Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

327. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, July 8, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Khrushchev’s Trip to Austria, June 30–July 8, 1960

1. Preparations

Khrushchev’s visit resulted from a long–standing invitation to repay Chancellor Raab’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1958.¹ The itinerary called for three days in Vienna followed by a five-day tour of the provinces and a final day back in Vienna. The only significant change was Khrushchev’s last-minute decision to return to Vienna a day early.

Considerable friction developed between Chancellor Raab (People’s Party) and Foreign Minister Kreisky (Socialist Party) over (a) the insistence of the former that he (Raab) accompany Khrushchev through the provinces and (b) the arrangements for Khrushchev’s July 2 speech before the Austro-Soviet Society. (Contrary to Kreisky’s advice, outdoor loud speakers were installed and, although not necessary, Raab was present.)

2. Attitude of Austrians

The Austrian public displayed a surprising lack of interest, as was reflected by the small crowds which turned out to see Khrushchev. The independent press brilliantly kept the wool from the eyes of the public and was consistently critical of Khrushchev, whereas the party and government controlled press tended to follow a mild middle path. The Catholic Church, at Arab’s request, did not close St. Stephans Cathedral during the visit. However, it did strongly remind its followers, particularly in special services, of the suppression of the Church in Communist countries. The trade unions remained cool towards the visitor.

In contrast, business interests seemed eager to extend hospitality to Khrushchev. Most important of all, the aging Chancellor, who believes that he alone can “handle” the Russians, seemed determined to convert the visit into a personal triumph for himself.

The reception at the airport was correct and protocolaire. Neither the Papal Nuncio, who is Dean of the Diplomatic Corp, nor Ambassador Matthews was there. (No members of our Embassy attended any of the functions for Khrushchev.)

3. United States Protest

Following the German protest to the Austrian Government over its failure to disassociate itself from Khrushchev’s violent attacks on Adenauer, Ambassador Matthews, on instructions, made a somewhat similar protest on July 6 with respect to Khrushchev’s attacks on the United States.² He stated that the fact Khrushchev attacked the United States in the presence of Raab added increased seriousness to the failure of the Austrian Government to act. Our Ambassador asked what steps the Austrians intended to take to make clear its disassociation from Khrushchev’s remarks. Our Embassy, and later the Department, informed the press of this démarche.

There was no official Austrian reaction to our démarche prior to Khrushchev’s departure on July 8, but the Chancellor has asked to see Ambassador Matthews on July 9, presumably to discuss our protest.³

4. Khrushchev’s Statements on Austrian Neutrality

Khrushchev stated on July 4, and later on July 8, that “the USSR would not remain idle should anyone violate Austrian neutrality”. On July 6 he warned that if the rocket bases in Italy were used against “Socialist countries”, this would be a violation of Austrian neutrality. The Austrian press reacted strongly to these statements, but there has been no official Austrian comment.⁴

5. Khrushchev’s Remarks on Berlin

At his farewell news conference on July 8 Khrushchev stated that the Soviets might sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans in September when the West German Parliament intends to meet in West Berlin. “This would mean that all members of the West German Parliament would have to ask for visas from the East German Government in order to return to West Germany.”

6. Communiqué

The final joint communiqué (attached)⁵ contained, in addition to the usual platitudes, a statement that future Austrian oil deliveries to the USSR (required by the State Treaty) would be reduced and Austrian compensation deliveries of goods (which are now coming to an end) would be continued under a five-year Austro-Soviet Trade Agreement, to be concluded. The Austrians have been worried over possible economic dislocations should these latter deliveries end abruptly.

7. Under Secretary’s Forthcoming Visit to Vienna July 14–17

The Under Secretary asked Ambassador Matthews whether, in light of the failure of the Austrian Government (1) to disassociate itself from Khrushchev’s attacks on the United States and (2) to remove the obstacles to the “Vienna Memorandum” settlement with Solon-Mobil, his (the Under Secretary’s) trip should be cancelled.⁶ Although Mr. Matthews at first recommended that the visit go on as scheduled,⁷ he subsequently telegraphed that, in light of the publicity given to our protest, he will recommend postponement unless the Austrian Government prior to July 14 gives adequate satisfaction to our July 6 protest.⁸

0. Source: Department of State, Austria Desk Files: Lot 68 D 123. Confidential. Drafted by Wells, concurred in by McBride and Boster, and initialed by White.
1. See Documents 298 and 299.
2. Telegram 58 from Vienna, July 6, reported that Matthews had protested to Kreisky the use by Khrushchev of an Austrian platform to attack the United States, along the lines authorized by telegram 19 to Vienna (see footnote 1, Document 326). (Department of State, Central Files. 033.6163/7–660)
3. On July 10, Raab made a speech over Austrian radio in which he specifically referred to the protests made by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the speech, he defended Austria’s friendship with these countries and with Italy and singled out Chancellor Adenauer as always having been the object of his special friendship. The speech is printed in Mayrzedt and Hummer, eds., 20 Jahre.
4. At a meeting of the Austrian Cabinet on July 12, reported in telegram 120 from Vienna, July 13, Chancellor Raab was authorized to issue a statement rejecting Khrushchev’s stated interpretation of Austrian neutrality and to restate the Austrian conception. (Department of State, Central Files, 763.13/7–1360)
5. Not attached to the source text; it is printed in Mayrzedt and Hummer, eds., 20 Jahre.
6. See Document 326.
7. Telegram 61 from Vienna, July 6, recommended that Dillon complete the trip as planned. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.12-DI/7–660)
8. Matthews’ subsequent recommendation to postpone the trip unless satisfaction was received was transmitted in telegram 75 from Vienna, July 8. (Ibid., 110.12–DI/7–860) Raab’s speech of July 10 (see footnote 3 above) and statement of July 13 (see footnote 4 above) apparently provided adequate satisfaction. Dillon visited Vienna July 14–17, giving a speech before the Foreign Policy Association on July 15. The speech and the communiqué that ended the visit are printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 8, 1960, pp. 215–219. Memoranda of conversation between Kreisky and Dillon, all dated July 15, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1713. The conversations covered European integration and international trade problems, U.S.-Austrian problems, Khrushchev’s visit to Austria, U.S. and Austrian foreign policy, the refugee problem, and the U.S.-Austrian Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty.