330. Memorandum of Conversation0
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, October 3–7, 1960
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S.
- The Secretary
- Benson E. L. Timmons, Advisor, USDel, UNGA
- Austria
- Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Austrian Foreign Minister
- Dr. Franz Schnitzel, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Dr. Wilhelm Apfel, Counsellor
- Dr. Rudolf Kirchschlaeger, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs
SUBJECT
- Bilateral Discussion between the Secretary and the Austrian Foreign Minister
The Foreign Minister opened the discussion by referring to his talks on October 4 with Mr. Merchant.1 He said that he had been entirely frank and had dealt with all aspects of the South Tyrol problem. He had, on the other hand, been careful not to exaggerate or dramatize the problem. He said he was definitely unhappy over the South Tyrol problem. Some way must be found to settle it. The Austrian proposal for autonomy for Bozen is already the minimum that Austria can accept. There would be no sense in accepting any other solution here and then being discredited at home.
Mr. Kreisky continued by saying that the institution of autonomous status is not a new idea. It has already been utilized with respect to other parts of Italy. After World War II provision was made for regions, some with more and some with less rights. Kreisky named Sicily, Sardinia and Aorta as regions having autonomy. Such status would be a good solution for the quarter million South Tyrol’s who live in a clearly defined [Page 834] area. Aosta is an example, Kreisky said, of a historical province divided into two artificial regions. Austria is not asking for such a solution, but rather the division of an artificial province (Trenton–Bolzano) into its two natural regions, with autonomy for Bolzano (Bozen). Kreisky said he wished to emphasize that Austria envisaged only a solution “inside Italy” and “within Italian frontiers”. Austria wished merely to see the maximum possible self-administration and self-government.
The Foreign Minister said there was a strong and growing feeling among the young in the South Tyrol in the direction of self-determination. There are hundreds of small villages where people do not want to hear of the difficulties in the outside world but are deeply concerned with their own problems. “There are a lot of Lumumbas there”.
Kreisky went on to say that there is a strong group in both North and South Tyrol who hope that no solution to the problem will be found but rather that self-determination will be demanded. The Minister said the South Tyrolese are conservative and will support the Italian Government if granted autonomy. “The only Communists in South Tyrol are among the Italians who have been brought in from other parts of Italy”.
If self-determination should come to be accepted as a demand, Kreisky said, there would be a “hopeless split between Austria and Italy”, for self-determination means in the long run a change in frontiers. The Austrian press would certainly support self-determination.
The Secretary said the U.S. was unhappy over this dispute between two of its good friends. We had hoped the problem could be worked out between them and not brought to the UN. But now that the item has been inscribed, we hoped the matter would lend itself to juridical determination.
The Secretary continued by saying that he did not wish to get into the merits of the matter. We have not done so with the Italians. He understood that there was both a question of interpretation of the treaty2 and of its implementation. He did not know whether the autonomy of which the Minister had spoken was possible.
Mr. Kreisky said that Italy had refused to discuss the question of autonomy. As for reference to the ICJ, speaking frankly, the Court would have “a very bad treaty” before it. Its only good aspect is its spirit. “Austria would lose the case before it started”. Kreisky said that if the UN should press Austria to go to the ICJ, public opinion in Austria would press for denunciation and the Austrian Government would probably be forced to yield.
[Page 835]Returning to the theme of the “bad treaty”, Kreisky said that when it had been signed Austria had no rights and no sovereignty. Also, Kreisky continued, the Soviets had had reservations. They had termed it “bad”, had said it would never help the minority involved, and had claimed it was the result of Austria’s “misplaced solidarity with the West”.
The Secretary asked whether the Soviets had put all this in writing, and Kreisky replied in the affirmative.
Kreisky also mentioned, but did not develop at length, the thought that there will be trouble from “some people” who will press for a demilitarization of the area. Kreisky said Austria was against this and added it represented “a danger to the West”.
