Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

187. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Paris, May 18, 1960, 5–6:20 p.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • President Eisenhower
  • Secretary Herter
  • Secretary Gates
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Kohler
  • Colonel Walters
• United Kingdom
  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Sir Gladwyn Jebb
  • Mr. de Zulueta
• France
  • President De Gaulle
  • Prime Minister Debre
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville(note takers, interpreters)

SUBJECT

• Report to NATO: Berlin; Disarmament

President De Gaulle opened the meeting by saying that there was a serious question now—whether photographs should be taken of the meeting. The President indicated his agreement, asking whether a fourth chair should be left vacant! On investigation by Couve de Murville it was found the photographers were not yet ready so the picture taking was postponed until later.

President De Gaulle then opened the meeting proper by saying that the Heads of Government had asked the Foreign Ministers to meet, and proposing that they now be asked to report as to the results of their meeting.

Couve de Murville, who had been designated as spokesman by the Foreign Ministers, reported that they had met this morning and again this afternoon to examine three questions. First was the question of reporting to NATO. This was simple and it had been decided that the Foreign Ministers would meet with NAC at 11 o’clock tomorrow and report to them fully and exactly what had happened. The two other questions were Berlin and disarmament. With respect to Berlin the Foreign Ministers had discussed what to do if communications were disrupted, especially in connection with the conclusion of a separate peace treaty by the Soviet bloc with the GDR. Contingency planning had been going on for some time and the Foreign Ministers had asked the experts to meet and review this planning in the light of present circumstances. The experts had submitted a report. Subject to reservation as to the circumstances which might prevail and to government decisions to be taken at the time, the report indicated that contingency planning was generally in satisfactory shape and the Foreign Ministers had confirmed its applicability. However additional planning would be required, particularly in two fields. In the event of a threat of disruption of allied communications the question arose as to the action which might be taken in the United Nations. This question had been studied and would be further studied in Washington. The second question was related to that which had been raised in the Heads of Government meeting by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, being connected with the problem of the supply to the civilian population of West Berlin in the event of a rupture of communications. This could become a difficult problem. It presented a complicated issue which would have to be considered in detail in cooperation with the Germans whose participation would be needed both for the counter measures which might be taken, mainly against the GDR, and for logistic and financial support of the effort to supply the population of West Berlin.

Finally, M. Couve de Murville said, the Foreign Ministers had reviewed the disarmament situation. They had agreed that the Ten Power Meeting in Geneva should be resumed on June 7 unless something new should happen before that time which would call for reconsideration. Consequently, it had been agreed that the five Western participants would meet in Geneva on May 30 to consider and prepare the Western positions.

President De Gaulle then reviewed the Foreign Ministers’ report. As regards NATO, he said, this was a matter of routine business to inform the members of NATO what did—or what did not—happen at the Paris meetings. As regards Berlin he referred to the measures which were to be taken in case of a disruption of communications to supply the civilian population of West Berlin and inquired what kind of measures the Ministers had in mind.

M. Couve de Murville said this problem had two aspects. First was the question of the stocks in Berlin, and, second, the means of transport of supplies to Berlin from the FRG. Both aspects must be considered. At present stocks of foodstuff were sufficient for about six months and it should be considered whether anything further needed to be done. As regards transport, in the last resort in the event of a complete blockade the only feasible means of supply would be by airlift. However this would not be as easy as it was twelve years ago since Berlin had a larger population and much higher requirements.

President De Gaulle then asked a question with respect to the counter measures contemplated, to which the French Foreign Minister replied that these would be economic measures which could be applied mainly against the GDR.

President Eisenhower said he thought the great problem that we would face would be a succession of little events, annoying but none important or dramatic enough in itself to arouse public opinion. Such tactics would pose very difficult problems. The allies would never be able to take strong measures unless the free world could be brought to recognize that an injustice was being done. We would be up against the necessity of making a decision “either to fish or cut bait,” but in a situation where the world might not understand. This seemed to indicate, he continued, in the light of the experiences of the last few days, that the three powers should be much closer together not only as regards specific problems but as regards the clearing away of smaller problems between themselves which sometimes distracted their attention from the main problem which probably for some time would be the question of Berlin. In this situation the three powers must speak with one voice.

President de Gaulle agreed that the situation would probably not be that of an actual blockade but more likely harassment, in which case economic counter measures would probably be the most effective means of acting against the GDR. He inquired whether the Foreign Ministers had considered any specific measures of this kind.

M. Couve de Murville replied that the Foreign Ministers had a rough idea but that the experts had not yet studied the problem in detail because they had worked mainly on the question of allied communications and focused particularly on the question of disruption of those. Prime Minister Debre commented that even in this case it might be that economic measures would be the more effective.

