out a massive aid program for West Berlin, Soviets would at least allow East Germans to use force to counter such move. In such an event we would surely be on brink of war. I should think however that most likely outcome would be that West Germans or West Berliners would have to try to negotiate a settlement with East Germans. I very much question whether terms they could get would be as good as could be obtained by our negotiating with Soviets now.

Whatever the merit of this analysis it seems to me absolutely clear that before going into a summit conference we should insist upon full agreement with our Allies including West Germany as to how we would handle East German pressure on West Berlin. This should have effect of bringing about at least some increased flexibility on part of West Germans as well as to enable us to gauge where French and more particularly British would stand when chips were down.

2. A second possible course would be a serious attempt to reach agreement with Soviets on West Berlin. It would of course not be necessary that this actually be concluded at summit and it could take form of a further meeting of Foreign Ministers following such summit. I believe key to solution is question of maintenance of our occupation rights since Khrushchev seems to consider that this blocks his separate peace treaty. It is barely possible that Khrushchev would at least defer conclusion of separate treaty if we could reach an oral agreement on a determined effort by both sides to reduce friction and tension in Berlin area, but I am fully convinced Khrushchev will maintain his position that he will not sign any agreement which reaffirms or continues our occupation rights. Possibility of such deferment would be greatly enhanced if there were favorable developments at summit meeting in other fields.

3. Another possible course of action would be a fresh approach to whole German question which had sufficient attraction to Khrushchev to at least get him to postpone action on West Berlin while it was being explored. One such proposal would be to extend period in our Geneva Peace Plan,⁴ or some similar scheme, to provide that there would not be a showdown by free elections for an extended period of time such as 7–10 years. I realize this would be difficult and possibly impossible to sell to Adenauer, and there is considerable doubt whether Khrushchev would accept it. While Adenauer should know German people I can’t help suspecting that he exaggerates probable effect of reunification issue on German elections. I wonder if some way might not be found either covertly or by persuasion of West Germans for a public opinion poll to be taken which would give us a clearer appreciation of situation.

4. Another possible approach might be in field of disarmament, particularly if this involved a step by step reduction in our forces in Germany and opened up possibility of our eventually giving up our bases there. Khrushchev would be particularly interested in any limitations on West German armament and would, I believe, be quite prepared to balance this by similar limitations in East Germany as well as in Poland and Czechoslovakia. While effects on NATO of any such steps would doubtless be serious it seems to me we might seriously consider whether or not we should attempt to get a price for some of our wasting assets.

I am conscious that this is a pessimistic message and that it could even be said that it smacks of defeatism. I should therefore like to conclude by reiterating my view that because of the evolution which is rapidly taking place within Soviet Union developments are in general going our way and will eventually lead to a situation in which a real accommodation with Soviet Union may become possible. The present apparent trend of our policy with respect to Germany seems to me to be leading to a situation which will force a premature showdown which could well result in a reversal of present evolution in Soviet internal and external policies. Question of East Germany is of course closely related to that of other satellites. My general view is that here, too, a period of relaxation is more likely to lead to concessions to democratic forces within satellites and thus to possibilities of eventual freedom, than would a situation of tension which could in end only lead to freedom by revolution—and for present at least there is no reason to suppose that revolution would end any differently than it did in Hungary.

Thompson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/1–2660. Secret. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.
1. Circular telegram 853 transmitted a summary of the events at the Paris Heads of Government meeting December 19–21, 1959. (Ibid., 396.1–PA/12–2659) For documentation on this meeting, see Documents 54– 60.
2. See Document 63.
3. For documentation on Vice President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union July 23-August 4, 1959, see volume X.
4. See footnote 3, Document 43.