Kreisky went on to say that fortunately thus far the South Tyrol question had not been caught up in the East-West conflict. However, the Soviets might change their attitude at any time. Austria would be unhappy if it were to be supported on the issue by the Eastern Bloc. Kreisky said he thought that up to this time the Soviets had not wished to support Austria on the South Tyrol question in view of the forthcoming Italian elections and the Italian Communist position of opposing South Tyrol autonomy. However, before the UN General Committee debate on inscription, Zorin (USSR) had told the Austrian delegation that if Austria would abstain on the Korean and Hungarian issues, the Soviets would support Austria on South Tyrol. The Austrians had refused.
Kreisky, reverting to the subject of the ICJ, said the Italians have “good lawyers” and are entirely willing to go to the Court. “But even if we had better lawyers, we would still lose.” He reiterated a solution must be found on the basis of autonomy.
Kreisky went on to say that the Austrian Government was now considering the question of the timing of the debate on the South Tyrol item. Originally the Austrians had agreed with the Italian idea of a debate as early as possible in the Special Political Committee, but were now giving thought to the desirability of postponing discussion until November. The Austrian delegation is wondering which would be better. If the debate were postponed, this would give “a little more time to see what can be done”, and would get the matter “out of the shadow of the present tension in the UN”.
The Secretary said that on the question of time he was not sure that a US judgment would be too useful. Sometimes a delay helps, but sometimes it makes the problem worse. Kreisky said the people in the South Tyrol want an early decision, whether positive or negative. The Secretary added that where internal problems of this nature are concerned, probably the earlier that a decision can be given the better.
[Page 836]The Secretary spoke of the five neutral power resolution3 on resumption of contacts between the President and Khrushchev, saying that it had earlier been reported to us that Nehru would not oppose the deletion of the references to the President and the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, but during the debates Nehru had in fact put up vigorous opposition. Nehru had given Tito a commitment, before the latter’s departure from New York, that the original resolution would be pressed unchanged in its essentials.
The Foreign Minister said that Austria had been informed by the Afro-Asian bloc that they opposed Portugal for the West European Security Council seat but would support Austria. Kreisky said Austria does not intend to accept this proposal, since she does not wish to become a pawn in such a game. Austria agrees that the Western European candidate should be supported, even though acceptance by Austria of the Afro-Asian “offer” would probably attract Afro-Asian support for Austria’s position on South Tyrol. Kreisky then made a plea for Western understanding and support of that position. He said Austria was the first Western country openly to support the UN Secretary-General, which had made Khrushchev “angry”. Austria was not in the position of, say, Canada, but lives in the shadow of the Iron Curtain. Kreisky said Austria has shown very many proofs of “Western solidarity” and has “run more risks than any other Western European country”. In return, the West should show more understanding of the Austrian position on South Tyrol. Kreisky said Austria would not understand receiving the “cold shoulder” in the form of a united Western front against her.
The Secretary said that the US also believes in supporting for Security Council seats the choice of the region concerned, even though this may present us with problems, as does the UAR candidacy this year. The US would very much dislike seeing the South Tyrol item and the question of the Security Council seat joined in any way.
The meeting closed with a statement by Kreisky that the Italians can afford to wait, since they have “the assets in their hands”.
In a separate subsequent conversation Waldheim spoke even more strongly to Timmons against any UN action referring the question to the ICJ. He said this would be “totally unacceptable” to Austria. He said Austria would probably find “satisfactory” an Italian declaration that South Tyrol autonomy would be discussed in the Italian Parliament as proposed by the South Tyrol’s deputies. Otherwise Austria would undoubtedly press for a UNGA resolution asking for discussions on the basis of autonomy for Bolzano.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1767. Confidential. Drafted by Timmons on October 7 and approved in S on October 14. The conversation took place at the Waldorf Towers. A briefing memorandum, dated October 1, for this meeting, originally scheduled for October 5, is ibid., Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123. It foresaw Kreisky raising the South Tyrol question, which Austria had inscribed on the U.N. agenda on September 23 and to which the United States had objected after inscription, and general international questions.↩
- See Document 329.↩
- Presumably a reference to the Gruber–de Gasperi Agreement of 1946; see footnote 15, Document 295.↩
- Regarding the five neutral power resolution, September 29. U.N. doc. A/4522, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, pp. 37–39.↩