Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, June 17, 1958, 4:22 p.m.

3226. Joint State–Defense message. (A) Unnumbered USMLMtel from Berlin June 16 re McQuail–Winzer meeting; (B) Berlin’s 1353; (C) Bonn’s 3746; (D) Bonn’s 3749.¹

Appreciate Ambassador’s comments Bonn reftel (C) and concur fully (a) that signing bilateral agreement proposed by Winzer would entail serious danger undermining our policy re GDR and (b) that would be preferable rather than accede to agreement to raise return of Army personnel and helicopter again with Soviets in diplomatic channels.

Therefore recommend McQuail be instructed act as follows in June 18 meeting with Winzer:

1. Should begin by reading statement along following lines:

(a) I have documentation from both senior military and senior diplomatic representatives of US in Germany establishing my full authority to deal with this question as representative of US Government. (McQuail should then present both credentials furnished by General Hodes and by Ambassador Bruce; text as suggested Deptel 3208 to Bonn, signature modified as suggested Bonn’s 3733.²FYI. Our only concern re signature was to avoid any reference to Federal Republic.)

(b) I have shown text of your proposed agreement to my superiors and have been instructed to inform you that they regard a document of this nature as entirely unnecessary and abnormal and your insistence on it as an attempt to delay and confuse simple question of returning personnel and aircraft by interjection of procedural difficulties and political issues. Such a document is wholly unacceptable and I have been instructed to refuse to sign it.

(c) I am however ready to meet all normal and reasonable requirements for arranging return of personnel and aircraft. I am today to reimburse here and now and in advance the various items of expense mentioned by you. (Assume arrangements can be made to have McQuail carry cash funds with him and to turn them over to Winzer on the spot. FYI. This approach designed eliminate basis of Winzer’s assertion bilateral agreement necessary to regulate matter. End FYI.)

(d) I or officer receiving personnel at border am prepared give receipt certifying transfer of personnel and aircraft to US control. I have receipt ready. (McQuail should then give Winzer copy of unsigned receipt reading as follows:

“To Whom It May Concern: I hereby acknowledge receipt of one helicopter (insert type, model, etc.) property of the U.S. Army, and of following named personnel of the U.S. Army (insert names).

Signed at___, this___day of June, 1958.

Robert P. McQuail, Col. USA

(or signature any other officer actually accepting turn-over).”)

(e) In conclusion I have been instructed to state that I regard these dilatory tactics re return of personnel and aircraft as inexplicable, unjustifiable, and contrary to normal and reasonable procedures in matters of this type. I therefore trust you will arrange prompt return of personnel and helicopter.

2. If wording of receipt becomes issue McQuail should be authorized make changes such as:

(a) Modification of description of helicopter and personnel as appropriate.

(b) Insertion in body of receipt after “I” and/or, following signature, phrase “duly authorized representative of the U.S. Government”.

(c) To Otto Winzer (or other named individual) instead of “To Whom It May Concern”.

(d) As last resort, and if this is only unsettled issue, use of heading “To Otto Winzer” (or any other name) followed by description of official position such as Deputy Foreign Minister, GDR.

3. If Winzer continues insist on an agreement signed by both sides, McQuail should reiterate any such agreement regarded as unacceptable and unnecessary and should break off discussion without setting date for future meeting.

Ambassador and CINCUSAREUR authorized to modify at their discretion any tactical step within framework above instructions.

We will try inform British French and Germans here today of substance above instructions but since this may not be feasible suggest you inform them as well.

FYI. Consideration being given here to appropriate procedure for raising issue with Soviets in diplomatic channels if McQuail–Winzer discussions do not lead to satisfactory conclusion.³

Dulles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6—1758. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Creel and McKiernan; cleared by Lisle, Kohler, L, and the Department of Defense; and approved by Murphy. Also sent niact to Berlin and USAREUR Heidelberg and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.
1. The USMLM telegram is Document 271. Telegram 1353, June 16, transmitted the text of the three-article draft agreement. (Department of State, Central Files, 762B.5411/6–1658) In telegram 3746, June 17, Ambassador Bruce stated that the point had been reached where the United States should either sign an intergovernmental agreement or break off the discussions and attempt to force the Soviet Union back into the picture. (Ibid., 762B.5411/6–1758) Telegram 3749, June 17, asked for precise instructions on receipt of documentation on the chance that Winzer agreed to accept McQuail’s credentials at their June 18 meeting. (Ibid.)
2. Dated June 14 and 16, respectively. (Ibid., 762B.5411/6–1458 and 762B.5411/6–
3. McQuail and Winzer met again on June 18 and 19, but failed to reach agreement on release of the helicopter and passengers. Winzer insisted that an intergovernmental agreement be signed to effect the release and McQuail rejected the proposal. McQuail reported on these meetings in unnumbered telegrams, June 18 and 19. (Ibid., 762B.5411/6–1859 and 762B.5411/6–1959)