57. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State0
Cahto 17. Eyes Only Ambassadors. Following report is based on interpreter’s summary of tripartite meeting held at Rambouillet Sunday morning1 among President, Macmillan and De Gaulle:
De Gaulle asked what attitude three Chiefs of Government should be with Khrushchev at summit. He himself felt and others agreed we should not let Soviets tax us with abnormality of Berlin situation, but if they raise matter we should point out real abnormality is creation artificial state by Soviets, namely the GDR. It was felt we should not allow Soviet take “holier than thou attitude” but should not raise Germany [Page 145] and Berlin unless they do. If they do we should indicate we regard their attitude on Berlin as test their real desire for relaxation of tensions. President felt we should be careful not make this appear to be ultimatum. Others agreed. It was agreed we should hold to July 28 offer.2Macmillan felt we should not go back on this offer. He felt Soviets had been close to accepting it in Geneva and perhaps Khrushchev wanted to reserve for himself acceptance that offer, particularly since Khrushchev wanted summit meeting very badly.
De Gaulle then asked for views on borders of Germany. Macmillan refused to be drawn into discussion saying it would become problem only after German reunification. He whispered to Debre “you don’t really want reunification do you?” and Debre nodded and added “Not quite yet.”
De Gaulle indicated that French not in great hurry for this but Western Powers must never give appearance abandoning Berlin or Germany. They must support Adenauer. German prosperity and political conditions in Germany were very fragile. French and British appeared feel maintenance status quo best solution for Germany’s frontiers at the time. President said permanently divided Germany source of difficulties in Europe. De Gaulle said Adenauer had once hinted to him he might accept Oder–Neisse border but not prior 1961 elections in view large number refugees in Fed Rep. It was bargaining card Chancellor would not want play until final settlement.
On disarmament it was agreed attempt would be made to achieve some results particularly in field of control and verification over means of delivery of nuclear weapons.
De Gaulle raised question of Africa. French were favorable to evolution to self-determination and were attempting guide them along this path in sensible manner. Guinea had already achieved its independence. Cameroons would be independent shortly as would Mali and Madagascar, but these countries were moving with the West. We should endeavor prevent this evolution towards freedom from taking place in a manner against the West. Debre said that they had every indication of concerted Soviet effort in Africa. This proved by very large number of leaders they were bringing to Soviet Union and training there to return to their countries to assume positions of leadership. It was important Western Powers concert their policies in dealing with Africa. Others agreed. There was discussion by Macmillan of situation in some British areas where there were large white populations. Both he and De Gaulle pointed out situation relatively simple in those areas with large homogeneous [Page 146] native populations, but where there were large white populations problem was quite different.
De Gaulle then asked President to describe his impressions of his recent visit to India and Pakistan.3 President stated he had been favorably impressed by President Ayub and his efforts on behalf of his countrymen. He spoke also of Nehru’s evolution in thinking and his attempts to rationalize Chinese Communist aggression as being Chinese aggression rather than Communist aggression. He mentioned Nehru’s speech at the civic meeting in New Delhi as having been quite constructive. President also indicated some concern with situation in Afghanistan. He concluded by saying that he had expressed to both Nehru and Ayub hope India and Pakistan would be able work out their differences and, instead of facing one another, “face north”.
There was an extremely brief reference to Laos and it was generally agreed situation there had improved recently. Debre expressed conviction efforts should be made to keep things calm there and not to excite the people. President remarked situation of these landlocked countries was difficult.
Macmillan vehemently expressed his concern lest situation in Europe develop into economic warfare between Common Market and outer seven. If this were to happen it might compel British to withdraw from NATO. De Gaulle asked Macmillan whether he still believed Common Market intended to wage economic war against Britain; Macmillan did not reply directly. De Gaulle then pointed out Common Market had liberalized many of exchanges not only among themselves but also with Britain. Macmillan indicated that this concern more with future than with present. It was indicated there would be conference of the 6 and 7 in January with United States and Canada also attending and hope was expressed that this conference would find ways of preventing an economic and trade split.
President then spoke of his concern over European air defense and delay in accepting General Norstad’s proposals.4 He spoke of difficulty of defending such a small area in compartmented fashion. De Gaulle said these matters should be considered from point of view of Alliance and also from point of view of interested nations. President expressed his concern on this matter and spoke at some length in support of NATO.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–2259. Secret. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, and London.↩
- December 20.↩
- See vol. VIII, Document 488.↩
- The President visited India and Pakistan December 8–14.↩
- Documentation on Norstad’s proposals for an integrated European air defense is in volume VII, Part 1.↩