Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

191. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/27

Paris, May 19, 1960, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Mr. Hillenbrand
  • Mr. McKiernan
  • Col. Schofield
  • Mr. Dubs
• United Kingdom
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Mr. Hillock
  • Mr. Drinkall
• France
  • M. Laloy
  • M. de Leusse
  • M. Senard
• Federal Republic of Germany
  • Dr. Carstens
  • Ambassador Grewe
  • Dr. Fechter
  • Mr. Rueckriegel

SUBJECT

• A Possible USSR–GDR “Peace Treaty” and Berlin Contingency Planning (Meeting of Working Group on Germany including Berlin)

After thanking the other delegations for their keeping the Germans fully informed of the developments of the past few days, Dr. Carstens stated that Khrushchev may shortly take measures leading to an eventual separate “peace treaty” with the GDR and that it would be useful for the Working Group to exchange views on four points: (1) Can we prevent a separate treaty, (2) What is our legal position regarding such a treaty, (3) What would be the probable consequences of the treaty, and (4) What can we do to prevent unfavorable consequences?

Regarding Soviet intentions, Sir Anthony Rumbold referred to a statement made by Gromyko in his meeting with Lloyd on May 16 [17]¹ indicating that there was no change in the Soviet position. Gromyko had said that conditions might have “matured” for a summit meeting in six or eight months. Meanwhile, Gromyko had continued, the Soviets would systematically follow a policy of reducing tension but if others increased tension the summit would be endangered. In response to Lloyd’s specific question about Soviet intentions regarding a peace treaty, Gromyko had said that the Soviet position remained as expressed by Khrushchev at Baku and that he, Gromyko, had nothing to add to it.

M. Laloy said that preparations for a Warsaw Pact meeting indicated that the satellites had been taken by surprise by summit developments. Mr. Hillenbrand said that we had information which confirmed that this was the case, for example in Hungary.

M. Laloy said that it was evident the Soviets did not want to force the situation just now, but that one could expect them to use the U–2 incident as a point of departure for harassment of Berlin on the grounds that it is a center of intelligence activity. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Sir Anthony Rumbold considered that the West might exploit propagandistically, in order to combat unilateral Soviet action on a peace treaty, Khrushchev’s frequent statements in the past about the need for four-power discussions of a peace treaty, relating them to his statement that no discussions at the summit have yet taken place.

Dr. Carstens expressed doubt that the West could do anything now to deter Khrushchev from concluding a separate peace if he decided to do so, but added that the Germans had been considering the possibility of an indirect approach. For example, some prominent figure like Nehru might be persuaded to tell Khrushchev that Soviet unilateral action could not fail to increase tension. Sir Anthony Rumbold commented that the idea of an approach through Nehru should not be excluded, but that there was also another method. During the forthcoming Security Council discussion of the U–2 incident, the West might introduce a phrase into a resolution calling upon all states to do nothing to increase tension. There was general agreement that there was little hope of dissuading Khrushchev by a direct approach. Dr. Carstens and M. Laloy also emphasized that the Western Powers should not allow themselves to be blackmailed by acting as if a separate peace treaty was dangerous to them.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that we would have a new situation if it was clear that Khrushchev was ready to move ahead, but that a mere statement in his Berlin speech on the following day² to the effect that negotiations for a peace treaty have begun would not necessarily require the approach to the Security Council contemplated in agreed Berlin contingency planning. There was general agreement on this point.

M. Laloy said that the legal arguments with respect to a USSR–FDR peace treaty are strong on the Western side and weak on the Soviet side. Mr. Hillenbrand concurred and stressed the importance of reiterating that a peace treaty cannot extinguish our rights. The Soviets had consistently stated that the peace treaty would have this effect. The US had published a memorandum³ refuting this contention and was prepared to rebut a Soviet counterargument.

Dr. Carstens said there were really two arguments that the Western Powers could make: first, that the treaty would be meaningless since no such state as the GDR exists to negotiate it; and second, that the treaty could not affect Allied rights. M. Laloy and Mr. Rumbold thought the latter argument was the more effective and Mr. Hillenbrand concurred that there was little understanding of the former argument among the neutrals. Dr. Carstens agreed that it might be preferable to concentrate on one strong argument, but added it should be made clear that one part of Germany cannot negotiate for all of Germany.

Dr. Carstens did not consider that the treaty need necessarily involve an immediate change in the access situation, but he thought that it might have an impact on some neutral countries, which might be brought to adhere to it and to recognize the GDR because they would regard the division of Germany as final. He cited Finland and India as examples. Sir Anthony Rumbold said he saw no greater danger of recognition of the GDR after the treaty than before it, for the treaty would not change political circumstances. M. Laloy agreed and said that the difficulties of a German solution had been obvious for some time. Dr. Carstens suggested that in the case of India the Western Powers might tell the Indian Government that it is Khrushchev who is responsible for the failure to reach an agreement on the German question and that he should not be paid a premium, in the form of recognition of the GDR, for his having obstructed a solution. Dr. Carstens considered that it would be better to have the Three Powers rather than the Germans do this.

