239. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State0
370. Paris for Kohler. From Dowling. I had long (one and one half hours), extremely friendly conversation with Pervukhin this afternoon by appointment. There was no attempt by Vopos to control my entry to East Berlin.
[Page 623]Although Pervukhin insisted throughout talk on sovereignty of GDR, and endeavored to argue that otherwise there was no change in U.S.-Soviet relations in Berlin, conversation afforded me opportunity to insist we relied on our existing agreements with Soviets re Berlin and access thereto, and that drift from status quo through unilateral actions of East German authorities represented increased risk not only to arrangements under which Soviets and Americans had arrived at reasonable degree of “co-existence” in Berlin in period since World War II, but also made more difficult solution to other outstanding problems between two govts.
Main emphasis of Pervukhin’s remarks seemed to be that problems between Soviets and Americans re Berlin and access could always be settled in talks between two of us, provided we paid due regard to GDR sovereignty. In this connection he pointed out that he alone, and not Soviet Commandant in Berlin, was competent in these questions. On other hand, I concentrated on insisting that we held Soviet Union responsible for maintenance normal situation in Berlin and for existing arrangements re access.
Pervukhin himself raised subject of FedRep denunciation of IZT agreement, and to my rejoinder that this action followed East German restrictions on movement within Berlin and interference with traffic to West Germany, argued that GDR measures in no way interfered with Allied access to Berlin.
I replied to this assertion that economic welfare of population of American sector of Berlin was also concern of U.S. Government.
My conclusion is that Soviet authorities, as well as East German regime, have been sobered by countermeasures to date against East German unilateral measures, and that they are most anxious that there be no disruption of trade relations between East and West Germany.
As I was leaving, Pervukhin said he understood there would be no publicity re meeting (his only source for this could have been telephone conversations between Bonn and Berlin). I responded in affirmative, adding that if press became aware of visit and queried me, I would reply that talk concerned difficulties experienced in movement U.S. personnel within and to Berlin. He argued against mention of Berlin, saying it would be sufficient to say we discussed matters of mutual interest. I declined this commitment, but said I hoped that there would be no publicity.
Memo of conversation follows by air pouch.1