The French Foreign Minister resumed by pointing out the further factor that allied communications are guaranteed by agreements with the Soviets which provide some basis for action while all the civilian traffic between the FRG and Berlin is under control of the East German authorities.

President de Gaulle then noted that two years ago when Khrushchev first made his threat to Berlin the three governments had agreed to a whole series of measures which could be taken immediately and inquired as to the status of these. To this M. Couve de Murville replied that these measures had been reviewed. President de Gaulle then resumed, saying again that, if we were not faced with an abrupt crisis, economic measures would probably be the best.

President Eisenhower agreed that the Working Groups needed to consider all possible measures to ensure the supply and health of West Berlin.

President de Gaulle then referred to the Foreign Ministers report with respect to disarmament, mentioning the meeting of the Ten to resume in Geneva on June 7. Secretary Herter observed that the five Western Powers would meet a week before. General de Gaulle then asked if the President or the Prime Minister had any new proposals on disarmament or whether they were standing on their established positions. The President indicated that the latter was the case as far as he was concerned.

Prime Minister Macmillan commented that he understood that a paper was being worked on by the disarmament experts in an attempt to harmonize the positions of all three.

President de Gaulle then referred to the current Paris meetings and the crisis which had arisen in connection with them. He said that while this had been rather bad, perhaps the meetings had not been entirely unprofitable. The three were perhaps clearer as regards the future and as regards their relationship with the USSR. Perhaps the future was a little clearer also as respects Khrushchev. President de Gaulle had the impression that these meetings had not exactly benefited Mr. Khrushchev’s own position. On the other hand, he thought that the three Allies had displayed wisdom and firmness. He thought that this had had a good effect not only so far as they themselves were concerned but with respect also to others.

The President stated that he did not know what the future might hold. It might be that this would be the last meeting of the three while he was still President of the United States. If it were the last, he wanted to say that it had been a great privilege to work with two such colleagues and to express his esteem and admiration, and even affection, toward them.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that he associated himself with the remarks of the President. He wanted to express his thanks to President de Gaulle for the way he had presided over their meetings. There had been some disappointments, but he wanted to thank President de Gaulle for the way he had brought them through these disappointments. He believed that the experience had brought the three much closer.

President de Gaulle then terminated the meeting by saying goodbye to both “mes amis.”

At this point the photographers finally descended on the meeting room en masse.¹

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and approved by S and the White House. The conversation took place at the Elysée Palace. See also Document 188. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Cahto 12 from Paris, May 19 at 9 p.m. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–1960) For McMillan’s account of this meeting, see Pointing the Way, p. 212.

1. As the President was leaving the Elysée Palace, he and De Gaulle continued the conversation along the following lines:

   “The President said that in respect to this closer consultation between France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, they should be able to set up an effective mechanism without having recourse to large ponderous machinery.

   “General de Gaulle agreed, and said that it was important to set up something permanent that would operate effectively on a long-term basis. With the close friendship existing between the Chief of Government of the three nations at the present time, things would be easy, but they must set up something that would work on a permanent basis whoever the principals might be. General de Gaulle said, ‘With us it is easy; you and I are tied together by history.’

   “The President said that this was true and that he was confident that appropriate means to maintain this close contact could be found.

   “General de Gaulle said that within the next few weeks he would write both the President and Mr. Macmillan and make specific proposals in this respect.

   “The President said that he would also like to be able to give his ideas on this subject to General de Gaulle, and the General agreed.

   “General de Gaulle said that he had not seen the President to thank him for the wonderful welcome he had received in the United States.

   “The President asked how Madame De Gaulle was, and the General said she was very well, but she had kept on the sidelines during the Summit Conference; but he wished the President to know how much he and Madame De Gaulle had enjoyed seeing the President and Mrs. Eisenhower in Washington. If he might say so, they represented a family which was the way families ought to be and this was true of John and Barbara also.

   “The President thanked General de Gaulle for his words, and said that later this year he was going to make two major speeches. One would be concerning the family as the basic element of Western civilization, and the other would relate to the necessity of not growing soft. He would be close to the end of his term, and therefore these speeches might have a greater impact than if he had made them earlier in his term.

   “The President said he felt that the meeting in Paris had not been a complete failure, because he felt that the unity of the West was perhaps now stronger than ever before.

   “General de Gaulle agreed with this completely.

   “The President then took his leave of General de Gaulle, who accompanied him to the door of the Elysée.” (Memorandum of conversation, May 18; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)