Sir Anthony Rumbold mentioned that both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Lloyd had discussed the German question during the recent Commonwealth Conference at London.⁴ He believed Nehru understood the Western position. The British had also been briefing the Commonwealth countries in the past few days, and he personally thought that Ghana, for example, understood the Western position. The British were making constant use of the machinery and channels of the Commonwealth for briefing on Germany. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the Three Powers would, of course, do whatever they could in persuading the neutrals not to accept the division of Germany, but he thought that the Germans might be more effective in persuading some of them because of the importance of their economic relations with the Federal Republic. Experience with the Hallstein Document⁵ had been successful. He asked whether the Germans had given any thought as to how a separate peace treaty with the GDR would affect the Federal Republic’s relations with the USSR. Dr. Carstens replied that the idea had not been considered, and that he could not express any views. However, the Federal Republic would make its case forcibly to the USSR through diplomatic channels. M. Laloy said that the French had also briefed the French Community on the German question, stressing the absence of a real German solution rather than the question of recognition of the GDR. The French had found that the political arguments were better understood than the legal ones.

Dr. Carstens said that he wished to raise a matter which he understood President Eisenhower had mentioned during the meeting of the Western Heads of Government,⁶ namely, what we would do if civilian access to Berlin were hindered. M. Laloy replied that it had been agreed at yesterday’s Foreign Ministers’ meeting⁷ that planning for this contingency should be undertaken on an urgent basis, with attention, for example, to the question whether there were economic counter-measures which the Federal Republic might take. Sir Anthony Rumbold added that the Ministers had agreed that the appropriate response would be selective economic counter-measures, the burden of which would fall most heavily on the Federal Republic. Dr. Carstens agreed that the possibility of economic counter-measures should be studied, but he expressed doubts about the effectiveness which they might have on the GDR in view of the great development of the East German economy since the blockade.

M. Laloy said that it had been agreed that planning would be initiated at Washington where the overall question of counter-measures would be studied, but that the details regarding their application in Germany would be planned at Bonn. The State Department would call the meeting in Washington soon to get discussion of this question started. Sir Anthony Rumbold said that the first job would probably be to determine what form harassment might take. Ambassador Grewe commented that cold economic warfare against West Berlin is already going on. For example, the GDR has blacklisted certain West Berlin firms and refuses to document shipments for them for passage through the Soviet Zone. He said it would be hard to apply counter-measures in interzonal trade in such a case, for the procedure under which shipments to and from Berlin, on which West-Berlin depends, is a part of the interzonal trade system.

Dr. Carstens said there had been some consideration in the German Foreign Office of the question whether a treaty might be concluded between the Western or all the NATO powers and the Federal Republic if the Soviets made a separate peace treaty with the GDR. The treaty with the Federal Republic would not be a peace treaty, but rather one in which the signatories would undertake: (1) the obligation to do everything possible to obtain a just peace treaty for Germany based on the principle of self-determination, (2) not to conclude a peace treaty with any separate part of Germany, and (3) not to recognize the validity of any peace treaty concluded with a part of Germany. Other states would then be asked to accede. There would thus be a counter-pressure on the neutrals which would enable them more effectively to resist Soviet pressures to get them to accede to the Soviet-GDR peace treaty. M. Laloy and Sir Anthony Rumbold expressed strong reservations about the idea of such a treaty. They pointed out that the Western Powers had already undertaken obligations of precisely this sort, that these obligations were well-known, and that the new treaty with the Federal Republic, coming as it would together with a separate USSR–GDR treaty, would inevitably be regarded as a separate peace treaty itself. The resulting confusion might only weaken the Western position with respect to the peace treaty. Dr. Carstens said that these objections had been expressed by some of his colleagues, and he was inclined to agree with them. Mr. Hillenbrand inquired whether the suggested treaty would have any function except as an attempt to neutralize the neutrals. Dr. Carstens replied that it could also re-emphasize common Western policies on Germany. M. Laloy said that in his opinion the statements which the Western Powers would make if the Soviets should conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR should be sufficient to accomplish these purposes.

Dr. Carstens inquired whether there would be any possibility of the group’s meeting once more in case Khrushchev’s Berlin speech indicated that serious trouble were imminent, but the meeting concluded without any clear understanding on this point.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by McKiernan on May 20 and cleared by Hillenbrand. The meeting took place at the Quai d’Orsay. A summary of this meeting was transmitted in Secto 48 from Paris, May 19 at 6 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, 762.00/5–1960)
1. See Document 179.
2. For extracts of Khrushchev’s speech in Berlin on May 20, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 433–434.
3. See vol. VIII, Document 118.
4. The Commonwealth Conference met in London at the beginning of May.
5. Regarding the March 16, 1959, report by Walter Hallstein on economic cooperation in Europe, see vol. VII, Part 1, Document 52.
6. See Document 185.
7. See Document 181–183.