285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0
1736. Paris for USCINCEUR, Thurston, Finn and USRO. Joint State/Defense message. Deptel to Bonn 1729.1 Soviet move changing form and style of USMLM passes clearly deliberate attempt to measure willingness of Western powers to accept a role for GDR in relationship between Soviet and Western military commands.
Move is to be seen against backdrop of intensive GDR campaign, abetted by Soviets, to enhance status of regime. But present move has additional crucial significance since it suggests Soviets are testing in advance what might happen if one day attempt were made to create role (however minor at beginning) for GDR in connection with allied military travel on routes of access to and from Berlin.
We thus provided with opportunity to demonstrate convincingly that we will not accede to Soviet-GDR moves designed to start us down path of substitution of GDR authorities for Soviets into relationships which stem from rights and agreements between Soviets and ourselves. Moreover, our refusal to acquiesce in this particular gambit does not contain within it risk of precipitating a major crisis. If, in end, Soviets cannot be brought to correct situation they have created, result of our firmness might force closing of our missions, a step we would regret in view their undoubted value. On other hand, risk of making false political move which endangers whole fabric of Western position much more serious.
Our willingness to accept passes in new form would be difficult precedent to discount if similar introduction of GDR role were to be attempted on access routes. Analogy in principle in both cases quite apt, since issue in both cases involves right of movement of allied military personnel through GDR.
Moreover, our posture at summit2 would be gravely weakened if Soviets successful in current move. Soviets would have gained wrong impression concerning allied willingness to compromise on question of [Page 748] breaking down existing relationship between Soviets and West in Germany.
We propose US, UK and French military commanders send letter to Zakharov along lines reftel. Next step depends on Zakharov reply. We would refuse a lengthy negotiation with Soviets on form and style of passes, limiting our demand to re-institution of passes in old form. If this not forthcoming, we would restrict movements of Soviet liaison mission personnel.
Depending on nature of reply, we would then consider whether diplomatic demarches are indicated prior to taking decision to withdraw Liaison Missions and eject Soviet mission personnel from FedRep. Important consideration here will be to prevent Soviets from maneuvering in a way designed to obscure clear nature of issue presented.
At point at which clear Soviets will not restore passes to old form, we would issue strong statement and launch propaganda campaign to maximize public understanding of issue and advantage gained by demonstration allied firmness.
For London and Paris: Foregoing should be conveyed to FonOff.
For Bonn: Urge British understand that action, to be effective, needs to be taken swiftly.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/2–1160. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Vigderman, cleared with Hillenbrand and the Department of Defense, and approved by Kohler. Also sent priority to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and” London, Paris, and Moscow.↩
- Dated February 10, telegram 1729 to Bonn transmitted the proposed text of a letter to General Zakharov protesting the changes in the passes for the Western Military Liaison Missions. (Ibid., 762.0221/2–1060)↩
- For documentation on the summit conference at Paris in May, see Documents 63 ff.↩