Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

62. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/16

Paris, December 21, 1959, 5 p.m.

MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Paris, December 19–21, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Kohler
  • And other advisors
• German Federal Republic
  • Foreign Minister Von Brentano
  • Mr. van Scherpenberg
  • Mr. Carstens
  • And other advisors
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • M. de Carbonnel
  • M. Lucet
  • And other advisors
• United Kingdom
  • Foreign Minister Lloyd
  • Mr. Hoyer-Millar
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • And other advisors

After discussing the report to be made to the NATO Ministerial Council tomorrow on the communiqué dealing with new economic proposals (covered in separate memorandum), Couve reviewed the oral report on other aspects of the Western Summit which he had agreed to make on behalf of the Four to the Council.¹ He proposed to follow the main points of the communiqué bearing on the East-West Summit and the letter to Khrushchev, adding some of the supplementary information contained in the agreed instructions to the three Ambassadors in Moscow.²

Couve then invited the NATO representatives present to express their views as to the consultative procedures which should be established with NATO for the next round of preparatory work. Ambassador Burgess said it was important to give the impression that there would be full consultation. The situation at the Geneva Foreign Ministers’ conference had been fairly satisfactory, with two reports being submitted to the Council each week and with individual Permanent Representatives going to Geneva from time to time to provide a human as well as a written link. Lloyd noted that it would be difficult to get over the next four months without the press trying to manufacture differences between Western Powers. It is important to warn NATO not to expect too much too soon from the Powers charged with the preparatory work. It would probably be necessary to make continuing noises to keep NATO happy. As to the idea of commuting Permanent Representatives, he could not be enthusiastic at the thought. The preparatory work which would be taking place in Washington was not the same as a conference of the Geneva type. CENTO and SEATO might also ask to send representatives to keep in touch with the work in Washington. The Secretary said that the consultative process should be worked out between the German and other members of the Working Group. Lloyd said it would be best to give NATO a weekly report. This would make the organization happy, even if the report said nothing more than that there had been no progress. Von Brentano opposed the idea of a weekly report, saying that a report could only usefully be made when the Working Group had reached some conclusions. As Couve had pointed out yesterday, a report to NATO would inevitably leak. Lloyd came back to the idea of having a weekly report to keep NATO happy. It was obviously necessary, however, to get away from the idea that, prior to important negotiations with the Soviets, the NATO organization could be given the entire Western position. A formula to the effect that NATO would be kept frequently and regularly informed should suffice. Couve agreed.

The Secretary raised the question of the U.S. draft³ (which had been circulated yesterday) of the proposed directive to cover the next phase of preparatory work on Germany and Berlin. He noted that the communiqué issued by the Heads of Government and Chiefs of State had referred to the “necessary directives” for this purpose, yet no such directives had been issued. Von Brentano expressed concern about the draft. He had no objections to the first paragraph and to the first sentence of the second paragraph. However, he felt that the language in the second sentence of the second paragraph might be dangerous, particularly if it came to public attention. After the Secretary had outlined the difficulties experienced during the preparatory work for the present meeting, with particular reference to the lack of instructions, or instructions barring representatives from substantive discussions, which some of the participants had had, Couve gave assurances that, during the next phase of work, the French representatives would have more latitude to engage in substantive discussions. Lloyd said that it should not be necessary to point out that no one intended to abandon the basic Western position. The Western Peace Plan at Geneva⁴ had proved more of a propaganda success than he had anticipated. He hoped the Peace Plan could be dusted off and looked at to see if any “presentational ornamentation” could be added. It was desirable that the West come to the Summit with some constructive proposals.

The Secretary stated that, although this was not in writing, the Heads of Government and Chiefs of State had directed the Steering Groups to accomplish this. Couve commented that he assumed the Steering Group would begin work in Washington early in January and establish various sub-groups as required. He envisaged one group on disarmament, which had already been provided for, another on Germany and Berlin, and a third on East-West relations. This last might actually require further sub-groups to study such matters as arms control, propaganda and non-interference. The latter might meet in Paris or London as it would be difficult for the continental countries to have too many experts absent in the U.S.

Von Brentano said he agreed that any proposals made in the Working Group would have to be thoroughly examined. It was the duty of each Government to properly inform and instruct its representatives. During the preparations for the present Western Summit in Washington, there had simply not been time to do this, as far as the Federal Republic was concerned. He intended to strengthen the staff of Ambassador Grewe by sending experts from Bonn. However, he still felt there was no need to formulate a directive as in the last sentence of the proposed draft. This point should actually be self-evident. He repented that it was understood that the Working Group would have to study thoroughly any proposals submitted to it.

The Secretary said that, with this clear understanding, he could agree that it might be better not to have a formal directive in writing, in view of the possibility of leaks.

Von Brentano asked whether the Foreign Ministers should try to set a time and place for them to meet to discuss the results of the Working Group. He did not believe it would suffice if the Foreign Ministers merely met a few days before the Summit meeting. The possibility must be envisaged of having, at an earlier point, to discuss the progress of the Working Group and to give it new directives. The Secretary said this might prove desirable, but the problem of heavy commitments made setting a specific date at this time impracticable. It was agreed that the possibility would be left open of having a special meeting of the four Foreign Ministers should this be required to resolve a deadlock in the Working Group.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1569. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on January 7, 1960. The conversation took place at the Quai d’Orsay. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 53 from Paris, December 22. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1-PA/12–2259)
1. Regarding the report to the North Atlantic Council meeting on December 22, see vol. VII, Part 1, Document 245; the memorandum under reference has not been identified further. For text of the special communiqué on the new economic proposals, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 576–577.
2. For text of the summit communiqué, see ibid., pp. 946–947; regarding the letter to Khrushchev and the instructions to the Ambassadors in Moscow, see Document 61.

3. This draft reads:

   “The President of France, the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany agree that representatives of their four Governments, under the guidance of the Secretary of State of the United States and the Ambassadors of the other three countries, should begin work in Washington sometime in January, at a date to be agreed, on the next stage of preparations for the East-West Summit. While the report of this Working Group will be submitted ad referendum to Governments, the four Heads of Governments and Chiefs of State believe that the representatives designated to serve as members should enjoy the full support of their Governments so that meaningful results can be achieved.

   “In arriving at their recommendations the consultants should be guided by the relevant discussions during the present series of four-power meetings. In examining the Western position as it relates to the problem of Germany including Berlin, the Working Group should be free to consider whether there exist feasible new initiatives, consistent with their basic commitments, which would serve to advance Western interests.” (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, France vol. 2)

4. See footnote 3, Document 43.